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The introduction of fault tolerance into real-time systems presents particular challenges because of the 
price of redundancy and the added complexity of verification and validation on these redundant structures. 
This thesis brings structural and formal design techniques to bear on this problem. 
Verification of fault tolerance properties in such systems has only received limited attention. in particular 
the design methodologies are in their infancy. We propose a transformational design methodology, spe-
cific to a real-time systems architecture. We then reason about the compositional addition of fault tolerant 
components and templates of the derived designs. This requires that we show the existing axiomatic se-
mantics for our chosen architecture sound with respect to a more constructive semantic model. The issues 
of presenting an operational model for a real-time architecture are discussed and a model is proposed. The 
extension of the existing semantics, to allow for faulty behaviour, is shown to preserve the existing semantic 
properties and the application of our methodology shown to be usable by a sizeable study. 
The contribution of this thesis is to define a transformational design methodology in which components can 
be extracted from a design and replaced by another component preserving functionality while providing 
fault tolerance. This approach requires the precise modelling of the faults we consider. the transformational 
method and verification of the transformed design with respect to faults. 
CHAPTERl. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Despite the wide spread awareness of the importance of fault tolerance and dependability, many industrial-
strength, real-time systems have stopped short of exploiting even well-known fault tolerance techniques. 
Missile systems fall into this category of systems in so far as the UK defence industries are concerned. The 
primary reason for this situation is the consequence of the constraints that are normally placed on missile 
systems. These constraints are two-fold. 
First comes the space constraint which discourages the deployment of redundant processors or power sup-
ply; any extra space is likely to be used up by processors with software that can provide highly sophisticated 
functions. Non-redundant power supply also mitigates against processor replication since a chain can only 
be as strong as its weakest link. Secondly, there is the timeliness constraint. Missile systems are basically 
control systems. This means that there are hard deadlines within which the targets have to be identified and 
their co-ordinates correctly estimated based on the radar data. 
Despite these constraints, efforts are being made to incorporate fault tolerance in missile systems due 
mainly to the growing importance placed on the UK Ministry of Defence regulations [Min99, Min97, 
Min96] on ordnance safety and reliability. Decreasing size and cost of hardware components and the 
increasing power and speed of such devices also motivate such efforts. The work reported here is a part of 
the on-going work being carried out to make the legacy missile systems of MBDA UK more fault tolerant 
without violating the timeliness constraints. 
The work is simultaneously motivated towards future system design, where it is feared people may shy 
away from applying fault tolerant strategies to real-time systems because of the perceived complexity and 
the lack of a sound engineering basis to help master the complexity. This work aims to provide such a sound 
engineering basis for fault tolerance strategies in a particular class of Real-Time Networks, and explore its 
utility. 
1.2 Contribution 
In this section we first describe the ultimate aim of our research and work backwards from this to determine 
the subgoals that must be achieved. We thereby introduce the main threads of the work in the thesis and 
identify the specific contributions in each thread. 
1.2.1 Structure 
Our goal is to provide a framework supporting (i) the transformation of existing real-time system designs 
to introduce tolerance of specified faults and (ii) the argument that the transformed design satisfies its 
original specification, extended with the specified faults. In order to achieve this goal, we must provide 
(i) a transformation design methodology based upon some design notation; (ii) a design notation that is 
capable of specifying fault tolerant techniques; (iii) a sound semantic model to reason upon and (iv) a 
specification of the faults we wish to tolerate. 
The specific real-time system architecture that is used in this study is that of RealTIme Networks (RTNs). 
A real-time network is a system of concurrent processes that can only communicate via defined, explicit 
2 
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paths. RTNs are described using the Real Time Network Specification Language (RTN-SL). a formal speci-
fication and design language covering the behaviour of RTNs in both the value and time domains. RTN-SL 
has been designed to be integrated into the MASCOT-3 design notation [loMJ87] which is used within 
MBDA. The RTN-SL is compatible with the process interaction protocols developed by MBDA [Sim03] 
and subsumes the Activity Description Language (ADL) [pAHoo], the formal specification language de-
veloped for describing the behaviour of the individual activities in RTNs. RTN-SL has a formal definition 
of syntax given in VDM-SL [LHP+96] and a formal axiomatic semantics given by means of a semantic 
function il taking RTN-SL designs to sets of axioms expressed in Real-time logic (RTL). This allows us 
to verify designs against specifications expressed in RTL. In order to support our goal of fault-tolerant 
design in RTN-SL, we need to extend the languages syntax and semantics with features to facilitate the 
specification of fault-tolerant techniques. 
Given that there exists a specification language for RTNs for which it is possible to reason that some design 
satisfies some specification, we must consider the implications of adding the ability to describe faulty 
behaviours to the design methodology. Suppose we have a RTN-SL design D that purportedly satisfies 
some specification spec. We write this as 
Dsat spec 
We identify potential faulty behaviours and wish to define a transformation from D to a fault tolerant 
version Drr that satisfies some weaker specification specf that allows for the behaviours of faults. We wish 
to show 
Drr sat speCJ 
In order to achieve this we require: 
• A means of describing the transformation D to Drr. The work required to achieve this is described 
further in Section 1.2.2 
• A means of specifying the faulty behaviours to be tolerated in specf. This is described further in 
Section 1.2.3 
• A means of showing the correctness of the design transformation with respect to the extended spec-
ification specf' for which we require a sound semantic basis for RTN-SL taking account of faulty 
components. The work required to achieve this described further in Section 1.2.4. We term this 
semantic basis ilf . 
Figure 1.1 illustrates this aim and its immediate subgoals. Each of the leaf nodes are described further 
below and outline either the technologies we utilize or the contributions of work we make. 
An underlying principle of our work will be the use of formal methods. This is intende to bring significant 
benefits to the work. First, it will strengthen the argument that there is a sound basis to the engineering 
approach advocated. Second, and more importantly, it will support rigorous, repeatable analysis. Formali-
sation will help to reduce ambiguity and provide a basis from which to present and discuss our work. The 
requirement for a formal argument is called for in the MoD Standard, 00-55 [Min97] which has informed 
the development of many of the systems to which we hope our work will be applicable. The standard 
requires of a formal method: 
3 
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D-+ DFT soundn, spec, 
Figure 1.1: First level overview 
A software specification and production method, based on mathematics, that comprises: 
a collection of mathematical notations addressing the specification, design and development 
processes of software production; a well-founded logical inference system in which formal 
verification proofs and proofs of other properties can be formulated; and a methodological 
framework within which software may be developedfrom the specification in aformally veri-
table manner. [Min97] 
Each of the three subgoals identified so far has a strand of work reported in the thesis. In the following 
sections, we describe the work to be done in each strand. 
1.2.2 Design Transformation 
Numerous design methods exist that enable the stepwise development of real-time systems [8SS94, U92]. 
MASCOT-3, which uses RTN-SL as its specification language, is one such. At a network level, one can 
first identify the concurrent components and the communication paths between them. Furthermore, the 
nature of the communication can be identified, and this specifies the nature of the asynchrony or synchrony 
between components. From a RTN-SL specification, the designer is free to choose a design or implemen-
tation structure. Common design patterns are known [80r98] and are left to a designer to apply correctly 
and at will in any scenario. No methodology exists either for modifying existing designs to apply well 
known solutions to common issues, such as jitter control in a real-time system, or in applying fault tolerant 
solutions. We therefore require a methodological solution to allow for a transformational method to apply 
pre-defined design templates, for both common design patterns and fault tolerance strategies. 
1.2.2.1 Suitability of Graph Grammars as transformational method 
We propose to use graph grammars to define design templates, particularly of fault tolerance strategies, to 
support the transformation of RTN-SL designs to more tolerant designs for a specified fault hypothesis. 
A RTN-SL design would be represented by a graph whose nodes represent the components of the RTN 
and whose links represent the control or data flows between components. The transformations defined by 
production rules in the graph grammar remove a node, or group of nodes, from a host design and replaces 
it with a new arrangement. The existing connections from the host design to the removed components are 
replaced with new ones, as specified by the production rule. Each production rule may have an associated 
context restriction, limiting its application to only those situations to which the transformation is deemed 
appropriate. 
4 
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The goal of our work in this strand is to use graph grammars to define a compositional methodology which 
restrains the effect on the design to those components, or sub-systems, being transformed and should assist 
in the verification of the transformed design. 
1.2.3 Faults in RTNs 
Modelling and reasoning about faults has not yet been considered in the development of RTN-SL. There are 
three principal reasons for this. First, the past experience of real-time system designers within the UK De-
fence Industry emphasises correctness by construction over fault tolerance. The past trend to use bespoke 
components further supports this. However trends towards the use of off-the-shelf (arS) components is 
tending to change this, and the need to tolerate component failures that may be outside a designers control 
must now be considered. As a result, faults have rerely been considered and are therefore an unknown 
entity. We have noted approaches in other real-time systems, notably those of a time-triggered architec-
ture (ITA) [SHS+97], but the RTN-SL approach to modelling events has not to date considered erroneous 
events. RTN-SL is still in its infancy and does not yet have a mature design methodology. Considering 
faults is yet another extension, which is expected to necessitate changes to the RTN-SL language semantics. 
The goal of our work in this strand is to provide a way of specifying faulty behaviours which can be 
combined with specifications of normal behaviours so that the combination can be shown to be satisfied by 
some more tolerant design. 
1.2.4 Soundness 
Central to our thesis is a solid semantic framework. Although there already exists an axiomatic semantic for 
RTNs, .Q [Pay02], it remains to be shown sound. We first extend the axiomatic semantics to accommodate 
the language extensions necessary to permit the design of fault-tolerance mechanisms and attempt to show 
that this extension to the existing axiomatic semantics is a conservative one which preserves the properties 
of the original terms. We then show soundness of the axiomatic semantics, using an operational semantic 
model. 
1.2.4.1 Axiomatic Semantics 
The axiomatic semantics gives the meaning of a model (specification or design) by giving the properties 
that characterise the meaning. For example, the axiomatic semantics for RTNs states that, if a read occurs 
on an IDA, then a write must have occurred to the same IDA previously. It is known that the main out-
standing work on the RTN-SL axiomatic semantics is to prove it sound with respect a more constructive 
semantics. This would contribute to the confidence in the consistency of the axioms, and help convince the 
wider community of the soundness of the RTN-SL approach, and its suitability for use on safety-critical 
and mission-critical systems. However, it has been unclear how to define an operational or denotational 
semantics for RTNs [Pay02]. 
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gragra RTN-S'-i 
i 
RTN-SL SOS 
Figure 1-2: Overiew of each goal 
1.2.4.2 Operational 
An operational semantics is a set of rules which provide a more constructive framework, specifying how 
the state of an actual or hypothetical computer changes while executing a program_ We choose a specific 
form of operational semantics called structural operational semantics (SOS) [Pl081, Plo03] because of its 
intuitive appeal and flexibility, and because SOS has found considerable application in the study of the 
semantics of concurrent processes_ A SOS characterises the meaning of a program by defining a labelled 
transition system, whose transitions are between program or system states. We later show the additional 
axioms to the RTN-SL language are new transitions. 
Our goals for this strand of work are first to specify an operational semantic model for RTNs and then 
to derive proof tactics in which to show an axiomatic semantics is sound with respect to the operational 
semantics. 
1.2.5 Summary 
From the overall aims of this thesis and the sub-goals identified above, it should be clear that several 
contributions will be made to complete the thesis. Each of these contributions are separated into individual 
threads of work and brought together to achieve our aim: to reason that a transformed design does still 
satisfy the original specification given some set of fault definitions. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the underlying technologies used for each thread or work, or further sub-goals that 
must, in turn, be achieved. 
1.3 Thesis Argument 
We assert that classical fault tolerance strategies can be incorporated into RTNs using a transformational 
approach in such a way that the the transformations preserve the required functionality and provide toler-
ance to a specified set of faults_ The aim is to provide a semantic framework to support reasoning about 
these transformations_ 
Practitioners use a range of design methodologies to model critical real-time systems. For many appli-
cations, these methods must have a well-defined syntax and semantics_ Practitioners must also have the 
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ability to conduct safety assessments over these models, such as fault tree and failure mode analyses. Most 
of the above have tool support, however do not have a framework to relate the results of one into the other. 
for example, identifying a critical fault then suggesting a design pattern to tolerate it. 
We argue that transformations, expressed over a graph grammar syntax, do integrate hypothetical fault 
analysis and design techniques. Further, providing a semantic framework allows to reason about such 
emergent properties, such as fault tolerance. Such transformations are constrained to respect the well-
formed ness of designs and their design language principles. 
We also argue that extending the existing semantics to make faults explicit, does not violate existing prop-
erties of a design. 
To substantiate our argument, we do the following: 
• Specify first the abstract definition of faults, then the definition of each plausible fault with respect 
to each RTN components; 
• Develop a (context-sensitive) graph grammar to facilitate the transformations we propose; 
• Construct an operational semantics for RTNs and argue that the existing axiomatic semantics is sound 
with respect to the operational model, therefore validating the assertion all results shown previously 
are valid; 
• Demonstrate the methodology of transforming an existing RTN-SL design to a more fault tolerant 
one given a set of hypothetical faults using material supplied by practitioners, showing the formal 
arguments for the fault tolerance are sound. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured into four parts: Premilinaries, Semantic Descriptions, Towards Tolerance and Eval-
uation. These four parts fit with the described overview and reflect the approach taken in this thesis. Part 
II explores the existing semantic descriptions for RTNs. faults and fault tolerance. whilst Part III illustrates 
through a case study how design transformations can be achieved using a graph grammar. Part IV evaluates 
the work and asses whether we have achieved our overal goal. 
Part I includes Chapter Two, where we provide an overview of the existing literature definitions of faults 
and fault tolerance. For the readers orientations, we outline the RTN-SL specification language for RTNs: 
its features and graphical syntax. A hypothetical safety analysis technique is reviewed, for examining the 
effects of each fault class at each components interface, a process which forms the 'fault hypothesis' for 
a design. Chapter Three briefly introduces a graph grammar approach to design transformations, then 
outlines a 24-rule grammar for RTNs. This grammar satisfies two requirements: First, all well-formed 
RTNs are reachable from the grammar's initial graph, secondly, classical fault tolerant strategies can be 
applied to existing or on-going designs in a compositional manner. 
Part II contains Chapters Four and Five which define the semantic framework required to support the 
rigorous arguments presented as our case study in Chapter Eight. Chapter Four specifies the definition 
of faults we consider plausible for RTNs, then propose an extension to the existing axiomatic semantics 
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for RTNs. Chapter Five proposes the first attempt at giving RTNs an operational semantics which is the 
used in Chapter Six to argue the existing, then the extended, axiomatic semantics sound with respect the 
operational model. 
The fault tolerant templates we propose are documented in Chapter Seven, which begins Part III, and their 
applicability demonstrated in Chapter Eight, which features a case study that illustrates the applicability 
of our methodology by applying the fault tolerant templates from Chapter Seven to tolerate a subset of the 
faults identified in Chapter Four. 
We conclude the thesis in Part IV withChapter Nine which presents conclusions drawn from the thesis 
and the extent to which work in the previous chapters supports our thesis argument. A number of areas for 
possible future work are also highlighted. 
Appendix A presents the complete PVS specification of our case study example, both the PVS model and 
the theorems and their proofs which demonstrate the transformed design is tolerant to the faults consid-
ered. Appendix B presents the complete soundness argument for the axiomatic semantics with respect the 
operational model. 
Appendix C is a complete presentation of the SOS rules for RTN-SL, accompanied by their embedding 
in a VDM-SL model to syntax and type check each rule and an investigation into the implementation 
issues of the concurrent, non-deterministic operational semantics. Appendix D concludes with the entire 
presentation of the RTN-SL graph grammar. 
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In this chapter, we outline the existing work on faults, fault tolerance and fault-treatment which is applicable 
to real-time systems and to a design transformation methodology. Section 2.1 details and classifies the 
fault specifications we consider. Section 2.3 describes classical principles of fault tolerance with which to 
correct a system exhibiting faults. Existing approaches are surveyed in Section 2.3.2 where we examine 
how faults, and more importantly fault tolerance, is formalised. We look at how one rea~ons that first, a 
fault tolerant system design is functionally equivalent to its non-fault tolerant counterpart, and secondly, 
that it has the fault tolerant characteristics (or behaviour) it claims. Section 2.4 looks at our target design 
method, Real-Time Networks, for which we begin the first investigations of faults of the design method. 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND - FAULTS, FAULT TOLERANCE AND FAULT TREATMENT 
Section 2.2 suggests a hypothetical design analysis technique to draw a fault hypothesis from a system 
design. The results of this analysis can then either prompt a re-design or suggest the use of some standard 
fault tolerance strategies, presented as design templates, which can be applied as transformations to the 
analysed design. A methodology for such transformations is suggested in Section 2.5.2 
We conclude this chapter by highlighting the scope and motivation for the work described in subsequent 
chapters. 
2.1 Faults 
This section does not deal with faults in RTNs per se but is aimed at giving informal but precise definitions 
of faults in computing systems. It is a summary of the work undertaken within the "Reliable and Fault 
Tolerant Computing" scientific and technical community [ES85, Cri85, LA90, Lap92) which strives to 
propose clear and widely acceptable definitions for basic fault tolerance concepts. 
2.1.1 System Structure 
The advantage of developing a simple system model is to provide a basic framework with respect to which 
various aspects of structure, design and fault tolerance can be examined. More importantly, this examina-
tion can be independent of whether hardware or software systems, or sub-components of either, are being 
considered. We proceed by describing our simple system model. 
First, the notion of a system should be given a more precise meaning - a system is an identifiable mechanism 
which maintains a pattern of behaviour at an interface between the mechanism and its environment. An 
interface exists at the system boundary at which interaction between two systems occurs. A system is 
said to interact with its environment and responds to stimuli at the interface between the system and the 
environment. It is not the system which constrains the interaction but the interface [dHOI). Consider, for 
example, a division system with inputs x and y and an output z. Whilst a system description may be 
x E Rl\y E R\ {O} => z =x/y 
which asserts that "if the environment provides proper inputs, then the system produces the desired result", 
an interface description may be 
x E Rl\y E R\ {O} I\z=x/y 
which asserts that "the environment provides proper inputs and the system produces the desired result". 
Requiring the interface, between an environment or system and components, to be constant provides for 
a compositional design methodology. From this, we can reason about each component in a black-box 
approach to derive system properties which allows that a component may be replaced by alternative ones 
which provide the same service at their common interfaces. Such a requirement is a common assumption 
of many object-oriented design approaches. 
The environment of a system is considered as yet another system which provides input to and receives 
output from the first system; thus the system can provide a service in response to requests from the envi-
ronment. The external behaviour of a system can be described in terms of a finite set of states, the external 
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states of the system. At discrete instants of time the system makes a transition from one external state to 
another, and thus moves through a sequence of external states which generate externally observable events. 
Thus, a system maintains behaviour at the interface between the system and its environment 
Systems implement their service (which exhibits the behaviour required by the specification) by using 
the services of other systems and components. A system, u depends on a system/component, r if the 
correctness of u's behaviour depends on the correctness of r's behaviour. If a system depends on lower-
level systems/components to correctly provide its service, then a failure of a certain type at a lower level 
of abstraction can result in a failure of a different type at the higher level of abstraction [Cri9l J. A failure 
behaviour can be classified only with respect to a certain specification, at a certain level of abstraction 
[Cri94). 
Imposing structure is the basis for controlling complexity and hence is the basis of methodologies for 
designing and constructing both hardware and software systems. 
System Model 
We have so far characterised systems in terms of their interactions with their environment. but we must 
address the issue of what a system is by stipulating the way in which systems are built up from their 
constituent parts: 
• A system is defined to consist of a set of components which interact under the control of a design 
[LA90). 
A component of a system is yet another system 1. Thus, a system contains a set of component sub-systems. 
which cooperate so that their composed activity generates the external behaviour desired of the system. 
The external behaviour of a system is therefore the manifestation of internal activity within the system. 
The internal state of a system is defined to be the ordered set of the external states of its components; the 
external state of a system is viewed simply as an abstraction of its internal states. 
In general. the design must ensure that each component receives as input an appropriate subset of the 
outputs of all the other components. Furthermore. the design is responsible for channelling system input to 
their components, and also for generating the system output as an abstraction of the component outputs. 
As an example, the alternating bit protocol [BSW69), extended with timers. is a simple way to achieve 
communication over a medium that may lose messages. Consider the duplex communication medium of 
Figure 2.1, where A and M are media with potential faults2• We now consider, in tum, each concept set out 
before and discuss in terms of our example. 
The system, Sys in Figure 2.1 is indicated by the outer rectangular box which has as its interface commu-
nication ports in and out for input from and output to its environment respectively. The components of 
Sys are S, R, A and M collectively which each interact to provide the system's service. Sys is itself the 
environment to these sub-components. 
IGiving recursive definitions is not for recursion's sake. Rather, the aim is to emphasise relativity with respect to the adopted 
viewpoint. 
2We will discuss afault hypothesis later. 
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Sys 
A 
in out 
M 
Figure 2.1: Duplex communication medium 
2.1.2 Specification and Design 
We first describe the notion of a system's specification and design and the relation between the two which 
then permits us to express the notion of erroneous transitions and states with a system and the specification 
thereof. 
System Specification 
Specification, according to [Bra03], is: 
... the invention and definition of a behaviour of a solution system such that it will produce 
the required effects in the problem domain. 
The definitions of faults and failures must be given with respect to a specification of acceptable behaviour 
for a system. Given the fundamental role played by specifications, it is appropriate to describe the desirable 
properties of a specification. We focus on timeliness and expected values, typical properties used in the 
literature [ES85], which are appropriate to specifying component faults (c.f. Section 2.1.3). A specification 
for a system should be consistent, complete and authoritative, and can be applied as an effective test in all 
cases to determine the correctness of an implementation. The need for consistency in a specification is 
obvious. Further, a specification should be complete so that the behaviour of the system is defined for all 
possible inputs. 
A specification of acceptable behaviour provides a standard against which the behaviour of the system can 
be judged: 
• A failure of a system occurs when the behaviour of the system deviates from that required by its 
specification [LA90]. 
Clearly it is necessary to be able to stipulate what constitutes a deviation from specifications; it is only 
possible when the specification is complete and correct. The specification of a black box component is 
restricted to the externally visible events. Therefore, any deviation from a specification must be described 
using externally visible events. 
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System Design 
A design, according to [Bra03], is: 
the decomposition of a system into its actual structural components for the purpose of 
constructing it. 
The design should be an informative system description, faithful to the specification, but avoiding irrel-
evant implementation detail. It should serve as a basis for discussions between the client, designer and 
implementor, and support objective analysis. Although identifying the structural components in a design. 
further implementation detail may be unavoidable given input from the customer. However. making such 
decisions in the design may lead to designfai/ures which introduce, at an early stage, a fault in the design. 
which may lead to a failure, which is not detected until unit or system testing. 
Casual Analysis of system failure 
Having defined a system in terms of its external and internal behaviour, we will adopt the work of Lee 
and Anderson [LA90] in analysing and naming the causes of system failures. Recall that when the system 
specification is authoritative, it need not be challenged and therefore the examination of the causes of 
system failures need only concern the internal operations of the system, i.e. the composition of the internal 
components. From our example (shown in Figure 2.1) the system Sys is made up of four components S. 
R, A, and M which interact under the control of design D. Let the external state transition of Sys from 
EI to E2 constitute correct behaviour and be caused by the internal state transitions through the states 
Sl ,S2,.·. ,S;_I ,s;, ... ,Sn' 
Suppose that the system fails by changing its external state from EI to E2 instead of E2. Two concepts are 
needed to discuss the causes of this failure: first, an event has occurred within the system which should 
not have occurred; secondly, the occurrence of that event gave rise to a condition or state which should not 
have arisen. Ifthe system had moved through the states Sl, S2, . .. ,S;_I, S;, . .. ,Sn, the failure would not have 
happened. Therefore, at some stage, the internal state transition must have diverged from that sequence. 
Let us say that the transition from S;_I proceeded to I; instead of going to S;. Thus, the transition from Si-I 
to I; is the first step towards system failure, and will be called an erroneous transition. Let the transition 
from EI to E2 be caused by the internal state transition Sl ,S2,··· ,S;-1 ,1;, ... ,s,,; the states 1;, ... ,s" which 
are generated after the occurrence of the erroneous transition are termed as erroneous states. 
Erroneous Transitions and States 
In the above scenario within Sys, the (erroneous) transition from S;_I to I; was considered to have caused 
the system failure. However, it need not be the case that such a divergence from the intended sequence 
always results in a system failure. Consider, for example, that the transition from Si-I to I; refers to flipping 
of a bit in communication channel, A from zero to one. (Occurrence of this event is clearly a failure of the 
communication component within Sys.) Sys will not fail, so long as the affected transmission (which is in 
an erroneous state) is not used during any computation, or if the bit is flipped back. or if the transmission is 
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Figure 2.2: Erroneous Transitions and Erroneous States 
repeated subsequently. Accounting for the possibility that a failure may not follow an erroneous transition. 
[LA90] carefully define erroneous transitions and states in the following manner: 
Two essential concepts are required in detailing the causes of failure; an event which should not have 
occurred and a state which should not have been reached. These are termed erroneous transitions and 
erroneous states respectively: 
• An erroneous transition of a system is an internal state transition to which a subsequent failure 
could be attributed. SpecificalIy, there must exist a possible sequence of interaction which would. in 
the absence of corrective action from the system, lead to a system failure attributable to the erroneous 
transition. 
• An erroneous state of a system is an internal state which could lead to a failure by a sequence of 
valid transitions. SpecificalIy, there must exist a possible sequence of interactions which would, in 
the presence of erroneous transitions, lead from the erroneous state to a system failure [LA90). 
The role of these definitions is illustrated in Figure 2.2, where arrows represent possible transitions between 
internal states in a system. All transitions are assumed correct with the exception of T,. T, is an erroneous 
transition which potentially leads to a failure, in which case T2 is representative of some corrective action 
which returns the system to a valid state. This illustration fits with the definitions given above, in that, not 
all faults ultimately lead to failure. 
The descriptions above are intended to reflect the situation where, after a system failure, the history of a 
system is used to identify the cause of the failure. We later appeal to these definitions whilst defining our 
fault semantics. 
Having identified an erroneous transition as the cause of a (possible) failure, we will continue to examine 
the causes of an erroneous transition. To simplify the analysis, we define the erroneous part of an erroneous 
system state as an error. 
Errors and Faults 
It is common practice to use the terms error or fault for a specific defect within a system: 
• an error is part of an erroneous state which constitutes a difference from a valid state 
IS 
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An error in a component or the design of a system will be referred to as a fault in the system: 
• A component fault in a system is the result of a failure in the internal state of a component . 
• A design fault in a system is a mis-representation in the design3. 
Following the terminology developed in [LA90], we will say that a component fails when its behaviour 
deviates from that specified. The term fault will be used to refer to the cause of the failure. 
Let us continue the scenario from above, where the system Sys has failed due to the erroneous transition 
from Sj_1 to I; (instead of Sj). Let the valid state Sj be {es,eR,eA,eM} where es, eR, eA and eM are the external 
states of components S, R, A, and M respectively; if the erroneous I; is {es, eR, ~,eM}' then e~ is the error in 
1;. That is, the external state of component A makes the system be in error. There are two cases: either A did 
not fail or failed during the erroneous transition. If A did not fail then no component failed within the failed 
system. In that case, the blame for the system failure must go to the system design whose role is to ensure 
that all internal state transitions are valid when aU components' behaviour conforms to their respective 
specifications. An example of a design failure is an application program invoking unspecified operations 
on objects or permitted operations with incorrect parameters; in case of hardware subsystems, a design 
failure could be a missing or wrong connection which prevents proper interaction between components. 
Considered as a system which has failed, the design of Sys must contain an error, i.e., D must be in 
an erroneous state. (Recall that a system failure cannot be caused by anything other than an erroneous 
transition occurred within the system.) 
Let us suppose that A failed during the erroneous transition within Sys. The analysis we have carried out so 
far regarding the failure of Sys can be applied (recursively) by considering A as a system in its own right. 
Let us denote by ea the error within A which caused A to fail. If A is made up of components a I. a2 and a3 
which interact under the design da• then the error ea is caused by the failures of one or more components 
of A and/or the failure of da. Let us say that only al in A has failed. The cause of ai's failure can be traced 
to error(s) within ai, caused by failures of ai's components and/or design. Thus, the ultimate cause of the 
failure of Sys can be pursued as far as considered worthwhile, or until atomic components are reached. 
ComponentlDesign Failures 
The distinction between a component and a design fault is apparent when they are exemplified. Failures of 
any system are due to a design fault or are the results of a component failure. The failure of a component is 
in tum attributed either to a design fault with the component or to a failure of a sub-component. Eventual1y. 
at some level, the original system failure will be attributed to a design fault, unless a failure of a component 
which is considered to be atomic4 is held responsible. 
However, should aU components meet their specifications then the problem must lie in the design of the 
system. A specification of behaviour for the design of a system is that is should ensure all internal state 
3Designs (in RTN-SL) are considered to be the architecture of the system. In other words, designs identify the component.'o 
or elements of the system and their inter-relationship. Designs do not have slates per se. Design faults are defects m the system 
architecture such that it is impossible to write software with that architecture which does not contain defects that result In errors and 
failures (e.g. too much ~r not enough- concurrency or non-determinism; or not a connection path. etc.). . 
4The implication that any further internal structure cannot be discerned. or is not of interest, and therefore, can be Ignored. 
16 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND - FAULTS, FAULT TOLERANCE AND FAULT TREATMENT 
pre: V x T -+ :IS post: V x T x V x T -+ B 
spec +!-I _~ _______ ---lt 
.. ' 
impl~ !",,~<I-----__ ---JWA1rzuL;QJ 
Figure 2.3: Specification and Implementation Model 
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time 
transitions of the system are valid in the absence of any component failures. If there is an erroneous 
transition and no component has failed then the design of the system must have failed. Since the stale of a 
design does not usually change, then such faults are considered pennanent 
2.1.3 Fault Classification 
Conceding no implementation can be perfect, we illustrate in Figure 2.3 the regions which are acceptable 
behaviours with respect to a specification. Infonnally, the response of a component for a given input 
sequence will said to be correct if the output value is not only as expected, but also produced on time. 
Figure 2.3 is more fonnally stated in Definition 2.1 where we define the correct (or acceptable) behaviour 
of a component from which we can then define faults 
Definition 2.1 (Correct Behaviour) Let a component receive an input at time ti and as a result pro-
duce an output value Vj at time tj. For that input, the response Vj at time tj is correct iff: 
1. Vj = Wj, where Wj is the expected value consistent with the specification at time tj, and 
2. tj = Ii + td + !::::,.t, where td is the minimum delay time of the component and !::::"t is the unpredictable 
delay time such that 0 ~ !::::"t ~ tmax and tmax is the maximum unpredictable delay time of the 
component. 
The values td and t'7Illl are constants for a given component. First, we note that the implementation's 
response of a component is not assumed to be instantaneous for a given input but experiences a finite 
minimum amount of delay which is specified by td. Second, it is usual to indicate a time interval during 
which a response is expected, i.e. ti -> tj. 
Definition 2.1 gave the specification of a correctly operating component with respect to our model. We have 
allowed for acceptable response delay in an implementation of a component and illustrated the relationship 
between a specification and implementation in Figure 2.3. Figure 2.3 shows more than the expected timings 
of input and output of a component. The predicates pre and post specify the validity of a value. V at a 
specified time, T. An acceptable implementation is also shown, which illustrates the acceptable response 
times. This figure illustrates the distinction between a specification and implementation. 
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Figure 2.4: Omission Fault Observable Intervals 
Faults are the primary causes of system failures. We present a fault and failure classification for components 
using 'timeliness' and 'expected values' as the two distinguishable properties of a component's response. 
A reliable computing system should be capable of providing guaranteed services in the presence of a finite 
number of component failures. In order to be able to provide any kind of guarantee of services. the system 
designer must specify what kind of, and how many, component failures the system is intended to tolerate. 
Abstract Fault Definitions 
Ezhilchelvan and Shrivastava [ES85] classified faults with respect to their (failure) consequences. A fault 
that results in system output not being produced at all is termed an omission fault. If a correct output is 
produced but at the wrong time this is said to be a timing fault. If an incorrect output is produced at the 
proper time, the fault is said to be a value fault. 
Definition 2.2 Omission Fault: A fault that causes a component not to respond to a nonempty input 
sequence will be termed an omission fault: 
1. Vj = null. tj = t; + td + 6t and 
2. Vj = Wj. tj = 00 
Figure 2.4 shows that an omission fault must occur at an absolute final time. Ideally this value would 
be 00 but in a computing environment this is not possible and we must choose a suitable value. Giving a 
suitable value for 00 is made easier by defining a window of observation. That is, each fault classification 
is observable with respect to a correct specification for a fixed, or well defined, period as shown in Figure 
2.5. For example, consider an omission fault. One can accept that the ith occurrence of an event is missing. 
presumed lost, once the i + 1 occurrence appears. 
Definition 2.3 Timing Fault: A fault that causes a component to produce the expected value for a 
given non empty input sequence either too early or too late will be termed a timingfault: 
1. Vj = Wj and 
2. either tj < t; or tj > t; + td + tmax 
18 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND - FAULTS, FAULT TOLERANCE AND FAULT TREATMENT 
spec 
correct 
~ 
!not seeni 
~ 
I omission I 
observable 
-~---------t--------______________ ~ ______ ~tirne 
• 
o ti ti + td B td + tmtu: tk 00 
Figure 2.5: Observable fault intervals 
Definition 2.4 Commission Fault: When a component produces a value that is not expected, then a 
commissionfault has occurred. 
1. vji'wjandtj=ti+td+6tor 
2. Vj = Wj and tj i' ti + td + 6t or 
3. Vj i' Wj and tj i' ti + td + 6t 
Definition 2.5 Value Fault: When a component that produces an omput at an anticipated time which 
does not satisfy the specification, then a value fault has occured. 
1. Vj i' Wj and tj = ti + td + 6t 
Referring to Figure 2.5, the time markings, ti, td, tmax and 00 are used from the definitions given previously, 
where 1j = ti + td + 6t, 0 ::; 6t ::; tmax and ti + td + tmax ::; tk ::; 00 where tk is a discernible value. We later 
suggest values of tk specific to our architecture. 
2.2 Fault Hypothesis 
The precise definition of any assumptions of the types of faults, the rate at which a component fails and 
how they fail, are an essential step in the design of a fault tolerant system. Yet. at the earliest stages of 
design of new software, nothing is known about its failure modes. nor their effect on a system's behaviour. 
However. it is at this stage that cost effective measures to deal with such failure modes is important. The 
assumed type of nature of faults indicates the type of redundancy that must be implemented within the 
system. 
The term fault hypothesis is standard in the literature [Cri85]. yet the term is mis-leading. Rather. we 
intuitively mean error hypothesis or even a failure hypothesis. Consider as an example a radar sub-
system. We expect as an output a periodic sample which is a snapshot view of some airspace. Then 
considering the detrimental outputs possible. such as no output, an output which is later than the known 
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Figure 2.6: Weakening the specification 
period or an incorrect output, are they faults, errors or failures of the radar sub-system? 1be inconsistency 
between the definition of faults, errors and failures (c.f. Section 2.1.3) and the term fault. error or failure 
hypothesis is due to the perception, in this case, of the radar sub-system - is it an atomic component or a 
system of some description? In reality, we are interested in the failure modes of the radar (sub-)system. not 
the faults as cause too, but the observation of a detrimental output. 
We therefore require a hypothetical process which challenges each design component to outline the poten-
tial failure modes of a design. In the absence of accurate and concrete statistical evidence. we are forced 
into this hypothetical process, which is an investigation of 'what if' questions of each component of a de-
sign. On finding a negative response, we then challenge the design for the effects of the fault to determine 
whether the failure mode is critical. If the outcome is negative -that the fault is critical- then we must 
incorporate the fault definition into our specification. Shown in Figure 2.6 is the relation between an orig-
inal (non-faulty) specification and the incorporation of several fault definitions, or fault hypotheses (FH). 
to define the (weaker) specification specF. The relation spec EB FHn indicates the disjunction of the be-
haviours specified in the original specification or those in a fault-hypothesis are observable for the design. 
It is therefore the requirement to consider these behaviours against any safety properties the design must 
uphold and guarantee the satisfaction of these properties given (only) the possibility of faulty behaviour 
specified by each FHn. 
The complete definition of a components fault hypothesis entails an assertion on errors occurring in all 
domains (time and value). 
2.3 FauIt-Tolerance 
The aim of fault tolerance is to prevent a system from failing and the discussions in the previous section 
indicate that meeting this aim requires the use of techniques to detect and correct errors before a failure 
could occur. The fault tolerance techniques used within a system are inevitably linked to. and influenced by. 
the design and architecture of that system. This means that there cannot possibly exist a general technique 
for implementing fault tolerance. This section presents the general principles identified by [LA90] which 
underly all known fault tolerant systems, and then examines certain ways by which these principles are 
implemented in practice. 
2.3.1 Principles of Fault Tolerance 
Given the distinction betweenfallits and errors above, and the relationship: 
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fault --> error --> failure 
then when there is a fault in the system, this fault can lead to errors in the state of a system. which -may-
subsequently lead to a system failure. The aim therefore of fault tolerance is to prevent this causal relation 
of errors and faults, and we therefore require techniques for detecting and treating errors and faults. 
Redundancy 
All design techniques that provide fault tolerant strategies are based upon redundancy. Redundancy in-
volves duplicate components to perform the same, or similar task within a system. Often redundant com-
ponents can be grouped together as a sub-system which satisfies the specification of a (original) single 
component. The arrangement of such components is determined by the redundancy strategy and detailed 
in a system design. Often these additional components are infrequently executed, with only a primary com-
ponent satisfying the specification, hence the term redundant. The additional components are necessary, 
and intended for, the sporadic or unusual data input. 
Redundancy strategies can be categorised as either static or dynamic. A static redundant strategy would 
arrange the components such that any faults or errors from a component are masked from the environment 
of the system. However, a dynamic strategy would provide detection mechanisms for which redundancy 
elsewhere would achieve the fault tolerance. 
Example replication strategy 
A standard example of the use of static redundancy is Passive State Replication (PSR). Typical applications 
of this strategy are to provide tolerance against timing and omission faults. To tolerate a fault of -say-
component E in Figure 2.7(a), E is replaced by three passively replicated components illustrated in Figure 
2.7(b) which satisfy the same specification as that which E did. By passive, the intention is that each 
component is executed in turn until an acceptance test is successful. If the acceptance test for Erp\ fails, 
then E rp2 is executed. E rp3 cannot fail its acceptance test. 
Given the specification of the component(s) we are transforming, we know that condition ct must hold on 
entry to E and that condition C2 must be satisfied on the exit from E. Therefore, we must assume condition 
ct is true in the transformed design and we must guarantee, in addition to our real-time requirements, that 
condition C2 also holds on exit. Incidentally, C2 becomes the acceptance test and therefore the exit condition 
from each replica. With regards thefailure test we must ensure that all the exit conditions form a tautology 
when specifying the fault hypothesis as the failure test 
The semantics of RTN-SL (presented in full in Section 2.4) state the exit condition of E is more than just 
condition C2. Additionally, the timing specification of E, the best case execution time (BCEn and the lIIorst 
case execution time (WCET) should be respected. We therefore illustrate these semantics and a possible 
fault hypothesis in our example, that the fault hypothesis states a late fault. That is. an exit condition to 
E
rp\ and E rp2 states "Erp\ transitions to Erp2" and "Erp2 transitions to Erp3" should a late fault be observed 
at E rp\ and E rp2 respectively. Then. C2 and FH should form a tautology. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 2.7: Passive State Replication 
We later consider another replication strategy, called Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [WLG +78), how-
ever the focus of this thesis is not to formalise a number of fault tolerant strategies, but to provide for the 
design methodology which makes applying such strategies possible for real-time systems. 
2.3.2 Formalisms of Fault Tolerance 
In the literature on the formalisation of fault tolerance, the earlier works [U96, Cri94, AK98b) do not ex-
plicitly model the occurrence of faults. Rather, much of the earlier work concentrated on process a1gebra~. 
particularly CCS [Pra84], and proved that the behaviour of a fault tolerant system is equivalent to that of 
the corresponding fault free system. In [Pra84], it was assumed a failure is detected by an acceptance test 
either by a faulty process itself or by a communicant. Further, that should a process detect itself to be faulty, 
then it should stop silently, until it is remade. Fail-stop processes were first formally defined by Schlichting 
& Schneider [SS83], who also considered the problem of implementing them. They therefore just assumed 
that failures, defined as derivations from the specified "normal" behaviour, are detected by some means at 
some points after they occur. This was sufficient for showing a fault tolerant design observationally equiv-
alent to the original design, but does not allow one to determine and derive a fault strategy for a non-fault 
tolerant design should the fault tolerant design not yet exist. 
Schepers and Hooman [SH94] use trace-based equivalences for proving fault tolerance. Faults are not 
treated as special actions; only the effects of faults on the externally visible input and output behaviours of 
the system are rnodelled. In [Nor92], Nordahl applies CSP and trace theory to develop a fault tolerant sys-
tem design. The system is a collection of processes. A fault tolerant technique is realised by a combinator 
operator which can be one of the CSP operators, a composition of these operators, or defined in terms of 
triples. 
Lamport and Merz [LM94] use a calculus for fault tolerance analysis based on the temporal logic of actions 
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(TLA) [Lam94]. In this work it is shown how the TLA can be applied to specify and verify fault tolerance 
algorithms. A specification is a mathematical formula and theorems asserted in the specification are proved 
using the method of structured proofs. This allows one to hierarchically structure proofs. where simple 
proofs can be discharged mechanically through the TLP verification system [Eng95]. Liu and Joseph 
[LJ96, LJ99] similarly use TLA to reason formally about the properties of an action system. The work 
presents a transformational framework in which it is assumed that the physical faults of a system are 
modelled as being caused by a set F of fault operations which perform state transformations in the same 
way as the ordinary program operators. 
The availability of automatic tools for verification also makes a framework usable in an industrial context. 
For example, the successful approach in the European Project GUARDS (Generic Upgradeable Architec-
ture for Real Time Dependable Systems) [PABD+99] to validate two basic fault tolerance mechanisms: the 
inter-channel consistency network mechanism [BFG99] and the fault treatment mechanism [PABD+99J il-
lustrated how large scale problems can be tackled 
Kulkarni et al [KRS99] argue that the decomposition of a fault tolerant program into its components is 
beneficial in its mechanical verification, and that such a decomposition admits reuse of the proofs for other 
fault tolerant programs as well as the variations of the given fault tolerant program. 
A common way of showing a fault tolerant design equivalent in the presence of faults to a non-fault toler-
ant design is to show observational equivalence. Observational equivalence, first introduced in [Mi180J. is 
based on the idea that the behaviour of the system is determined by the way it interacts with the environ-
ment: two systems are equivalent whenever no observation can distinguish them. 
Conclusions 
Explicitly mode\ling the behaviour of faults is essential if we wish to reason about faults in a real-time 
context. However, we feel that the effects are more crucial than the cause, and choose to model the obser-
vational effects offaults on design components. Only concerning ourselves with the observational effects. 
we allow for internal state transitions of components which are erroneous, but do not lead to failure. not 
to interfere with our modelling. Rather, by recording the observation of a fault as a/aldt event in a trace 
model, we provide for a history of a RTN, over which we can reason about faults, and more crucially. 
fault tolerance. Our intention to introduce new operations, or actions, into RTNs that generate fault events 
which are distinct to the existing event model suggests a reactive approach to fault tolerance: given the 
observation of a fault event then action a fault tolerant operation. Therefore. those faults we do not con-
sider are still undetected and may lead to non-deterministic behaviour. Finally. we can show a fault tolerant 
RTN observationally equivalent to its non-fault tolerant counterpart should the non-fault tolerant trace be 
a subset of the fault tolerant design, excluding the fault events. 
2.4 Real-Time Networks 
In Chapter 1, we alluded to scale and complexity as common characteristics of real-time systems. A proven 
method for dealing with any complex system is to partition it into smaller independently operating subsys-
tems which only interact with one another and with the system environment through explicitly defined 
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communication connections. For real-time systems, one approach is the Real-Time Network (RTN) ar-
chitecture which does partition concurrent processing components and enforces communication for data 
exchanges and synchronisation through shared data via explicit connections. 
MASCOT (Modular Approach to Software, Construction, Operation and Test) is a design methodology 
based on the real-time network concept [Sim86]. It comprises a design language and graphical notation. 
together with a process for design derivation based on structural decomposition. This involves identification 
of computational components of a system (its subsystems and processes) and the interactions between these 
components (i.e. data-flow paths), together with protocols that characterise these interactions. MASCOT-3 
has been advocated for the design of large concurrent or distributed, real-time embedded software systems 
and has been used extensively throughout the defence industry [Woo%]. 
DORIS [Sim94], the Data-Oriented Requirements Implementation Scheme is a variant of MASCOT-3 de-
veloped by MBDA. The main difference is that DORIS distinguishes three levels of design abstraction. 
such that application network designs and execution network designs are specified in addition to the func-
tional design. The former define the logical architecture of a system, whilst the latter extend the application 
network to include all additional components required to support distribution across a particular processor 
network. This enables flexible re-mapping of a design to the hardware platform as the hardware platform 
evolves [PAHoo]. DORIS also supports a wider-range of synchronous and asynchronous communication 
protocols appropriate to both shared-memory and message passing implementations (SimOJ). 
In this thesis, we focus on support for transforming designs represented using RTN-SL, a specification and 
design language (intended for integration into MASCOT-3 and DORIS) being developed by MBDA for 
defining the behaviour of real-time networks [Pay02]. The following sub-section provides an overview of 
the RTN-SL and its graphical notation in particular. 
2.4.1 RTN-SL 
RTN-SL is used to define flat Real-Time Networks, including the real-time and functional behaviour of their 
activities. A flat RTN comprises a set of activities (single-threaded processes) which are connected into a 
network by ports that interface with communication paths. Between each activity is an intercommunication 
data area (IDA) which defines the interaction protocol used on that path. Activities may not be directly 
connected together, but must communicate via an IDA [Pay02]. 
The RTN-SL has both a graphical and textual representation where the latter is a precise specification of the 
functionality of the graphical form. The concrete textual syntax of the RTN-SL is influenced by a number 
of languages, particularly by Ada [Bar%], VDM-SL [LHP+96, FL98] and the PVS logic [OSRSC99a). 
The concrete textual syntax is not introduced here and the reader is referred to [Pay02] for a full reference. 
RTN-SL supports five standard protocols5, namely pool, channel, signal, stimulus and dataless channel; the 
three basic protocols are the pool (similar to a shared variable), channel (a bounded buffer) and signal (a 
one-place over-writing buffer). These impose different synchronisation constraints on the reader and writer 
of the protocol depending on whether they allow data to be destroyed when it is read or written (see Table 
5Several variants of these standard protocols where added to the language in [Pay02]. such as Flash Data. Prod and Overwriting 
Buffer, however the fault tolerant strategies suggested in this thesis only use the standard protocols and the reader IS referred agam 10 
[pay02) for a full reference. 
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Non-uestructtve Read uestructtve l<ead 
Read data not consumed Read data consumed 
(Never held up) (Held up when no data) 
Destructive Write + + Old data overwritten (Never held up) 
Pool Signal 
Non-Destructive Write ~ + Old data not overwritten (Held up when no space) Constant Channel 
Table 2.1: The Basic Protocols 
2.1 for a summary). The two other RTN-SL protocols, namely stimulus and dataless channel, are variants 
of signal and channel respectively; they differ in that both allow communication of void (null) data. 
Abstract data types (ADTs) may be defined to support definition of a flat Real-Time Network. These 
are necessary when a data type must be visible in more than one activity and/or IDA where one activity 
communicates data to another which is not a built-in type [Pay02]. 
Additionally, the RTN-SL includes a sub-language known as Activity Description Language (ADL) for 
defining the behaviour of activities. In tum, the ADL includes a timed state-machine notation sub-language 
termed the Activity State-Machine (ASM) which is used to define the structure and timing constraints of 
an activity'S algorithm. 
ASM distinguishes between static and dynamic states; static states model synchronisation points of an 
algorithm. For example, when an activity is in a static state, it maybe attempting to communicate using a 
synchronous protocol. Transitions from a static state are labelled either with the event indicating that the 
communication may continue or finish, or with the lower and upper bounds of a time delay [Pay02]. 
Dynamic states model an activity'S computation, each one encapsulating some non-reactive functional-
ity. They have a best-case execution time (BCET) bound, a worst-case execution time (WCET) bound 
and worst-case response time (WCRT) bound; an optional worst-case response time on read may also be 
recorded. An activity is normally required to exit a state within these times. Transitions from a dynamic 
state are labelled with conditions over the local activity's state which are evaluated when a dynamic state 
terminates [Pay02]. A composite dynamic state comprises several dynamic states whose operations may 
execute non-deterministically. 
Usually, the RTN-SL graphical syntax, which builds upon the graphical syntax of MASCOT [Sim86], is 
commonly used when discussing RTN-SL specifications. Activities are represented as circles; IDAs by 
the appropriate symbol from Table 2.1 (which is enclosed within a rectangle where the IDA is defined and 
hence named); ADTs by diamonds; communication paths by solid arcs with arrows indicating the direction 
of data-flow; and ADT imports by dotted lines with arrows pointing towards the unit that imports the ADT. 
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Input Port Optional WCRT Output Port 
Name on Read Name 
Dynamic State Name 
BCET Lower 
WCET WCRT Bound Upper Bound 
Figure 2.8: Dynamic State 
P1 P5 P3 P2 
State1 State2 State3 
BCET Lower 
WCET WCRT Bound Upper Bound 
Figure 2.9: Composite Dynamic State 
Ports are represented by solid circles on the perimeter of activities and the state machine drawn within the 
activity circle. 
Static ASM states are represented by an ellipse and dynamic states as a rectangle. Where an input or output 
is associated with a dynamic state, then the appropriate port name is shown in the top left hand and right 
hand corners of the rectangle respectively. Labels in the bottom left and right hand corners indicate BCET. 
WCET and WCRT; the optional WCRT on read is shown in a box next to the input port name. The dynamic 
state graphical syntax is summarised in Figure 2.8. 
Composite dynamic states are depicted by partitioning a dynamic state using dotted lines. Each constituent 
state may have its own input and output port, although one set of time bounds applies to the whole state. 
An example composite comprising three dynamic sub-states is shown in Figure 2.9. 
Transitions between states are depicted by directed arcs pointing from the source to the target state. Con-
ditions events and time-outs are shown as textual labels adjacent to the appropriate transition. The initial 
state is shown by being the target of a transition with no source. 
Figure 2.10 illustrates the main constituents of an RTN-SL specification as described above. Activity A2 
includes three static states, A (the initial state), C and E, together with two dynamic states, Band D. When 
the activity is in state A and a void data value is present in the stimulus connected to port 2 (P2), then event 
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Figure 2.10: An Example Graphical RTN-SL Network 
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D 
Figure 2.11: Existing Semantic Framework 
Sp2 occurs and the activity moves to state B which reads from the pool on port 3 (P3). The computation 
(not given here) associated with state B is executed and takes between Ll and U3 time units; conditions 
CI and C2 are then evaluated. A transition with a true condition is taken and either state Cor D is entered. 
Assuming state C, the activity is de-scheduled for between t) and t2 time units whereupon state D is entered. 
The algorithm associated with state D (again not given) is executed between its time bounds (as state B) and 
a value written to the channel linked to port 4 (p4). The activity waits in state E until the W p4 event occurs 
whereupon it returns to the initial state (A). Activity A I executes concurrently with A2, communicating 
with it via IDA idal. ADT adtl is used in the definition of AI, A2 and idal; ADT adt2 is used in the 
definition of adt3, which in tum is used in the definition of A2. 
2.4.2 Verification of Real-Time Networks 
Given a real-time specification language which provides a formal framework for top-down design of real-
time systems, one requires tool support for the ensuing verification effort. To obtain mechanised support for 
our chosen formal framework, the semantics of RTNs are represented as a shallow embedding [OSRSC99a] 
in the PVS logic, which is a typed higher-order classical logic and supported by the PVS (Prototype Veri-
fication System) [OSRSC99b] verification system. 
The principal tool which defines this embedding is NetSpec [PayOld]. NetSpec first syntax and type checks 
an RTN-SL specification (D) file that conforms to the notations static semantics, NetSpec then -with the 
correct switch- instantiates the axiom schema of Q, the RTN-SL semantic function, to produce a set of 
axioms which encode the behaviour of the specification (Figure 2.11). 
The generated PVS theory from NetSpec naturally type checks with respect to the PVS type-theory. How-
ever, the theory section of an RTN-SL specification isfree hand and may generate errors in PVS. Once we 
have the theorems we wish to prove, for example timeliness or safety properties, we begin to reason with 
our axiomatic semantics within the PVS system. Some automation of trivial goals are completed by PVS, 
but the bulk of the effort is driven by the designer. We later appeal to our transformational approach as 
aiding the designer in this effort. 
Earlier experiences with this proof approach were successful. In [PAHOO], a small example -principally 
the ASM- proved two theorems of liveliness and safety. The fact that both theorems were proved from the 
theory obtained by applying Q provides some validation of the adequacy of the semantics and approach. 
Their experience supported the need to plan formal proofs before embarking on using a prover, and that 
formal proofs need to be reconverted to rigorous proofs for presentation and comprehension. Also, that the 
identification of suitable lemmas improves the modularity and clarity of proof, which gives hope that we 
can benefit our transformational methodology again towards this proof style. 
Other methods and approaches have been similarly advocated in the literature. Hooman [Hoo97] proposes 
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a compositional verification method, again utilising the PVS system, which enables the design to be a 
framework of specification and programming constructs mixed freely, to formalise intermediate design 
stages during the top-down design process. Liu and Joseph [U97] extend their work on formalisation of 
fault tolerance with TLA 6 to consider refinement steps in an real-time design, as a way of verifying the 
timing properties inherent in real-time systems. Their work considers the balance of a low or high level 
abstraction which is feasible to verify, yet recorded accurately, the timing properties. 
2.5 Methodology 
2.5.1 The SHARD Analysis Method 
We describe a method which draws on techniques from the chemical industries Hazard and Operability 
(HAZOP) analysis [CIS77], combined with work on software failure classification to provide a structural 
approach to identifying the failure modes of software [MP94]. The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) 
analysis system of imaginative anticipation of hazards provides precisely the type of structured analysis 
which can feed in to the development of a new system. A HAZOP study attempts to identify previously 
unconsidered failure modes by suggesting hypothetical faults for review. The software specific method was 
christened Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD) [MNPF95]. to avoid confusion 
with traditional HAZOP and is based on the MASCOT design notation. In the SHARD approach. as each 
part of the system design is produced, an analysis is produced based on the principles of HAZOPs. This 
analysis must either be shown to justify the design proposal, or impose a number of emergent requirements 
which must be satisfied later in the design development. 
The decision to use SHARD as the basis for our work favours the use of design notations which employ 
a structural model of the system of the system which partitions the system into independent processes and 
defines the interfaces between them. The fault transformations possible within a passive IDA are much 
more restricted than those possible within an activity, providing good fault containment properties and an 
effective basis for analysis. The method we adopt, may not itself be sufficient for a complete safety analysis 
argument, but does provide the initial analysis to those parts of the system where faults may prove critical. 
Illustrated in Figure 2.12 is the relationship between the original specification, design and the derived 
fault tolerant design which addresses the fault definition found critical by a SHARD analysis. Figure 2.6 
highlighted the intermediate steps to reach the faulty specification from the original. it is therefore the 
responsibility of a SHARD analysis to define clearly which component behaviours may lead to a critical 
fault so they can be removed, or tolerated in a transformed design. The iterative process continues until all 
critical faults have been addressed, which cumulates to our fault tolerant design, D 17· 
2.5.1.1 Method 
The basic unit for analysis of a software design is a single RTN specification representing a system or 
subsystem. This system or subsystem consists of components -activities and IDAs- connected by data 
flow paths. Separate tables are produced for each RTN component. The process begins with a top-level 
(context) RTN diagram of the system. The major steps of the method are outlined below: 
6mentioned in Section 2.5.2. 
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Figure 2.12: A SHARD invoked design process 
• Each component and data flow are uniquely named; 
• The design is reviewed to ensure it correctly models the intended system; 
• A table of guide words is constructed; 
• For each data flow in the system, each guide word is considered, with the evaluation recorded in a 
tabular format; 
• The potential causes of each identified fault are determined; 
• The effects of each hypothetical fault are considered and recorded; 
• The set of hypothetical faults is reduced to a set of meaningful faults and the justification recorded. 
2.5.1.2 Guide Words 
A considerable amount of research has been carried out into the classification of software failures [BS90, 
ES85], for which the categorisations are based on a component, analogous to our model of information 
flow to and from components. 
The correctness of a component is specified in terms of two parameters: the value associated with it, and 
the time at which this value is presented. The value domain is divided into four categories: correctly valued, 
subtle incorrect, coarse incorrect & omission. The time domain is similarly divided into four categories: 
correctly timed, early, late & infinitely late7• The summary of the possible combinations of time & value 
faults is show in Table 2.2. 
Considered previously from [ES85] was a commission fault, which expressly includes events such as com-
pletely unexpected output, which is specifically considered in our analysis. 
7The distinction between an omission in the value domain and infinitely late is assumed to be made by a perfecl observer 
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Value 
I Time Correctly Subtle Incorrect I Coarse Incorrect I Omission Valued 
Undetectable Detection on Correctly Timed Correct Service failure value syntax or DetectionatT_ 
semantics 
Detection on 
Early Detection on time Detection on time value syntax or Detection at T_ 
semantics and/or 
time 
Detection on 
Late Detection on time Detection on time value syntax or Detection at T_ 
semantics and/or 
time 
Infinitely late Detection at T_ Detection at T_ Detection at T_ DetectionatT_ 
Table 2.2: Fault classes and detectability 
We therefore consider that a complete set of suitable failure classes which represents the guide words used 
for the SHARD analysis: 
Service: Omission 
Commission 
Timing: Early 
Late 
Value: Coarse Incorrect 
Subtle Incorrect 
These failure classes are then considered in the context of an RTN design, to mature the formal definitions 
of each. The failure categorisations and their context-sensitive meaning is shown in Table 2.3. 
As noted in [MNPF95], the original intention of the guide words in Table 2.3 was to find the minimum 
set which we could be reasonably confident would prompt consideration of the plausible failure modes 
of software. Though McDermind et al suggest from their experience with their study, had the "raw" 
words (i.e. omission, commission, early, late, ... ) been used, there would (probably) have been fewer 
difficulties with interpretation [MNPF95]. We therefore use the guide words interchangeabilly, choosing 
the most appropriate word to aid comprehension in a given context. For example, "unwanted updates" are 
appropriate when considering data components, however it is hard to derive a meaningful intuition of it for 
an Activity, whereas a "crash" guide word is more appropriate. 
Table 2.4 shows a fragment of the analysis output of the design shown in Table 2.10. The column heading 
M? records whether a hypothetical failure mode has been identified as meaningful. 
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Failure Categorisation 
I Service Provision Timing I Value Component Omission Commission Early I Late Subtle I Coarse 
Pool No Update Unwanted Update N/A Old Data Incorrect N/A 
Signal No Data Extra Data Early Late Incorrect Inconsistent 
Channel No Data Extra Data Early Late Incorrect in Range Out of Range 
Dynamic State No Update Unwanted Update Early Exit Late Exit Incorrect in Range Out of Range 
Static State N/A N/A Early Exit Late Exit N/A N/A 
Activity Crash N/A Early Late N/A N/A 
Table 2.3: Table of guide words applicable to RTNs 
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Drawing Ref 
Drawing Name 
FlowID 
Protocol 
Data Type 
Additional Information 
Top Level 
p3 
Pool 
adtl 
Guide Word Deviation Causes 
Old Data Old pool data Period of p2 
read by state B 
No Update state B fails to Period of p2 
readp3 
Late Exit state 8 exits Late read @ p2 
later than 113 
'--------
Detection Co-effectors Effects M? 
A I failed to up- Stagnant data NO 
date ida I used in computa-
tion & Repetition 
of data written to 
p4 
None Stagnant data No 
used in computa-
tion 
None Late entry to state Yes 
D 
--- - - -
Table 2.4: A fragment of an SHARD analysis of the example network in 2.10. 
Justification / Design Proposals 
Justification: By design to use a 
Pool 
Justification: By design to use a 
Pool 
MAction: aka state 8 tolerant to a I 
timing fault 
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2.5.2 Design Transformations 
The idea of design transformations for fault tolerance is not new. Other approaches have been proposed 
to study fault tolerance for systems applying error detection and recovery. In particular, using program 
transformations, Liu and Joseph [U92] show that proof of fault tolerance is not different from the proof 
of any other functional property. Effort has also concentrated on automating the addition of fault tolerant 
solutions to an intolerant design [KAOO). 
The motivations for a transformational method are three-fold. The first motivation comes from the fact 
that the designer may have a fault-intolerant program and it is known to be correct in the absence of faults. 
The second motivation is that the use of such automated transformation will obviate the need for manually 
constructing the proof of correctness of the transformed fault tolerant program as the transformed program 
will be correct by construction. This is especially useful when designing concurrent and fault tolerant 
programs as it is well-understood that manually constructing proofs of correctness for such programs is 
especially hard. 
The third motivation stems from previous work by Arora and Kulkarni [AK98a, AK98b] that shows that a 
fault tolerant program can be expressed as a composition of a fault-intolerant program and a set of 'fault 
tolerance components'. Such fault tolerant components are described in some template format (preferably 
one akin to RTNs [80r98]) which details where and when a template is suitable and hopefully proof of 
correctness to show tolerance against a class of faults. 
Arora and Kulkarni [AK98a] propose a method where components are added to a design in a stepwise 
fashion. Each step adds a component to the design which tolerates one fault class, until the design is tolerant 
to the full set offault-classes. Components are either detectors or correctors [AK98b]. Intuitively. a detector 
detects whether some predicate is satisfied by the system state; and a corrector detects whether some 
predicate is satisfied by the system state and also corrects the system state in order to satisfy that predicate 
whenever the predicate is not satisfied. Decomposition of a fault tolerant program permits the verification 
of a given property by focusing on the component that is responsible for satisfying it. For example. if 
we need to show that a program eventually recovers to a state from where it satisfies its specification, we 
should focus on its corrector components. Similarly, if we are interested in showing the absence of faults. 
then we must focus on the detector components. 
Other approaches have proposed redundancy management within software modules, namely fault tolerant 
real-time structures (FERTs) [8SS94]. The approach deals with the use of software implemented fault 
tolerance in those real-time systems where a designer wishes more run-time Hexibility than that afforded 
with static redundancy. The method introduces a three-level framework which manages the functionality 
through to the scheduling of the components. Although this approach in not applicable for our problem, it 
does support the idea of composing a system with a fault tolerance component in a dynamic, transforma-
tional approach. 
2.6 Conclusions 
From this survey of existing work in the literature on "Faults, fault tolerance & fault treatment" we have 
found the scope and motivation to propose a design transformation methodology for RTNs to provide for 
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classic fault tolerant techniques. 
It has been noted that faults have not been considered explicitly in RTNs, although much development has 
been made for other real-time design methodologies, we feel the RTN approach is capable of sustaining 
a study of this nature. The obvious benefits are expected to be gained by extending a relatively new. yet 
increasingly accepted, design methodology as our foundation. Working within the RTN-SL methodology. 
rather than proposing a bespoke one, allows the clear specification of faults with respect to an RTN. Further, 
having existing examples allows for the presentation of transforming a design, rather than contriving new 
ones and facilitates the evaluation of the transformation against existing practices. RTNs also provide clear 
and discernible characteristics with which to specify fault definitions, as to a tightly structured graphical 
syntax. 
In addition to the control and structuring offered by a transformational design method, we require structur-
ing support for the proof task. Specifically, the form of the transformation -the arrangements of components 
being removed- should suggest the properties which are presented. For example, consider a component 
is removed which reads a value, computes some result and writes that result to an actuator within a time 
bound. Should we consider a value fault, then the new arrangement of components should still read and 
write a result within the time bounds, in addition to computing an agreed value. We therefore would 
consider this timeliness guarantee to be suggested by the transformational methodology. 
Finally, we have identified a structured approach to challenging designs to derive the faults feasible. and 
more importantly, the critical effect upon the overall success of the system at a component level. This then 
defines our fault hypothesis. In addition, it suggests which components should be replaced and isolates the 
reasoning in a compositional fashion. 
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[n this chapter, we outline a method for making (fault tolerant) design transformations to RTN-SL de-
signs which provides constraints on which transformations are feasible through specifying a context. The 
proposal to define the abstract syntax of design notations using graph grammars is not new [Pay95J. [n 
[Pay95 j, Paynter proposed a node-labelling controlled embedding (NCE) graph grammar to give semantics 
to an arbitrary MASCOT design. We extend that approach here. by using a context-sensitive grammar 
Before we present the transformations, we first outline the idea of a graph grammar. 
3.1 Introduction 
There are many graph grammar proposals in the literature, e.g. those of [AKTY99)[Roz87]. We have 
chosen an NCE context-sensitil'e graph grammar (NCE-CSG) [AKTY99j which is suitable to specify the 
abstract syntax for RTN-SL. We require a context-sensitive grammar to extend the previous work ([Pay95)) 
to pemlit the specification of fault-tolerant design templates and to restrict their application. That is. the 
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A, X" Y 
(ii) C {
(a, XI,p, Y, Yl, in) ,(c, XI, a, a, Yl,in). -
= (c, Xl,a,a, Y2,in) ,(d, X2,p, Y. Y2,oUI). 
Figure 3.1: Production rule, p 
type of templates we seek to present should not be instantiated into any part of a design. rather only an 
identified sub-system which is hypothesised to exhibit the faults we wish to tolerate. 
We first present some basic terminology and production rules of an NCE-CSG. 
Definition 3.1 (Graph) Let E be an alphabet of node labels and let r be an alphabet of edge labels. A 
graph over E and r is a 3-tuple D = (V, E, A). where: 
• V is afinite nonempty set of nodes. 
• E ~ {(v,y, w) I v, wE V, vi- w, y E r} is a set of edges. 
• A: V -t E is a node labelling function 
The components of a graph H are denoted by VH , EH and A. respectively [AKTY99]. 
Definition 3.2 (Suhgraph) Given two graphs. Hand G. we say H is a sllbgraph of G (or H is in-
duced of G) ijVH ~ VG andVn E VH, 3n' E VG ·abs_edge(EH,n) = abs_edge(EG,n') where abs_edge: 
edge_set x node -t edge_set gives the set of edges whose source or target is the node in graph. 
Definition 3.3 (A Directed Edge Neighbourhood-Controlled Embedding (edNCE) Grammar) The 
edNCE graph grammar [AKTY99] is a 6-tuple G = (En,E"rn,r"Z,p). where En and E, are sets of 
non-terminal and terminal node labels respectively, r nand r, are sets of non-terminal and terminal 
edge labels respectively. Z is the initial graph and P is a set of production niles for transforming Z A 
nile pEP has the form (A, X) : : == (B, Y), C where A. B. X and Yare graphs, X is a subgraph of A. 
Y a subgraph of B, and C is the embedding relation for p. It defines how X can be replaced by Y in the 
context of A and B, as specified by C. 
Figures 3.1, 3.2 & 3.3 show an example of applying a production rule p, depicted in Figure 3.1, and 
<-
transforming the Host graph H (Figure 3.2) into the Result graph H (Figure 3.3). 
The production rule of Figure 3.1 has two components: the parent/daughter graphs and the embedding 
relation. The parent graph in this instance has an additional context graph (A) component which restricts 
when a production is applicable. The embedding relation C states that where there exists in H an edge that 
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Figure 3.2: Host graph. H 
Figure 3.3: Result Graph. Ii 
is between nodes a and xl. xl EX. and labelled /3. there should exist in Ii an edge that is between a and 
yl, yl E Y. and labelled y, the field IN indicates the edge under consideration must be an incoming one 
incident on xl. 
We observe from Figure 3.2 that there exists an arrangement of nodes equal to the mother graph (X) of 
our production rule. Additionally. the graph has the required context. We can therefore remove the mother 
graph from the host graph and replace with the daughter graph. The resulting graph is shown in Figure 3.3. 
The graphs X and Y in a production rule of the form p = ((A,X):: == ((B, Y),e)) are often termed the 
mother and the daughter graphs respectively; the context graphs A or B may be omitted in which case A is X 
and B is Y. For p to be applied over a host graph H, A must be a subgraph of H. When all nodes and edges of 
X are removed from H. the remaining graph is referred as the rest graph. In certain scenarios, a production 
of the form p = ((A,X) :: == Y, C) is not sufficient to describe a context sensitive embedding. For example, 
the neighbourhood of a production may have surplus nodes that satisfy the embedding relation which are 
not required. we therefore specify an embedding context graph, B. A production rule p = (A,X) :: == 
(B, Y), e, where K = A-X = B-Y specifies how additionally the daughter graph is embedded in the context 
K in a production - a specification not given in C. An example illustrating this embedding is shown in 
Section 7.1. 
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02 
Figure 3.4: The RTN-SL Initial Graph 
3.2 The Grammar for RTN-SL 
Based on the semantics of the edNCE graph grammars. we have developed a 24-rule graph grammar 
which allows us to represent an RTN design in terms of a more abstract syntax. These rules can be used. in 
appropriate permutations. to represent any well-formed RTN design. All design representations are derived 
from the Initial Graph which is shown in Figure 3.4. 
The 24-rule RTN grammar is a 6-tuple G = (En,Et,rn,rt,Z,P). where: 
• En = {<AjDA >,<ACT >,< IDA >,<SM >,< STATE>,<D_ST>} and 
• Et = {< ida >, < d_st >, < s_st >, < port>} 
are sets of non-terminal and terminal node labels respectively; 
is the set of non-terminal and terminal edge labels l . Z is the Initial Graph shown in Figure 3.4. and P the 
set of production rules. Note that more than one node can have the same label drawn from the finite set and 
nodes are uniquely identified by integer tokens "01" or "02" as in Figure 3.4. The 24-rule of our grammar 
are grouped into 'families' based on the context in which they can be applied. The reader is referred to 
Appendix ?? for a complete presentation of the grammar. 
3.2.1 RTN Production Rules 
We now give a flavour of the full 24-rule of our grammar presented in graphical form. The reader is 
referred to [OE02] for the full presentation of the graph grammar and the abstract syntax and embedding in 
VDM-SL2. We group similar rules into 'families' dependent on their mother graphs. Then. for each rule. 
we describe the production rules daughter graphs. The embedding relations applicable for each rule in a 
'family'. are not presented here and the reader is again referred to [OE02] for a complete description. 
I Due to the nature of our grammar -where each edge label is unique to the arc- we take artistic license with read. write and 
boolean labels respectively. 
2The abstract syntax of our grammar is embedding in VDM-SL to allow for an exploration of automating the process of applying 
graph grammar productions and begin to specify the requirements for a tool set 
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(a) (b) (e) 
Figure 3.5: The A_IDA family based production rules and embedding relations 
The first family of (three) rules shown in Figure 3.5 specifies how the non-terminal node labelled A_IDA 
can be transformed into networks. An AjDA always consumes data supplied by activities and produces an 
output for an IDA. The first rule (a) shows how a new A_IDA can be instantiated into a network. The second 
rule (b) specifies the basic decomposition of an AjDA into a pair of ACT and IDA nodes to represent an 
activity (ACn writing to an IDA. The third rule (c) indicates how data from a new data source can be 
instantiated into an existing area of a network. 
The next group of production rules, shown in Figure 3.6, are the first context-sensitive production rules 
to appear. These are intended to (a) direct the input from one specific inwardly direct port to a single 
state. States may only read from one port, therefore any existing inwardly directed data flows to node 01 
are directed to node 03 in the production (specified in the embedding relations). Rules (b) and (c) direct 
output to a specific port and similarly specific input & output to a state respectively. Details to note are the 
repetition of the context graph on both sides of the production. The context graph K. where K = X -A = Y-8 
specify how the mother (X) and therefore daughter (Y) graphs must be connected to the rest graph before 
and after the production respectively. However, the embedding relation c = (E, vx.r,r, Vr, {IN,OUT}) 
must not specify nodes in Vx as nodes in K (VK rt. Vx), which respects the context-sensitive embedding. 
Should there exist a node in VK in the embedding relation then the desired finite detail is lost and the rules 
are not context-sensitive. 
3.3 Design Transformations using Graph Grammars 
Although the 24-rule grammar introduced previously is sufficiently rich to derive all permissible designs. 
our focus is on transforming existing designs rather than deriving new ones. However. the 24-rule grammar 
does serve to illustrate that the grammar on which the fault tolerant transformations are based is sound. 
We wish to transform designs by applying templates -described in the graph grammar syntax- which repre-
sent classical fault tolerance strategies. By encoding each strategy as graph grammar production rules we 
harness the transformation aspect of graph grammars. Both the presentation of mother and daughter graphs 
and -more importantly- the embedding relation enable 'faulty' components to be removed from a design 
and replaced with an arrangement of components that tolerates the fault and preserves the interfaces. By 
'preserve', it is meant that each connection from the host graph that existed previously. is replaced by a 
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Figure 3.6: Context Sensitive SM productions and embedding relations 
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Figure 3.7: Passive state template 
connection from the rest graph to daughter graph. Embedding relations inherently give us the control to 
describe this aspect of the transformation. 
Our chosen transformational design technology is graph grammars for three principal reasons: (i) it is 
possible to represent a well-formed RTN design in an equivalent graph grammar design; (ii) production 
rules inherent in graph grammars allow one graph to be embedded into another (host) graph in a specified 
manner; and (iii) certain properties (e.g., flatness) desired of an RTN design can be verified effectively 
in the equivalent graph grammar representation. For instance, Paynter used a graph grammar to verify 
properties desired from a low-level design specification [Pay95]. 
Context Sensitive 
Suppose a context-sensitive grammar had not been used. Then, for example, the presentation of the essence 
of a production, such as shown in Figure 3.7 would be complicated with repeating the context of the parent 
graph again with the daughter graph, which also then extends the neighbourhood of the transformation fur-
ther complicating the embedding relation. This undue complexity is removed by using a context sensitive 
grammar. 
Given the previous exposition of design transformations using graph grammars, we now describe one 
example of the fault tolerant templates, our ultimate goa\. The template shown in Figure 3.7 is termed 
passive state replication in which one faulty dynamic state (fcd)'_st) is replaced with a series of three 
sirnil;n3 states. The context of this variation4 of the rule is that the parent graph must write an output to 
some port. The embedding relation specifies that each incoming state-machine transition to 01 is replaced 
by a state-machine transition to 02 and that each outward transition from 0 I is replaced by one from each 
replica. The embedding relation also creates the links that specify each replica writes to the output port. 
3They may still exhibit the assumed fault 
40ther possibilities are read or write only & reads and writes. 
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Figure 3.8: Abstract System Specification 
Advantages 
By providing a transformational design method as we propose, we have established a mechanism which 
constrains the transformations. By choosing to use a graph grammar we retain the graphical structure 
inherent to RTNs, but gain a transformation mechanism for which we can describe our templates in suitable 
abstract form. Having chosen to use a context sensitive graph grammar, we have already argued how the 
transformations are more concise and benefits us by restricting the disruption on the surrounding network. 
3.4 An Example derivation using the graph grammar 
We now introduce a RTN-SL design fragment for a small example which illustrates how an RTN-SL spec-
ified real-time system can be transformed and reasoned about with respect to faults and failures. This 
running example will first serve to make concrete our understanding of the definitions of system and spec-
ification, then the specification of faults with respect an RTN. We then propose a simple transfomlation 
which will serve as our continuing example in subsequent chapters. 
3.4.1 Scenario 
We consider a target tracking sub-system as our example. Typical constraints on such a system are that it 
should produce updated vector information of the target to port, p4 within some time of a new image data 
arriving at port, pI, and that it should not produce a vector update if there has not been a new image. 
3.4.2 Specification 
From this scenario, we can extract two end-to-end specification properties. One is a timeliness and the 
other a safety property. One typically needs to specify both kinds of properties for real-time systems. 
Work has been done on showing how many of the common real-time system requirements can be formally 
expressed in the RTL logic [JMS88]. The timeliness and safety properties for this system are no exception. 
The timeliness property the system should exhibit can be formalised as: 
Theorem 3.1 (Liveliness) Vi: Occ,tl : Time· 0(Rp l,i,td => 3t2: Time· 0(Wp4,i. t~);\(2 ::; tl +X 
This state that every input at pI should give rise to an output within X time units at p4, where X is the 
system deadline. 
A safety property the system should exhibit can be formalised as: 
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A: Identify Target B: ~ Target Vec:lDr 
Figure 3.9: A Target Tracker 
This states that every output (i.e. each occurrence) should be in response to an earlier input. 
3.4.3 Design 
The network in Figure 3.9 consists of two activities linked by a channel, and is a typical design fragment 
which might be found in many real-time tracking systems. The example is motivated due to [pAHOO). 
The arrival of fresh target images from some input sensors triggers activity A, which performs some image 
processing to determine the coordinates of the target. These coordinates are then passed to B via the 
channel, and B calculates how the target is moving, and outputs this vector to the rest of the system. 
Space does not permit a full RTN-SL specification for the system to be given. Instead. the graphical 
specification (a subset of the textual specification) shows the arrangement of activities, IDAs, ports and 
state-machine representation of the functional behaviour of each activity in Figure 3.9. Where required. 
the textual specification is given to highlight functional behaviour which must be preserved. or highlight 
the specifics of the components we intend to transform. 
3.4.3.1 RTN-SL Design Fragment 
The textual fragment that follows supplements the graphical specification of Figure 3.9 to illustrate the 
tight coupling between the graphical form and textual specification. This aspect. though very useful at the 
production level. makes it tedious to pursue our objective of design transformations in a larger scale. 
LOCAL STATE 
Prev_Target_Pos TI; 
END LOCAL STATE; 
op assess_Threat (image Image.Processed_Image) 
assess: Threat.Threat_Assessment; 
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EXT READ ... 
EXT WRITE 
PRE true; 
Figure 3.10: Host Graph, G H 
POST exists (tr: Threat.Threat_Assessment): assess tr; 
end op; 
static stateD 
transition goes stateE on Rp3; 
end state; 
dynamic stateE 
op asses_threat reads from p3 writes to p4; 
[_1_1_]; 
transition goes to stateD on true; 
end state; 
Graph Grammar representation of GH 
Figure 3.10 illustrates the graph grammar presentation of the design of Figure 3.9. 
3.4.4 Faults 
In the absence of a SHARD [MP98] investigation on the eventual design, we hypothesise the faults plausi-
ble in our example which could have a detrimental affect. Drawing from the system requirements, and to 
make this example interesting, we consider a timing fault within the system, specifically a late write fault 
at portp4. 
Fault Hypothesis 
A fault that causes a component to produce the expected value for a given nonempty input sequence too 
late will be termed a late timing fault, which in RTL can be defined as: 
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LATE_FAULT: Event x Occ x Interval--> B 
LATE_FAULT(e,i,l) ~ 
3t' :TIme't';::: I.u/\ 0(e, i,t') 
The basic RTL formula states that an event, e occurs for some occurence, i at some time, t. Th LATE_FAULT 
formula states that an event (e) occurs for the of the interval (I). This auxiliary function (and the fault axiom 
stated below) are discussed further in Section 4.2 when the Real-TIme Logic (RTL) is introduced. The aim 
of the auxiliary function is to state the characteristics of the specific fault (Similar functions are defined 
for Early, Omit and Commit faults) so that the fault axioms can clearly identify the observable interval an 
event should occur within. 
Specific to our example a late write at port p4, in RTL, is specified to identify the time the read event 
occured (for the same occurence) and that the write event occurs later than some deadline (X). 
LateWrite(p4, i, t) !?:. 
3t': TIme· t' ~ t /\ 0(Rpl ,i, t') /\ 
LATE_FAULT(Wp4,i, [t',t' + X]) 
In turn, this fault hypothesis would be considered for each design component, to establish where the fault 
in a componenrS leads to a fault in the system. 
Note, extending the specification to include our fault hypothesis leads to a contradiction against the safety 
and timeliness properties. This contradiction can be seen by looking at the timeliness property and the 
fault hypothesis. The timeliness property states that the output must be produced within some deadline 
(X), whereas the fault hypothesis states that the output event will not occur until after this deadline. This 
contradiction must be addressed by the fault tolerant template. 
3.4.5 The chosen Template 
The RTN-SL graph grammar design fragment shown in Figure 3.12 illustrates the arrangement of design 
components proposed to tolerate the fault identified above. This passive state replication (PSR) design 
template requires three diverse functions6 which can calculate a target vector. 
Design Context 
The environment of a template in a host graph is crucially important. The interactions between an envi-
ronment and template may be either flows of data or control algorithms. The existing links which define 
the environment not only specify what new links should be established during the embedding, but also the 
context on which our context-sensitive grammar relies. From Figure 3.12, we can see the context (shown 
in Figure 3.11) specified for this example is that a dynamic state must read an input and write an output: 
only in this context is the template applicable. 
Considering the template in Figure 3.12 more closely, the environment we consider from the host graph 
(Figure 3.10) on the IN direction is the arc D --> E and similarly E --> p4 on the OUT direction. When 
evaluating the embedding relation it is these arcs that stipulate those required during the embedding phase. 
Si.e. that a late exit from a dynamic state (that writes to p4) leads to a late write 
6The existence, and design of such functions is assumed. 
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Figure 3.11: Production Rule Context 
(.,OI,c.,02,c.,in). 
(.,OI,c.,02,c',oUl), (.,OI,c.,03,ca.oUl), ( •. 01. c'. 04.(" •. 0lIl) 
Figure 3.12: Graph Grammar Syntax of PSR Template 
Specific to this context and fault tolerant pattern is the issue of a blocking protocol at port p3. The char-
acteristics of a blocking protocol are that a reader is held up and the data is consumed by the reader (c.r. 
Section 2.4). Therefore the template must be specific in dealing with this issue and highlights why a context 
sensitive grammar is required. Should rp 1 fail, the data acquired by rp 1 reading p3 would be destroyed and 
not available for rp2 or rp3. The solution is discussed with the production rule applicable. 
Production Rule 
The rule, shown in Figure 3.12, states that, should the first dynamic state (with an associated operation) fail 
to produce a result within some given interval (Worst Case Response Time (WCRT», afailllre transition is 
taken to the second replica, which similarly has an upper bound to produce a result. Should this replica fail, 
a further failure transition is followed to a third and final state. The embedding relation, c of Figure 3.12 
additionally specifies the successful transitions from each replica: if a replica produces the result within 
interval WCRT, a transition to the successor should occur. The fault tolerant property of this configuration 
is timing (and crash) tolerance. 
Note, the mother of this production rule could be decorated with a context graph, one which includes the 
parent graph and specifies the context in which it can be replaced, however in this example no context 
graph is required. 
RTN-SL 
Supporting specification not contained in the graph grammar presentation of this template is given below. 
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static stateD 
transition goes to stateE'_rpl on Rp3; 
end state; 
dynamic stateE'_rpl 
op _ peeps from p3 writes to p4; 
[E'_rpl_l,_,E'_rpl_u); 
transition goes to stateD on true; 
late_fault =) transition goes to stateE_rp2; 
end state; 
dynamic stateE'_rp2 
op _ peeps from p3 writes to p4; 
[E'_rp2_l,_,E'_rp2_u); 
transition goes to stateD on true; 
late_fault =) transition goes to stateE_rp3; 
end state; 
dynamic stateE'_rp3 
op _ reads from p3 writes to p4; 
[E'_rp3_l,_,E'_rp3_u); 
transition goes to stateD on true; 
end state; 
Considering an issue raised previously - that the data acquired by rpJ reading p3 would be destroyed and 
not available for rp2 or rp3 - we specify in the supplemental RTN-SL how the template (in the context of a 
read-blocking protocol) overcomes this issue. The specification is now that rpJ & rp2 speculatively read 
from p3 which means p3 doesn't have to be stored in the local state, L. The third replica, rp3 still though 
performs a read as it must succeed. 
3.4.6 Transformation 
The design transformation is carried out in the following manner. Figure 3.12 showed a dynamic state 
(D_ST) can be replaced by a specific arrangement of three replicas. Figure 3.\0 showed the host graph 
which represents the RTN-SL design. Removing the parent graph from the host graph gives the rest graph 
to which we add the daughter graph. The transformation is completed by establishing the arc's specified in 
the embedding relation between the rest graph and the daughter graph. 
The result graph nett' obtained after applying the template is given in Figure 3.13. 
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E' 
Figure 3.13: Result graph netl· 
3.5 Evaluation 
We have described a methodological way to transform an abstract representation of RTNs using graph 
grammars by providing templates of classical fault tolerant strategies. The method is sufficiently enabled. 
for example. to deal with the complexities of replication where the interface must be preserved so as to 
localise the environment disruption and ensure the method is compositional. 
An initial investigation into defining the semantics of graph transformations. specifically those which 
should transform a design to a more fault tolerant one. is discussed in [OE02]. 
The original specification and design given above and the considered fault hypothesis are related as de-
scribed in Figure 2.12. We can now begin to understand what is required to complete this example. and 
ultimately this thesis. to conclude i) the transformation proposed tolerates the anticipated fault. and ii) the 
transformed design maintains the functional properties that satisfied the original design. Building up a 
methodological framework from Figure 2.12. by first adding the relation shown in Figure 2.11 leads to 
a three-dimensional framework. The missing. or remaining. vertices to this framework are the semantic 
elements of our work which allows for formal verification of our designs. 
It is evident we now require a semantic framework that relates each aspect of our design methodology. 
as now illustrated in Figure 3.14. To complete our methodology framework we are required to: define 
-as axioms- the semantics of each fault we wish to tolerate; show the existing axiomatic semantics sound 
with respect a more constructive model; and preserve the existing behaviours of RTNs under the explicit 
assumption that no faults occur. We therefore propose to define an operational semantic model for RTN-SL. 
Each aspect of our framework is discussed. and the relationships that exist: 
• spec:: We refer to the specification (spec) as end-to-end properties we wish to hold of our design. 
Section 3.4.2 gives two such examples. 
• FHI :: Is an abstract specification of some fault behaviour. Section 3.4.4 gives an example of a late 
write fault of our abstract system specification. 
• spec EEl FHI :: This notation is illustrative to the combination. or addition. of some fault hypothesis 
(FH) in unison to a specification. In our example we allow for alternative behaviours. either the 
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spec 'Z':.-'r!'-, .:."~.~ F=.H;.-.-. - .. -.---> [speeD 
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DFT ------>Q[DFTB 
Figure 3.14: Required Semantic Framework 
write event at p4 is timely (0( weJl4, i, t» or is late (Late Write ( weJl4, i,l», so spec of! FH I can be 
considered as: 0( weJl4, i, t) V Late Write ( weJl4, i, I). speCF is simply indicative of a specification 
and each FH we consider, rather than writing spec EEl FH I EEl ... EEl FHn . 
• D,DFT:: A design, D is an RTN-SL representation of a solution proposed to satisfy a specification. 
DFT is indicative to the design which tolerates all faults we consider and satisfies speCF. Section 
3.4.3 details an example design and Section 3.4.5 shows an extract from the fault tolerant design we 
propose satisfies speCF. 
What is therefore missing is a formal framework to show the design, DFT does satisfy speCF. In the next 
Part, we define more formally the specification of faults and the axiomatic semantics (ill) they generate. 
Finally, [spec] and [specF] are terms which express the semantic implication of our end-to-end specifi-
cation in the semantic model. Although spec and FHx are written as RTL predicates, [spec] and [specF] 
may appeal to other semantic properties, such as internal events, when reasoned about. 
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In this Chapter, we address the issue of giving a semantics of faults. which is the core of this thesis. We: first 
introduce the Real Time Logic (RTL) for which the existing RTN-SL semantics are axiomatically 'pccified. 
Using RTL, we give an axiomatic semantics for the faults we consider in RTNs. We then introduce ami 
describe the RTN-SL language extension and semantics we propose for descrihing failures. 
4.1 Real Time Logic 
Real-Time Logic (RTL) was developed for specifying and reasoning about real-time behaviours of computer-
based systems. It was originally described in [JM86], since then RTL has been used for the definition of 
several graphical notations, specifically those for real-time systems which include Statechart., [Arm98]. 
ADL [PAHoo] and in defining the semantics of a family of communication protocols [Sim03]. RTL is used 
also to describe the axiomatic semantics of RTN-SL [Pay02]. 
4.1.1 RTL Event Model 
The RTL event model is only informally defined in the literature [J1\-186] which uses a trace based model. 
That is. RTL reflects an early approach to reasoning about time-dependent systems. RTL makes no mention 
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of states or transitions, either in the language or in its model. Although an RTL interpretation can be 
regarded as a sequence of event sets, it is not necessary to do so, and this is different from most other 
techniques of modelling computer systems, which rely on transition systems. In the transition system 
approach, the behaviour of the system is represented by a sequence of states, which are intended to represent 
the system configurations. Two consequences of this distinction are important and discussed below. 
First, in RTL time passes between sets of occurrences of occurring events, and the actual sets of events 
are instantaneous, while in transition systems, time passes in states, and transitions between them are 
instantaneous. Second, transition systems are generally defined by their transition, so that if two actions of 
the modelled system occur concurrently, a transition must be explicitly included to reflect that concurrent 
action, while such concurrency is implicit in RTL. 
The last difference has two further results. Any computation of a transition system induces a total order 
on event occurrences, even those that occur at the same time. The fact that interleaving guarantees the 
existence of other computations where the ordering is different does not change this for any particular 
computation. Also, if two actions begin and end at the same time, transition system must introducefalLt-
states in which one action has completed and the other has not. 
In order to reason formally about a specification, three things are required: afonnallangllage in which 
assertions can be formulated; an interpretation of the meaning of the expressions and statements of the 
formal language; and a set of axioms and inference mles describing inferences which are valid for the 
given interpretation [BFL +94] 
4.1.2 Syntax 
We first give the formal language syntax for RTL, in which the formula's of RTL are made up of the 
following symbols: 
• The truth symbols trlle and false 
• A set of time variable symbols A 
• A set of occurrence variable symbols B 
• A set of constant symbols C including the natural numerals, N 
• A set of event constant symbols D 
• The function symbol + 
• The predicate symbols <, S;, >, ~, = 
• The occurrence relation symbol e 
• The logical connectives /\, V, ...." => 
• Existential and universal quantifier symbols 3, V 
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Time tenns are RTL expressions built up over the constant symbols C and A which I, + 12 is also a time 
tenn. 
Occurrence tenns are RTL expressions built up over the constant symbols C and B which i + j is also an 
occurrence tenn 
The propositions of RTL are constructed according to the following rules: 
• The truth symbols true andfalse are propositions 
• If t, and t2 are time tenns and p is a predicate symbol, then t, pt2 is a proposition 
• If i andj are occurrence tenns and p is a predicate symbol, then ipj is a proposition 
• If i is an occurrence tenn, t is a time tenn and e is an event constant, then e(e, i, t) is a proposition. 
Theformulas of RTL are constructed from the propositions, logical connectives and quantifiers according 
to the following grammar: 
Key: 
{x} 
(alb) 
a b 
x is optional 
a or b 
a followed by b 
end of a grammar rule 
"ABC" 
separator between non-terminals and its definition 
The terminal word 'ABC' 
A (concrete) syntax for RTL fonnulas 
fonnula 
Bfonnula 
Efonnula 
predicate_application 
logical_op 
NumericExp 
comparator 
variable_list 
expression_list 
th-exp 
BNumericExp 
literal 
var_name 
type_name 
expression 
evenCname 
arith op 
"(" fonnula ")" I "...," fonnula I Bfonnula I Efonnula I 
predicate_application I name I "true" I "false"; 
fonnula logical_op fonnula I NumbericExp comparator NumericExp; 
(" 3" I "\I") variable_list"·" fonnula; 
name "(" expression_list ")" I th-exp; 
"V" I "/\" I "~" 1"<*"; 
"(" NumericExp ")" I "_" NumericExp I BNumericExp I name ) literal; 
"<") "~" I ">" I "~" I "=" I ";i:"; 
var_name ":" type_name { " ," variable_list}; 
expression { " ," expression_list}; 
ne" "(" evenCname"," NumericExp"," NumericExp ")"; 
NumericExp arith_op NumericExp; 
number I number" ." number; 
name; 
name; 
fonnula I NumericExp; 
name; 
"+" I "-" I "*"; 
Example 4.1 (Example RTL Formulas) Two typical RTLformlllas that are examples of the concrete 
syntax are: 
\It, : Time, i: Occ· e(e" i, I,) ~ 3t2: Time· t2 > t, /\ e(e2. i, t2) 
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spec 
currect 
~ inot seenj ~ I omission I 
observable 
-
r-__ ~r-__ ~ ____________________________ ~tin 
.. 
o t; ti + td ~ td + tmcu tk 00 
Figure 4.1: Repeat of Figure 2.5: Observable fault intervals 
'<It) : TIme, i: Occ· 0(e,i + I, tJ) => 3t2: TIme· t2 < tl/\ 0(e,i,t2) 
The first expresses two events (el and e2) are causally linked, the second formula states that a sl/bse-
quent occurrence of an event must occur strictly later than its predecessor. 
4.2 Faults in Real-Time Networks 
From our informal description on fault specifications in Section 2.1.3, we now seek a more formal pre-
sentation. Using RTL, we first formalise four key definitions as auxiliary functions, then for each RTN 
component we consider the faults that can be specified on it and which will be considered in this thesis. 
This set of fault definitions form our fault hypotheses for RTNs. The auxiliary functions for LATE, EARLY, 
OMIT and COMMIT faults which are used in the RTN definition of faults are given below. The intervals 
highlighted in Figure 4.1 (which is a repeat of Figure 2.5) illustrated the bounds between which a fault is 
observable. These functions simply define whether an event is observable, or not, given the type of fault. 
The bounds to each interval are dependent on the fault type, Table 4.1 enumerates each bound with respect 
to the time markings in Figure 4.1. 
An interval, I is a pair of TIme values, namely the lower (I) and upper (u) time bounds. 
Interval I : TIme 
u: TIme 
inv mk-interval(l, ll) !::.I ~ u 
LATE: Event x Occ x Interval-+ IS 
LATE(e,i,l) !::. 
3t': TIme· t' ~ I.ll/\ 0(e, i,t') 
EARLY: Event x Occ x Interval-+ IS 
EARLY(e,i,l) !::. 
3t': TIme· t' ~ 1.1/\ 0(e, i,t') 
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OMIT: Event x Occ x Interval--> 18 
OMIT(e,i,l} ~ 
~I: Time ·1.1:::; I:::; I.u/\ 9(e,i,l} 
COMMIT: Event x Occ x Interval--> 18 
COMMIT(e,i,l} ~ 
31: TIme·l.l:::; 1 :::; I.u /\ 9(e,i,l} 
I Fault Type I 
LATE 
EARLY 
COMMIT 
OMIT 
Interval 
ti + td --> ti + td + tfTl/ll 
ti + td --> ti + td + tfTl/ll 
0-+ ti 
ti+td -+ 00 
Table 4.1: Bounds to Fault intervals 
Note, a LATE & EARLY fault occurs after or before some interval respectively, whereas COMMIT & 
OMIT faults are within some interval. It should be noted, that the value tk shown in Figure 4.1 is not 
realised in these definitions. However, the dynamic semantics for RTNs do distinguish between late & 
omit faults and such a value is retrieved from the semantics, as is stated for each omission fault definition 
that follows. 
4.2.1 Fault Hypotheses 
Following on from the abstract definition of faults given previously, we now seek to apply those definitions 
to a specific real-time architecture, namely that of Real-Time Networks (RTNs). Identified in the definitions 
are bounds to the time intervals in which each fault is observable. Fortunately, such time bounds are implicit 
in the semantics of RTNs. For each fault identified in Table 4.2, we provide a suitable RTL proposition 
which specifies the dynamic behaviour over the component identified. The collection of these predicates 
form our fault hypotheses (FH) for RTNs. 
Consider a RTN-SL component: a dynamic state. Graphically this is described in Figure 4.2, which spec-
ifies that once the state has been entered, it should be left within ul time units. Afault hypothesis may be 
that the write action to the output port (PX) is delayed. The subsequent/ault definition may be: 
LateWrite(we""pX,i,t} ~ 
31: Time· 1 + III < t /\ 9(V\,i,l} /\ 
LATE(we""pX,i, [I +11,1 + ul]) 
This states that a late write fault is observed at time, t which is defined with respect the time (I) when state 
A was entered and its specified time bounds i.e. the write event (which triggers the exit transition) should 
not occur before II time units (I + II) nor later than ul time units (I +ul). The auxiliary function of LATE 
distinguishes the fault from that of an omission stating the event does occur, despite being late. 
If all the components of a RTN are to be considered faulty, the design transformation to a tolerant RTN 
would be intractable. Rather, we propose that only a sub-part of an RTN be considered faulty (identified 
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c1 
px 
we-pX 
Figure 4.2: A Dynamic State 
by some suitable safety assessment approach, e.g. SHARD) at a time. This requires that the extended 
semantics of ill should specify which component is perceived as being potentially faulty. This requirement 
is critical and influences the RTN-SL language extension, semantics and approach to defining our fault 
hypothesis accordingly. 
Definition 4.1 A component is defined to be a distinguishable semantic object which has discernible 
dynamic behaviour. Particularly, a RTN component is one of -determined by the semantics- a static or 
dynamic state, Activity, Port or an IDA. A fault component is defined to be a component which exhibits 
extraordinary behaviour (as defined below) which is at conflict with the expected behaviour. 
For each fault classification, described in Chapter 2, we consider it plausibility on each RTN component. 
A complete presentation of every permutation between each fault classification (i.e. late, early, value, 
etc) and all RTN events (i.e. state entry, read, read vale, etc) would generate over 100 fault definitions. 
Many of these definitions would overlap, for example, a late exit state fault would incur a late entry fault 
at a successor state. Instead, we identify in Table 4.2 those faults which are most meaningful and do 
not overlap. Those celIs in Table 4.2 which are blank indicate a meaningful fault does not exist for the 
permutation, the shaded celIs indicate a fault definition is feasible, though overlaps another. 
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LateDyExit 
Table 4.2: Faults considered 
The fault classifications distinguished in Table 4.2 are taken from the SHARD analysis method and those 
guide words derived in Section 4.2. 
The form of the fault hypothesis definitions given below follows closely from that used to define the se-
mantics of RTN-SL [Pay02]. Each FH has the form: every syntactic entity in the state-machine. which 
satisfies certain static connection properties. will exhibit some specified dynamic behaviour. However. we 
do not intend to consider all consituent components of a RTN to be faully. Instead. we only consider those 
components to be faulty which are found by the SHARD analysis. 
As an aid to presentation, the quantification over the syntactic entities of the RTN-SL specification is left 
implicit, and the static syntactic guards are presented in square brackets at the start of each schema. To 
support our specifications below, we require several auxiliary functions which determine the event name 
associated with components under certain actions, such as read and write actions at ports and entry and exit 
actions of states, as illustrated below: 
rds : Port -> Event 
wds : Port -> Event 
1 : State -> Event 
As stated previously, the bounds ti, tj, td, 6t and t1TllLt from Figure 4.1 are realised within the RTN archi-
tecture either by time bounds on events, deadlines on components or the occurrence of other events. e.g. 
Omission: 00 could be defined as re-entering the state for the i + 1 occurrence. These bounds can be deter-
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mined in the context of RTN components and are defined and discussed in the following RTL definitions 
of faults. For each definition, a brief commentary will describe the expected dynamic behaviour which 
determines each fault in isolation. 
4.2.1.1 State Machine Component Faults 
The constituent components of state machine are its (static and dynamic) state which we consider as atomic. 
Therefore, all the behaviours of an RTN can be defined as state-machine actions: 
LateRead :: Dynamic State, Late Read Fault - Given a dynamic state performs a read for the ith 
occurrence, then a late read fault occurs should the read not start immediately upon entering the associated 
dynamic state. 
LATE specifies an event occurs after the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower Ts A read cannot start before entering the associated (non-faulty) state. 
upper s.wert If a state is supposed to read and hasn't before the state's WCRT 
deadline, then the read is late 
[is_DynamieState(s),s.in""p f= nil, inHolding (s.in""p)] 
LateRead(s.in""p, i, t) ~ 
3 1',1" : TIme· I' < t 50. 1" /\ 0(lf, i, 1') /\ ....,0(!s', i, 1") /\ 
LATE(rds(s.in""p),i, [1',1' +s.wertJ) 
Note, this definition weakens the existing semantics defined by n, which states that a read must occur at 
the same time as entering the (dynamic) state. By the laws of RTL, t is bound to occur later than 1.11 given 
the definition of LATE. 
LateWrite :: Dynamic State, Late Write Fault - Similarly, should a dynamic state be specified to 
perform a write, then a late write fault occurs should the write commence later than the exit transition from 
the associated dynamic state: 
LATE specifies an event occurs after the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower If + beet A write cannot commence before the best case deadline. 
upper If + weet A write must occur before the worst case deadline. 
[is_DynamieState(s) , Non Holding (S.Ollt....P ), ...., is_Speculative (s. Ollt....p )] 
LateWrite(s.out....P,i,t) ~ 
3 1',1" : TIme· I' < t 50. 1" /\ 0(lf, i,t') /\...., 0(!s', i, 1") /\ 
LATE(wds(s.out....P) , i, [t' +s.beet,t' +s.weetJ) 
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OmitRead:: Dynamic State, Read Omission Fault - Eventually a late readfault becomes an omission 
fault. However, unlike the definitions in Section 2.1.3, we can enumerate co to a more precise, discernible 
value: 
OMIT specifies that an event does not occur within the interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower f5 = I A read cannot start before entering the associated state. 
upper I' I' is specified as either the time at which s is exited 1 , or the time at 
which the (holding) port is next read from (which may potentially 
be another state in the activity). 
[is_DynamieState(s), InHolding (s.in"'p )] 
OmitRead(s.in...p, i, t) ~ 
31,1' : Time· I < t $. I' /\ 0(ls", i, I) /\ 
(0(~, i+ 1, I') V 0(rds(s.in"'p), i+ 1,1') /\ 
OMIT(rd(s.in"'p), i, [I, I']) 
Omit Write :: Dynamic State, Write Omission Fault - Similarly to read omit fault, the specification 
here makes a precise value for 00 which is the upper bound of a write omit fault: 
OMIT specifies that an event does not occur within the interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower j.\' = I A write cannot commence before leaving its associated state, earlier 
would be a early write fault. 
upper I' A write must occur before the port is next written to (otherwise an 
omission faults occurs) or before the dynamic state is next entered 
[is_DynamieState(s), OutHolding(s.out...p)] 
OmitWrite(s.out...p, i, t) ~ 
31,1': Time· I < t$. I' /\0(~,i,I)/\ 
(0(ls",i+ 1,1') V0(wds(s.out...p),i+ 1,1')/\ 
OMIT(we(s.out...p) , i, [1,1']) 
EarlyRead :: Dynamic State, Early Read Fault - Should an dynamic state perform a read action before 
the associated dynamic state is entered, then a early readfault has occurred: 
EARLY specifies an event occurs before the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower is A read should occur when entering a (non-faulty) state 
upper f5 + beet A read must occur before the earliest exit can occur and therefore 
respect its time bounds 
[is_DynamieState(s),s.in...P"I nil] 
EarlyRead(s.in...p, i, t) ~ 
31: Time· t < I /\0(ls", i, I) /\ 
EARLY(rds(s.in...p), i, [I,t' + beet]) 
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EarlyWrite :: Dynamic State, Early Write Fault - An early write fault occun; should the write occur 
before the best ca'>e execution time (BeEn delay: 
EARLY specifies an event occurs before the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower lv + beet A write should not start before entering the associate state and the 
upper 
minimum time delay has elapsed 
lv + weet A write should occur upon leaving a state and therefore within its 
time bounds 
[is_DynamieState(s),s.out-p =J nil] 
EarlyWrite(s.out-P, i, t) !:=. 
31': Time· 1'::; tI\0(~,i,1')1\ 
EARLY(we(s.out-P) , i, [1' + beet, l' + weet]) 
Write Value:: Dynamic State, Write Value Fault - A write value fault occurs if the value written at the 
time of leave the associated state does not satisfy the post-condition: 
[is_DynamieState(s) ] 
WriteValue(s.out-p, i, t) !:=. 
31': Time· l' ::; tI\0(~, i, 1') 1\0(1I", i, t) 1\ 
pre_(s.in-p(1') , ~ (1')) 1\ 
-,posUs.in-p(1') , ~ (1'), v(t),s.out-p(t)) 
Note, the timing of ~ is the same as timing of the fault, which excludes timing (and therefore omission) 
from the definition. 
ReadValue :: Dynamic State, Read Value Fault - A read value fault occurs if the value read at the time 
of entering the associated state does not satisfy the pre/post-condition: 
[is_DynamieState(s) ] 
ReadValue(s.in-p, i, t) !:=. 
31' : Time· t < l' 1\0(~, i,t) 1\0(1I", i, 1') 1\ 
pre_(s.in-p(t) , ~ (t)) 1\ 
-,posUs.in-p(t) , ~ (t), v(1'),s.out-p(t')) 
Crash :: Dynamic State, Crash Fault - A erash fault occurs of a state, s should there have occurred an 
event (ls) entering the state and no occurrence of leaving the state (~) during the interval from entering s 
to t.: 
OMIT specifies that an event does not occur within the interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower 1S+beet Once a (non-faulty) state is entered, it may exit any time after the 
upper 
minimum delay. 
A crash fault is a special case of omit, in that the omission is 
bounded to 00, or in our case the time at which we observe the fault, 
t. 
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[is_DynamicState(s) , .is_TenninateState(s)] 
Crash(s,i,t) ~ 
31: TIme· 1 < t 1\ 0(fy, i, I) 1\ 
OMIT(!s, i, [I +s.beet,t])I\OMIT(fy, i+ I, [I +s.beet, t]) 
It is interesting to note that I.u = t. If a erash fault is observable at t, then it has been observable since t' 
(see Figure 4.1). Whereas a erash fault (a special case of an omit fault) is bounded to 00 in Section 2.1.3. 
no assertion to I.u can be made greater than t. 
LateDyExit :: Dynamic State, Late Exit Fault - Upon entering a state. the state must be exited before 
the deadline, otherwise a late exit fault has occurred: 
LATE specifies an event occurs after the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower ls + beet A state cannot be exited until at least after the minimum time delay 
after entering the state 
upper ls + weet A state must exit within its deadlines 
[is_DynamieState(s) ] 
LateDyExit(s,i,t) ~ 
31: TIme· 1:$ tI\0(fy, i, I) 1\ 
LATE(!s, i, [I +s.beet, 1 +s.weet]) 
EarlyDyExit:: Dynamic State, Early Exit Fault - A early exit fault occurs should a state exit before 
the minimum time delay has elapsed: 
EARLY specifies an event occurs before the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower ls + beet A state cannot be exited until at least after the minimum time delay 
after entering the state 
upper ls + weet A state must exit within its deadlines 
[is_DynamieState(s)] 
EarlyDyExit(s,i,t) ~ 
31: TIme· 1 :$ t 1\0(ls, i, I) 1\ 
EARLY(!s, i, [I +s.beet, 1 +s.weet]) 
EarlyStTImeExit :: Static State, Early (Timing) Exit Fault - Should a static state exit before the speci-
fied time, then a early exit fault is said to have occurred: 
EARLY specifies an event occurs before the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are:EARLY 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower ls + I A static state should not be exited before the lower bound, I speci-
fied. 
upper Ts + II A static state should not exit later than the upper bound. u specified. 
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[is_StatieState(s), tr E TransitionsOut(s, ts), is_TImingBounds(tr.label) , tr.labeLr: = (I, II)] 
EarlyStTImeExit(s, i, t) ~ 
31': Time· I' < tl\f)(~, i,t') 1\ 
EARLY(!s',i, [I' +1,1' +u]) 
EarlyStEvExil' :: Static State, Early (Event) Exit Fault - Should a static state exit before the specified 
exit event, then a early exit fault is said to have occurred. 
EARLY specifies an event occurs before the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are:EARLY 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower ~ = I' A static state should not exit before it is entered 
upper 1" A static state should not exit before the event label occurs. 
[is_StatieState(s) , tr E TransitionsOIlt(s, ts), is_EventBounds( tdabel) , tr.label.x = e] 
EarlyStEvExit(s, i, t) ~ 
3j: Oee, 1',1" : Time· I' < t < 1" I\f)(~, i, 1') 1\ f)(e,j, 1") 1\ 
EARLY(!s', i, [I' ,1"]) 
LateStTImeExit :: Static State, Late (Timing) Exit Fault - Should a static state exit later than the 
specified time, then a late exit fault is said to have occurred. 
LATE specifies an event occurs after the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower is + I A static state should not be exited before the lower bound, I speci-
fied. 
upper is + u A static state should not exit later than the upper bound, u specified. 
[is_StatieState(s) , tr E TransitionsOut(s, ts), is_TImingBounds(tr.label) , tdabel.x = (I, II)] 
LateStTImeExit(s,i,t) ~ 
31': TIme·l'+u < tl\f)(~,i,I')1\ 
LATE(!s',i, [I' +l,t' +u]) 
LateStEvExil' :: Static State, Late (Event) Exit Fault - Should a static state exit later than the specified 
exit event, then a late exit fault is said to have occurred. 
LATE specifies an event occurs after the correct interval, therefore the bounds here are: 
Interval Bound Justification 
lower is = I' A static state should not exit before it is entered 
upper 1" A static state should not exit before the event label occurs. 
[is_Static State ( s), tr E TransitionsOut( s, ts), is_EventBounds( tdabel) , tr.label.x = e] 
LateStEvExit(s,i,t) ~ 
3j: Oee, 1', 1": Time· I' < 1" < t I\f)(~, i,t!) !\f)(e,j,I") 1\ 
LATE(!s', i, [I' ,1"]) 
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4.2.1.2 Activity Component Faults 
An activity is simply a collection of its states, transitions and ports. The fault axioms for activities define a 
failure at the acitivty level to behaviours of the activity's component parts. We give as an example of this 
approach a single definition below which is intentionally loose such that no constraint is made that state. s 
reads from some port. 
LateActRead :: Activity, Late Read Fault-
[is_Activity( act) 1 
LateActRead(act,i,t) ~ 
3s E act.SM.states ·latcrd(s.in-p, i, t) 
4.2.1.3 IDA Component Faults 
Again, our approach to specifying faults for IDAs is to regard each components as a black box and specify 
its fault definition in terms of our state-machine faults. However, this restricts the expressiveness towards 
an IDAs dynamic behaviour, such that no reference can be made to the internal value of an IDA. That 
is, only the externally visible events and their value can be used to express the fault hypothesis of these 
components. With regards both sides of an IDA, that is the reader and writer our approach is similar to that 
of Activities & state-machines, in that the causal behaviour is specified. Similarly, we specify the behaviour 
of IDAs by relating the occurrence of faults at the IDA interfaces (ports) to the caused occurrence of faults 
at either the opposite interface at the IDA or the related Activity fault. Our decision to explicitly link 
the cause of an IDA fault to the (faulty) dynamic behaviour of an activity (and therefore a state-machine 
state) is derived from the link axioms of RTN-SL which state the coupling of activity and IDA events. It is 
therefore seen to be consistent with our current approach to reasoning when one must trace events through 
an RTN. It could be argued that we do not specify fault IDA axioms. just their link counterparts. However. 
because we do not consider the internal behaviours of IDAs. we are restricted to linking the behaviours of 
activities by means of events. Although, the approach developed in this thesis could be applied to the full 
reasoning of IDA faults, we do not wish to use arrangements of them at an RTN level. 
Axiom AxjDA]fClate :: IDA - As an example, we illustrate the coupling by defining a late read fault 
of an IDA: 
LateRead(ida.oltt, i, t) ~ 
(OlttHolding(ida.out) => 31: Time· 1 < t /\ 0(late_we(ida.in) , i, I)) 
V 
(NotOlltHolding(ida.ollt) => 31: Time· I> t /\ 0(vallleJd(ida.ollt), i, t)) 
4.3 Extensions to the RTN-SL language 
The current version ofRTN-SL, version 3.1 and its semantics are presented in [Pay02]. There, the concrete 
and abstract syntaxes are presented along with the static and dynamic semantics, the latter as RTL axioms. 
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The dynamic semantics are presented as a function, Q which generates the R11.. axioms from a RTN-SL 
specification which specify the behaviours of the constituent components. The set of axioms constitute 
a PVS theory, which is motivated by the intention to reason about RTN-SL specifications using the PVS 
theorem prover. In this section we propose the additions and modifications to this language to support the 
specification offaults in RTN-SL. We refer to the extended (dynamic) semantics as the function, Qf. 
4.3.1 Language Extensions 
Investigations and experience from the initial stages of our research lead to the requirement of several 
new RTN-SL language extensions. This section presents the concrete grammar, abstract syntax, static and 
dynamic semantics necessary to include our requirements into the RTN-SL language. Where appropriate, 
we highlight our modifications to the dynamic semantics presented in Q, for each extension outlined. The 
axiomatic schemata of Q, is present as 13 axioms referred by their number (Ax 1 , ... , Ax 13). We present all 
the extensions to Q together in Section 4.3.2 and not with each language extension, though we refer the 
reader to the appropriate axiom modifications generated by each extension. We therefore continue to use 
the same names as references in these modifications. 
4.3.1.1 Multiple Static State Exit Transitions 
The motivation to limit the number of exit transitions from a static state to one was simplicity. then we 
propose to lift this restriction. Our motivation is to permit fault transitions from static state, as identified 
in Table 4.2. It is only the static semantics that need be modified, though with a slight influence on the 
dynamic semantics that necessitates the conjunction of exit guards on each transition. 
4.3.1.2 Fault Transitions 
Experience in attempts to write RTN specifications has highlighted the importance of state transitions as the 
predominant RTN component for specifying fault actions. Afautt action is just another kind of operation 
in an RTN that are performed at random time intervals on a RTN by a network's adverse environment. This 
allows one to describe fault actions by definitions similar to those used to describe the semantics of ordinary 
operations. It is therefore preferred that the semantics of faults should be mapped to transitions. An 
example of the suggested concrete syntax is given below (Specification 4.1). Transitions labelled without a 
fault hypothesis, FH assume no faults can occur, this approach is similar the approach taken for speculative 
read and writes. 
The required extensions to the specification of RTN-SL are outlined below. 
Concrete Grammar 
fault_transition "LATE_FAULT" I "EARLY_FAULT" 
"OMISSION_FAULT"; 
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Specification 4.1 Example RTN-SL Fault Transition Concrete Syntax 
dynamic state_A 
op foo; 
timing [bcet, wcrt, wcetl 
transition goes to state_B on true; 
late_fault => transition goes to state_C'; 
value_fault => transition goes to state_D'; 
end state; 
transition_guard "WRITE" "FAILURE" "=>" I "WRITE" "SUCCESS" "=>" I 
fault_transition "=>" ; 
dynamic_transition_def : (transition_guard) "TRANSITION" "GOES" "TO" 
name "ON" expression 
dynamic_state 
Abstract Syntax 
"DYNAMIC" 
name 
local_op_defs 
(timing_def) 
dynamic_transition_defs 
"END" "STATE" ; 
Transition TYPE ( tr [# Guard: Transition_Guard, %-- optional? 
Source State, 
Target State, 
Label : Label_Type #1 I 
" . " ,
inv_Transition(Guard(tr), Source(tr), Target(tr), Label(tr)) ) 
4.3.1.3 Speculative Reads 
It was realised that the existing read and write access methods were too strict to adequately specify fault 
tolerant strategies. The methods forced complicated algorithms for reading and recording values to an 
activities local states which are then subsequently used withing calculations. It was preferred to diversify 
these methods and complement them with speculative read and write methods. This meant a reader could 
peep read a value from a blocking protocol which meant the read wasn't destructive nor blocking. Similarly, 
a speculative write meant a writer couldn't be help up. Although the implementation of speculative reads 
66 
CHAPTER 4. FAULT SEMANTICS 
are completed in RTN-SL v3.1, the documentation in [Pay02] lacks the fuller explanation and definitions 
given below. 
Specification 4.2 Example RTN-SL spec/peep concrete syntax 
ports 
pI : (channel, integer, in, speculative); 
p2 : (channel, integer, out, speculative); 
end ports 
dynamic state_A 
op foo peeps from pI writes to p2; 
timing [bcet, wcrt, wcet] 
transition goes to state_B on true; 
read_failure => transition goes to state_C' on true; 
write_success => transition goes to state_B on true; 
write_failure => transition goes to state_C' on true 
end state; 
Given transition guards are optional, their absence assumes the default behaviour of success. Specifically 
to speculative reads this means a read or write action succeeds, for example, the first and third transition 
specification in Specification 4.2 are identical. If they had each specified alternative target states, then one 
of the transition would be chosen non-deterministically. 
The required extensions to the specification of RTN-SL are outlined below. 
Abstract Syntax & Static Semantics 
access_type : TYPE = {normal, speculative} 
read_type : TYPE {read, peep} 
inv_Port(ident : Id_Name, 
Port 
type : access_type, 
direction : Direction_Kind, 
protocol : Protocol_kind, 
the_dataType : A_type_reference) : bool = 
(type = speculative IFF (InHolding (protocol) OR OutHolding(protocol)) AND 
NOT Stimming(protocol)) 
Type { port [# ident : Id_Name, 
type : access_type, 
direction : Direction_Kind, 
protocol : Protocol_kind, 
the_dataType : A_type_reference #] I 
inv_Port(ident(port), type(port), direction(port), 
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protocol (port) , the_dataType(port» 
DestructiveRead (p : Port) : bool 
type(p) speculative 
Speculative (p : Port) : bool 
type(p) = normal 
inv_IDA_Spec(Ida_id : Id_Name, 
type : access_type, 
withed_adt : optional_type [Id_Name) , 
Kind : Protocol_Kind, 
Datatype_ref : A_type_reference, 
Buffersize : optional_type[nat): bool 
(Kind = Poll IFF absent?(Buffersize» AND 
(Kind Dataless_Channel OR Kind = Stimulus) IFF 
(basic_type? (Datatype_ref) AND type_name(Datatype_ref)=NULL_TYPE» AND 
(type speculative IFF (InHolding (Kind) OR OutHolding(Kind» AND 
{ ida 
NOT Stimming(Kind» 
[# Ida_id : Id_Name, 
type : access_type, 
withed_adt : optional_type [Id_Name), 
Kind : Protocol_Kind, 
Datatype_ref : A_type_reference, 
Buffersize : optional_type [nat) #) 
inv_IDA_Spec(Ida_id(ida) , withed_adt(ida) , Kind(ida), 
Datetype_ref(ida) , Buffersize(ida»} 
inv_Operation_localisation( op : Operation, 
in-p : operational_type [Port) , 
in_mode : read_type 
in_wcrt : optional_type [TimeJ, 
out-p : optional_type [Port) ) : bool = 
(absent? (in-p) AND absent?(input-parameter(op» AND absent?(in_wcrt» OR 
(present? (in-p) AND direction(x(in-p» = in_dir AND 
present?(input-parameter(op» AND NOT Stimming(x(in-p») AND 
((absent?(out-p) AND absent?(output_result(op») OR 
(present? (out-p) AND direction(x(out-p» = out_dir AND 
present?(output_result(op») AND 
(present? (in_wcrt) IMPLIES present?(in-p») AND 
(in_mode = peep IFF speculative(in-p» AND 
(in_mode = peep IFF DestructiveRead(type(in-p» 
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Operation_Localisation TYPE [lOp : Operation, 
Input_Port: operational_type[Portl, 
Input_Read-Hode : read_type 
Input_WCRT : optional_type[Timel, 
Output_Port : optional_type [Port I II 
inv_Operation_Localisation(Op(l_op), Input_Port (l_op), Input_Read_Mode(l_op), 
Input_WCRT(l_op), Output_Port(l_op» 
at_least_one_read_on_blocking_port( in-ps : finite_set[Port], 
ss : finite_set [State] ) : bool 
FORALL (p : (x : in-ps I blocking?(x)} ) 
( EXISTS(s : (x : State I member (x, ss) AND dynamic_state?(s)} 
( EXISTS (op_l : ops (s» : 
(Input_Port (op_l) = p IMPLIES Input_Read_mode(op_l) read) 
a_id : Id_Name, 
adts : finite_set[Id_Name], 
ts : finite_set[A-Type_Declaration], 
in-ps, out-ps : finite_set[Port], 
aux_defs : finite_sequence[Auxiliary_Definition], 
Is : finite_set[Variable], 
ops : finite_set[Operation], 
sm SM_Spec): bool = 
FORALL (vI, v2 : {x : Variable I member (x, Is) }): 
(var_id(vl) = var_id(v2) IMPLIES vI = v2) AND 
FORALL (s : (x : State I member (x, States(sm» I): 
Only_valid-ports_accessed_by_states(s,union(in-ps,out-ps» AND 
FORALL (t : (x : Transition I member(x,Transitions(sm» }): 
Ports_on_events_are_valid(t,union(in-ps,out-ps» AND 
at_least_one_read_on_blocking-port(in-ps, States(SM_Spec» 
4.3.2 Extended (Axiomatic) Semantics (ilf) 
This section details the extended axiomatic semantics to .Q given in [Pay02] which considers the behaviour 
of faults. This extension describes the semantic function, .Qf· 
As was the approach in defining.Q (in [Pay02]), we again present the schema definitions for .Qf· This ap-
proach specifies the complete behaviours of a fault RTN component. The remaining issue is to distinguish 
when we apply each function: .Q- nonnative semantic function, or .Qf - the fault semantic function. Instead 
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of introducing new components into the language, such as a late reading dynamic state or a l'aille read IDA 
fault components, we instead rely on the implementation -or application- of n and n f to be selective. We 
indicate in the specification which components we expect to be faulty by specifying speculative protocols 
or fault transitions on them. It is this observation that determines if the component is defined by nor n l 
As an aid to the reader and for clarity to show the extensions from n to n f we present nf in the same 
structure as [Pay02]. That is, n f can be seen as a collection of functions: 
• nSM! for converting the activity state-machine into PVS, 
• noP! for converting RTN-SL operations and functions into PVS. 
Note, nIDA is also a function that composes nf, but are unchanged from n. 
4.3.2.1 State-Machines, nSM! 
The function, nSM is presented by means of a series of axiom schemata which, for each syntactic entity 
in the state-machine (states, transitions, etc.), specifies the exhibited dynamic behaviour. n SM is enriched 
to be nSM! to yield an extended axiom schemata which specify the behaviour of state-machines given the 
definition of faults in Section 4.2.1.1. 
For brevity in the axiom schema below, those existing auxiliary functions and unchanged axioms are omit-
ted and the reader is referred to [Pay02] for those definitions. As an visual aid to the reader, we shade 
the new formulas and predicates we propose adding to the semantics. To make the dynamic behaviour 
more visible in the following presentation, the quantification over the syntactic entities of the RTN-SL 
specification is left implicit. 
Start-up Axiom 
It is assumed that no faults can occur before time index 0, therefore the start-up axiom is assumed to hold 
in n SMf as in nSM. 
State Exit Axioms 
Ax 2 - Static State Exit 
Ax 2 [is_StaticState(s) , TransitionsOllt(s,ts) =f O,s, E Successors(s, states, ts)] 
Vi:Occ,t:Time·0(ls"i,t) ~ 
«SE(s, states, ts) As =f initial A 0(ls" i, t)) V 
(SE(s,states,ts)AS= initiaIA0(ls"i+ I,t)) V 
(ME(s,states, ts) As =f initial /\ 3j: Occ·j ~ i /\ 0(ls"j,t)) V 
(ME(s,states, ts) As = initial A 3j: Occ·j ~ i + I /\ 0(ls,,j,t)) V 
(3rOc~-.e(late~exit(s),j,t) 've(early~~t(s),j,t))) 
70 
CHAPTER 4. FAULT SEMANTICS 
We state that for each occurrence of entering a static state (s) we should leave it as was specified before (i.e. 
timely) or that a late exit or early exit fault occurs. The number of occurrences of the fault is not the same 
as that of entering the state, as such, faults can be observed numerous times during an interval, though we 
only need specify one such fault need occur. 
It is worth noting the structure ofAx2 above (which is repeated throughout this presentation) that faults are 
seen as alternative behaviours in QI to that that was allowed in Q. We therefore add the fault behaviours 
to each axiom schemata as disjunctions. This is consistent with our observation that in Q DO faults (or the 
absence thereof) is assumed, so one should have specified in Q the explicit absence of faults. 
Ax 3 - Dynamic State Exit 
The form of the existing axiom -as stated previously- is complicated by the relationship between occur-
rences numbers of two connected states. Furthermore, it is argued that implicit to Q SM is the absence of 
faults and therefore QSMJ should explicitly state this fact to ensure the consistency of the axioms. 
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Ax 3 [is_dynamicState(s)] 
Vi:Occ,t:TIme· 
(0(,J.s,i,t) A 3tr: ts· tr E Enabled(s, ts, t) Ahfaull~(tr.gnl). :;. 
~~=~W~ .. 
(s=s,A0(lv"i+ l,t» V 
(s =I s, A SX(s, states, ts) A SE(s" states, ts) As, =1= initial A 9(lv" i. t» V 
(s =I s, ASX(s,states,ts) A SE(s, , states, ts) As, = initial A 9(lv"i + 1. t)) V 
(s =I s, A SX(s,states, ts) A ME(s"slales, IS) As, =1= ~itial A 
3j:Occ·j? iA0(lv"j,I» V 
(s =I s, A SX(s, states, ts) A ME(s,,slales, IS) As, = initial A 
3j: Occ·j? i + 1 A 0(lv"j, I» V 
(s =I s, A MX(s,slales, IS) ASE(s"slales,ts) As, =1= inilial A 
3j:Occ-j ~ iA0(lv"j,t» V 
(s =I s, A MX(s, stales, IS) A SE(s"slales, IS) As, = in ilia I A 
3j: Occ·j ~ i + 1 A0(lv"j, I» V 
(s =I s, A MX(s,states, ts) AME(s"slates,ts) As, =1= initial A 
3j:Occ·0(lv"j,t» V 
(s =I s, A MX(s, states, IS) A ME(s"slates, ts) As, = initial A 
3j: Occ· 0(lv"j, t» 
) v ... __ .. 
(3j: Occ, Ir: ts· Ir E Enabled(s, ts, t) Afault-Kllard?(tr.gTd) => 
C· ... ~~=~W~ _ 
«tr.grd = CRASH => 0(crashJaultj,t» V 
(tr.grd = LATE_READ => 0(lale_rd(s.in....P)j,t» V 
(tr.grd = OMIT_READ => 0(omiUd(s.in....P)j,t» V 
(tr.grd = OMIT_WRITE => 0(omiCwe(s.out....P),j,t» V 
(tr.grd = WRITE_VALUE => 0(we_value(s.out....P)j,t» V 
(tr.grd = READ_VALUE => 0(rd_value(s.~p),j,t» V 
(tr.grd = LATEj£XIT => 0(late3xit(s)j,t» V 
(tr.grd = EARLY_EXIT => 0(early_exit(s)j,t» V 
(tr.grd = LATE_WRITE => 0(latcwe(s.out....P)j,t»)A 
(s =I s, A SX(s,states, ts) A SE(s"states, ts) As, =I initial Ae(~"i,t» V 
(s =I s,ASX(s,srates,ts) A SE(s" states, ts) As, = initiaIA9(~"i+ 1,1» V 
(s =f s, A SX(s,states, ts) AME(s"states,ts) As, =I initial A 
3j:Occ·j? iA0(~"j,l» V 
(s =I s, A SX(s, states, ts) AME(s"slates,ls) As, = ~itial A 
3j: Occ-j? i+ 1 A0(~hj,t» V 
(s =I s, AMX(s,states,ts) ASE(s"slates,ts) As, =I initialA 
3j: Occ) ~ i A 0(~"j, t» V 
(s =I s, A MX(s,states, ts) A SE(s"states, IS) As, = initial A 
3j: Occ)::; i + 1 A0(~,j,t» V 
(s =I s, A MX(s,states, ts) AME(s"stales,ls) As, =I initial A 
3j:Occ·0(~"j,l» V 
(s =I s, AMX(s,stales,ls) A ME(s"states, ts) As, = initial A 
3j: Occ· 0(~"j,l))) 
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As before, the fault behaviours are added as a disjunction to the non-faulty behaviour pre\iously defined in 
Q. However, this presentation is complicated with the intricacies between the source and target states of a 
transition (tr), such that the expected behaviour is determined by the type of state a transitions source and 
target is. However, it is obvious to see that for each fault considered, a relevant event must be observable 
to allow the transition (guard) to be satisfied. 
State Entry Axioms It is perceived that faults are handled when exiting states, such that the only modi-
fication to Ax 4 & Ax 5 would be the conjunction that no faults have occurred, which is implicit to QSM. 
State Progress Axioms QSM states "Dynamic states are always exited within their time bOllnds" as the 
implicit assumption no timing faults can occur, yet given the definition of faults in Section .t.:!.!.l we 
propose the following modifications: 
Ax 6 [is_dynamicState(s)] 
Vi:Occ,t:TIme·0(js,i,t) =} 
(3tl : TIme· (t+s.timing.WCRT ~ 11 ~ t+s.timing.BCET A0(j.s,i,tl)). 
':1'--0, , '~<",,: • .i_ ' .'"' 00:.'; • ~ . ~ .,.. '. 
3j: Occ'- (0(crash(s),j,t\) V-i.··· 
0(Late3xit(s),j,ll) V 
0(early_exil(S),j,tt}) A 
II> 1 
Ax 7 holds per se as faults are made events in QSMr 
Ax 8 is modified similarly to Ax 6 by weakening the behaviour to allow for the occurrence of faults: 
Ax 8 [is_staticSlate(s) , is_TImeBollnds(tr.label),tr.label.x = (I, Il)] 
Vi:Occ,t:TIme·0(i s,i,t) =} 
(3tl : TIme· (t+ I ~ tl ~ t+ Il A 0(.l.I', i,tt}Y V 
~Oc;: (;;(:rl;~~~),j7~) V 
0(laICexil(S),j, 11» A 
11> 1 
The modification to Ax 6 & Ax 8 simply allow the possibility a fault has occurred, rather than specify the 
behaviour exhibited. The fault behaviours themselves are defined in other axioms. These modifications are 
required to ensure the PVS model is consistent. 
State Stability Axioms Given the approach that faults are characterised on exit from states, then the 
stability axioms (namely Ax 9 & Ax 10) are largely unaffected in QSMJ' other than to weaken the assertion 
to include the possibility of faults occurring. 
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Ax 9 [is_DynamicSlale(s)] 
Vi:Occ,/:TIme·0(.J$,i,/) => 
(3/1 : TIme· (/-s.timing.,~<::~!. $ 11 $ I-s.timing ,BeET /\ e( ts. i. t. )) v 
3}: Occ· (0(early_exlt(s),j,tl) v 
0(late_exlt(s),j,tl)) 1\ 
tl > t 
Ax 10 [is_StaticState(s),#Successor(s, states, ts) # 0, is_TImeBounds(tr.label),tr.label.x = (I,ll)] 
Vi:Occ,t:TIme·0(J,s,i,t) => 
(3/1 : TIme· (t-u $ 11 $ 1-//\ 0(ts, i,l.)) V 
3j: Occ· (0(~;;i;~;;t(S)j,tl) ~ 
0(late_exlt(s),j,tl» 1\ 
tl > t 
Ax 11 & Ax 12 as defined in QSM. 
4.3.2.2 Operations, QoP! 
Ax 13 asserts the post condition of an operation must hold for the input and output parameter read and 
written respectively. 
Ax 13 [is_DynamicState(s)] 
Vi: Occ, tl, t2 : TIme· 0(ts, i,11) /\ 0(.J$, i, t2) => 
(posu(p_in(tl), "v (I.), V(t2),P_OW(t2)) /\ QFramt) ,/\ 
~j: Occ·0(latcrd(s.in..p),j,tl) /\ 
0(rd_value(s.in..p),j, 11) 1\ 
0(late_we(s.olll..p) ,j, 12) 1\ 
0{ we,.:,.value(s.oll(p ),/,/2) 
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We set up a fonnal framework to describe transition system specifications in the ~tyle of Plotkin known as 
Structural Operational Semantics (SOS) [PI081]. The framework is used to present a conscnativity format 
in operational semantics, which states sufficient criteria to ensure that the extension of a transition sy,tcm 
specification with new transition rules does not affect the semantics of the original tenm. 
Before presenting the Plotkin-style rules for RTNs, we first introduce some syntactic sugar which is later 
required to show the SOS rules for faults are a conservative extension of the non-fault transition sy~tcm. In 
Section 5.2 we present the SOS rules which define the semantics of activities in an RTN and the faults fea-
sible. Section 5.3 first introduces the theory of a conservative extension and states that our fault semantics 
are such an extension. Section C.5 discusses the issue of concurrency and non-determinism in transition 
systems. This relates to expressing the "meta-level" specification over the SOS rules, which specifies how 
each rule fires in parallel with otherrules and which rule should fire next. We conclude with an inve<,tigation 
into implementing the SOS rules and discuss the implications with regards non-determinism. 
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5.1 Basics 
5.1.1 Labelled Transition Systems 
What follows is a description of the model of labelled transition systems (LTS) as described in [AFV99], 
which are used in tum to express the operational semantics of RTNs. We later establish a notion of a 
"meta-level" which is a specification of the LTS with regards our RTN semantic rules. 
A LTS consists of binary relations between states, labelled with an action as a predicate between its states. 
Intuitively, s ~ s' expresses that state s can transition to state s' through the execution of action a. 
Definition 5.1 (Labelled Transition System) A labelled transition system (LTS) is a triple {Proc .Act, { ~ I 
a E Act}), where: 
• Proc is a set of states, ranged over by s.s'; 
• Act is a set of actions, ranged over by a. b; 
• ~~ Proc x Proc for every a E Act. As us/tal, we use the more suggestive notation s ~ s' in lieu 
of(s,s') E~. and write s.!!.. ifs ~ s' for no state s'; 
Binary relations s ~ s' in a LTS are called transitions. 
Definition 5.2 (Trace Semantics) Given a LTS {Proc.Act. { ~I a E Act}), a sequence 
<;=al •...• anEAct· 
for n E N is said to be a trace of state so if there exist states Sl •...• Sn such that so ~ Sl !2. ... ~ Sn 
~ (abbr. by So --+ sn). 
We later embrace Definition 5.2 in our choice of trace model for RTNs, which essentially is an ordered 
sequence of Event sets. 
5.1.1.1 Term Algebras 
This section reviews some basic notions of term algebras that will be needed later in the chapter. 
Definition 5.3 (Signature) A signature E is a set of jUnction symbols together with an arity mapping 
that assigns a natural number arif) to each function symbol f. Afimction symbol of arity zero is called 
a constant, while function symbols of arity one and two are called unary and binary, respectively. 
Definition 5.4 (Term) The set'U' of (open) terms over a signature E denoted 'U'(E), ranged over by t is 
the least set such that: 
• each x E Var is a term; 
• f(tl •...• tarlj)) is a term, iff is afimction symbol in E and tl.··· ,tarlj) are terms. 
T(E) denotes the set of closed terms over E, i.e., terms that do not contain variables. 
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5.1.1.2 Transition System Specifications 
Definition 5.5 (Transition Rule) Let E be a signature. and let t and t' range over If(E). A transition 
rule p is of the form ~. with H a set of premises of the form t ~ t' or tP and a conclusion a of the form 
t ~ 1 or tP. The left-hand side of the conclusion is the source of p. and if the conclusion is of the form 
t ~ I. then is its right-hand side is the target of p. A transition rule is closed if it does not contain any 
variables. 
Definition 5.6 (Transition System Specification) A transition system specification (TSS) is a set of 
transition rules. 
Definition 5.7 (Proof) Let Ta be a TSS. A proof of a closed transition nile ~ from Ta is a well-formed. 
upwardly branching derivation tree whose nodes are labelled by transitions. where the root is labelled 
by ex. and if K is the set of labels of the nodes directly abOl'e a node with label ~. then 
1. either K = {} and ~ E H. 
2. or j is a closed substitution of a transition rule in Ta. 
If a proof of ~ from Ta exists. then ~ is provable from Ta. notation Ta f-- ~. 
5.1.2 Plotkin-style Transition Rules 
Structural operational semantics (SOS) [Pl081. Plo03] provides a framework for giving an operational se-
mantics of programming and specification languages. In particular. because of its intuitive appeal and 
flexibility. SOS has found considerable application in the study of semantics of concurrent processes 
[Mil80, ABV94]. The SOS rules of a language generates a labelled transition system. whose states are 
the closed terms over an algebraic signature, and whose transitions are supplied with labels. The transi-
tions between states are obtained inductively from a transition system specification (TSS). which consists 
of transition rules of the form prets.es . A typical example of a transition rule is 
cone USIOns 
stipulating that if x ~ x holds for closed terms x and x, then so does x II y ~ x II y for any closed term 
y. Each rule is then a label on transitions in the LTS theoretical framework. An important point about 
SOS is that it is structural. not. structured. The idea is that. in denotational semantics one follows an idea 
of compositionality, where the meaning of a compound phrase is given as a function of the meaning of its 
parts. In the case of operational semantics the behaviour of the program is. roughly speaking, the collection 
of transitions it can make [Plo03]. 
5.2 An Operational Model for RTNs 
We wish to give a structural operational semantics for RTN-SL. which consists of the possible transitions. 
or actions. a RTN can make. A SOS framework is one which plots out each transition in a RTN semantic 
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model. The values between these transitions are referred to as configurations [Win93]. to differentiate them 
from the dynamic state of an RTN. which is formed from values of variables within an RTN -such as local 
variables in activities and internal variables in IDAs- and the (semantic) model states. Given a (static) RTN 
specification, then considering its dynamic behaviour is to consider the transitions from configuration to 
configuration. A configuration is a triple (RTN: RTN-Types, 0'\ : E, It\ : IT). where 
RTN-Types = ld ~ (Activity I IDA I Connection) 
E = ld ~ dyTypes 
IT = Event-set" 
The RTN-Types element represents the abstract syntax of a static RTN-SL specification, E the dynamic 
values of those components in an RTN which have dynamic values (for example local variables and current 
state registers) and TI is the history -or trace- of an RTN to date. The trace. ltJ is a sequenced set of 
(observable external) events, indexed by time. The abstract syntax and static semantics for the rules that 
follow, may be found in Appendix C.I. The VDM-SL model used to facilitate syntax and type checking 
the SOS rules and provide a degree of animation is discussed later in Section C.5.1. 
The operational semantics of RTNs begins with the idea that the dynamic behaviour of an RTN is the 
sequence of 'RTN Actions' and the semantics thereof the actions. Several actions are permissible in an 
RTN. These are: 
• read and write actions of IDAs and the subsequent actions wi thing activities; 
• state-machine transitions from source states to targets. 
Each of these actions are expressed atomically by disjoint SOS rules. An action will generate an event such 
as is for entering a state s. or rp -p I for reading a port p 1. An action may also modify the dynamic values 
within an activity or IDA. e.g. by reading from or writing to an IDA. Considering the idea that RTN actions 
will transform the state. we consider the function: 
.!....; :Action x E --t E 
However. this recursive function style approach -although intuitive- does not handle non-determinism and 
concurrency. The evaluation relation 
(rtn, 0', It) --t ~ 
specifies the evaluation of an RTN in rather large steps; given the static specification and initial values then 
yield a final trace directly. This choice of large step semantics makes the issue of parallelism and non-
determinism opaque and hides the non-deterministic choices deep within the rules. Rather. a small step 
semantic is preferred which makes it possible to give rules for evaluation which capture the single steps. 
We therefore (formally) define an evaluation relation between pairs of configurations. We therefore could 
define a relation as: 
.!....; : ((RTN-Types x E x TI) x (E x TI)) 
Although this.!....; relation captures the semantics of the set of actions occurring. it does not provide for the 
ramification of this powerset. From a configuration. many concurrent actions can, and should, fire - yet the 
set of states should be ramified to yield the next configuration. 
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t 
Figure 5.1: Possible derivation tree from some starting configuration, (01, ltl) 
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Figure 5.2: Possible sequencing of actions 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the divergence of configurations from a starting configuration when two or more 
actions can fire. This possible derivation tree shows the generation of new configurations having executed 
each action, whereas we require to ramify these resulting values for each step. It can be see from Figure 
5.1 that a transition from a configuration to another is autonomous to a step in time. Therefore, if -say-
action SI is evaluated from a starting configuration (01,1t.). then actions S2 and S3 may not still be valid 
in (~,~). if only that time was advanced! Considering the implications on ramifying o~, ct; and cr't 
is technically challenging as it is unknown which variables of <ri have been modified. Ramifying ~ is 
straightforward. it is simply the union of the events at each time instance. The observation that ramifying 
each resulting Xi is straightforward suggests the event-set generated by each action are disjoint, which is 
as expected given actions are non-interfering and atomic. It is therefore feasible for each action to fire from 
the resulting state (<ri) of another action within the same time instance, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. We 
then take the union of each event set and record within the trace at t + 1. 
The transition semantics are therefore expressed in a two-tier approach. The first is dedicated to expressing 
the non-deterministic, concurrent semantics of a single transition, which equates to one time unit (in our 
discrete time model). The second tier expresses the small-step semantics of an RTN action. Given RTNs 
are truly concurrent, then so too are its actions. An action should only fire in a given configuration if 
the premise(s) of its associated SOS rule hold true. Given that actions can fire concurrently, the events 
generated in one action cannot interfere with another firing from the same configuration. 
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Conclusively, we propose to specify the operational semantics for RTN-SL by two relations: 
~ : ((RTN-Types x E x n) x (E x n» 
~ : ((RTN-Types x E x n) x (E x Event-set» 
The evaluation relation ~ of a small (atomic) step is one which generates a new state (I:) and an event 
set (Event-set) - the observable events generated in the transition. The first tier is expressed by two SOS 
rules that specify the ~ relation. The two rules specify a single step of an RTN, such that each concurrent 
component in an RTN take a small step from a configuration. Once no further rules in ~ can fire from a 
configuration, the time base -the indices of 1t\- is advanced. Consecutive 'tick' events are permined, which 
would mean the first rule is evaluated in successive configurations. 
The second ~ rule specifies that each rule in ~ that can fire does so, such that the resulting state (0;) is 
carried forward for the recursive premise. The event set (es') produced from the ~ action are collected. 
Note, events occurring at time, t cannot affect the semantics of other actions firing at t. Until there are no 
further small step actions that can fire from an intermediate configuration, we collect each event set (es) 
generated in a handbag which is committed to the trace (1tt 0- res, {} j) in the Tick ~ rule which records 
these events in our trace and increments the time base by one, as was illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
(rtn,o\,1td j.. ~~~--~~~--~~----~----~ ~ (rtn,ot, 1t t0-[es]) ~ (o\,1t\0-[es,{}]) 
Described in these rules are three key points: 
1. "(rtn, 0\, 1tt 0- res]) ~ ... " :: The form of the source of both rules explicitly separates the trace 
-or history- of an RTN into the events upto t-l and those events occurring at t. This is to enforce 
atomicity and model currency such that A II B == A; B Or B;A 
2. " ... ~ (at, 1tt 0- res, { }])" :: The form of the target of the first rule is such that those events occur-
ring at t are committed to the trace of an RTN and time is advanced 
3. The observation that these rules describe a greedy semantics. Each rule that can fire in a configuration 
must do so before time is advanced. The benefit of this is that maximal progress is made in each time-
step. This design decision is consistent with the STATECHART semantics [HN96] which specify a 
maximal subset of non-conflicting transitions are always executed which is termed the "greediness 
property" of the semantics. 
5.2.1 RTN-SL SOS Rules 
We first give a transition system specification (To), for the ~ relation, for the semantics of RTN-SL. Later 
we give the TSS for the extended RTN-SL language which supports the specification of faults. 
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5.2.1.1 A TSS Specification for RTNs, To 
The set of rules that follow fonn the transition system specification for To. These rules are grouped (indi-
cated by number suffixes) when a rule describes a similar dynamic behaviour to another rule. In such cases 
a generic description is given for the group with individual comment to highlight the distinction. 
We present the RTN-SL abstract syntax on which the SOS rules are written, to aid the reader. This approach 
is not dissimilar to other presentation of language semantics [Jon03, Jon04]. The abstract syntax is given 
in the VDM-SL notation [LHP+96, FL98], and each SOS rule written as a VDM-SL function in Appendix 
C to syntax and type check the rules. Additionally, the implementation issues of the operational seman-
tics with regards concurrency and non-detenninism is investigated and reported with regards animation in 
Appendix point 3 above. 
types 
1.0 Id = token; 
2.0 Var= token; 
3.0 Expr = token; 
4.0 Event = token; 
5.0 Fault = LATE_EXIT; 
6.0 Bounds: : beet: N 
.1 bcrt:N 
.2 wcet:N; 
7.0 Port::id:ld 
.1 dir: IN lOUT; 
8.0 7imeBound:: lower: N 
.1 upper:N; 
9.0 Label = TimeBound I Event I Expr I Fault; 
10.0 Static-State:: id: Id; 
The first group of rules describes the reactive behaviour of dynamic states - should a state read. write, both 
or neither? The necessary abstract syntax is shown below: 
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11.0 Operation: : id: Id 
.1 read-vars: Var-set 
.2 written-vars: Var-set 
.3 input-parameter: [/d] 
.4 output-result: [/d] 
.5 preC: Expr 
.6 postC: Expr; 
12.0 Dynamic-State:: id: Id 
.1 ops: Operation-set 
.2 bounds: Bounds; 
13.0 State = Static-State I Dynamic-State; 
14.0 Transition: : src : Id 
.1 trg:ld 
.2 I: Label; 
The premises of Rule 1.1 identify that there exists an activity (ol(a) = mk_act(cs, Is, INDS) in the RTN 
dynamic state (a E dom (1) which satisfies three conditions: i) the current state, cs has operations remaining 
(line 3), ii) that the operation (and therefore state) reads from a port but does not write a result (line 6), and 
iii) lines 6-10 state that the pre-condition holds for the read value, and the post-condition is true in the new 
local state, Is'. Given these premises hold true in a configuration (RTN, 01, 1t1), then the conclusion is that 
the resulting state of this transition has the updated dynamic state (removing the evaluated operation 0 I t {cs 
-+ 1101 (cs).ops}) and the event (rd(in...]J» recorded. 
Rule 1.1: A dynamic state that only reads: 
a E domol 
01 (a) = mk_act(cs, Is, INDS) 
01 (cs).ops '" [] 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id,rd, we,in...]J,out...]J,pre,post) E elemss.opst\hdOI (cs).ops = id 
in...]J '" nil,Ollt...]J = nil 
(in...]J,RTN,ot}.!!!.. v 
Is' = 1st {in...]J f-4 v} 
(pre, Is) ~ true 
(post, Is') ~ true I dySt-op-rd I (RTN,OI, 1t1) ~ (01 t{cs f-4 1101 (cs).ops,a f-4 mk_act(cs, Is', INDS)}, {rd(in...]J)}) 
Similarly with Rules 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, the premises are that the written values preserves the post-condition 
in Rule 1.2 and Rule 1.3 and that Rule 1.4 neither reads nor writes but the post-condition holds on the 
computation of the local state, Is. 
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Rule 1.2: A dynamic state that reads and writes: 
a E domat 
at (a) = mk_act(cs, Is, INDS) 
at (cs).ops 1= [) 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id,rd, we, in-p, out-p,pre,post) E elemss.ops /\ hdat (cs).ops = id 
in-p 1= nil,out-p 1= nil 
(in-p,RTN,at}.!!!.. v 
Is' = 1st {in-p 1-+ v} 
(pre, Is) .!-. true 
(out-p, v', Is') ~ ls" 
(post, Is") .!-. true I dySt-op-rdwe I s (RTN, at, ret) -+ (at t{cs 1-+ t1at (cs).ops,a 1-+ mk_act(cs, Is", INDS)}, {nl(in-p). lI't'(OIlt-P)}) 
Rule 1.3: A dynamic state that only writes: 
a E domat 
at (a) = mk_act(cs, Is, INDS) 
at (cs).ops 1= [] 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id,rd, we,in-p,ollt-p,pre,post) E elemss.ops /\hdat (cs).ops = id 
in-p = nil,Ollt-p 1= nil 
(out-p, v', Is) ~ Is' 
(post, Is') .!-. true I dySt-op-we I s (RTN,at, ret) -+ (at t {cs 1-+ tlat (cs).ops,a 1-+ mk_act(cs,Is', INDS)}, {lI'e(ollt-p)}) 
Given the SOS rule that an operation specified upon a dynamic state neither reads nor writes, we note the 
local state (Is) is unchanged by the transition. Since post conditions are expressions not statements, they 
can have no side effect on the local state and can only specify an expression on the state. 
Rule 1.4: A dynamic state that neither reads nor writes: 
a E domat 
at(a) = mk_act(cs,Is,INDS) 
at (cs).ops 1= [] 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id, rd, we, in-p,ollt-p,pre,post) E elemss.ops /\ hdat (cs).ops = id 
in-p = nil,out-p = nil 
(pre, Is) .!-. true 
(post, Is) .!-. true ~ (RTN,a\,ret) ~ (at t{cs ...... tla\(cs).ops},{}) 
The second group of rules define the behaviour of activities should the initial state be static or dynamic. 
For a static state, the activity's status is simply set to the wait transition (WAIT _ TR) status which stipulates 
the activity is waiting for a valid exit transition, for example, a read event to occur at a blocking (input) 
port which is the guard of an exit transition. Alternatively -for a dynamic state- the activity is set to the 
in-dynamic-state (iNDS) status and the operations specified upon it in the static specification (RTN) are 
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added to the dynamic environment (Line 5) for evaluation. For both cases, the state entry eyent is recorded 
(linitial). 
15.0 SM: : ss: State-set 
.1 ts: Transition-set 
.2 initial: Id; 
16.0 Activity: : input-ports: Port-set 
.1 
.2 
.3 
.4 
output-ports: Port-set 
local-state: Id ~ Var 
ops: Operation-set 
sm:SM; 
Rule 2.1: Initialise an activity into a static state: 
a E dorn<J1 
<JI (a) = mlcactC,_, INIT) 
~ uact = mk act(RTN(a).sm.initiai,RTN(a).locai-state, WAIT TR) 
s . (RTN, <JI, 1t1) ---+ (<JI t{ a f-+ uact} , { lRTN(a).sm.imtiai}) 
Rule 2.2: Initialise an activity into a dynamic state: 
a E dorn<J1 
<JI (a) = mk_act(cs, is, INIT) 
uact = mk_act(RTN(a).sm.initial,RTN(a).locai-state, INDS) 
mk_DynamicState(id,ops,_) E RTN(a).sm.ss /\id = cs 
trgs - mk dySt([op I op E ops]) I dySt-init I (RTN,<JI, 1tJ) -:.. (<JI t{ a f-+ uact,RTN(a).sm.initiaif-+ trgs}, 
{ lRTN(a).sm.initiai}) 
Rule 3.1 specifically defines that a dynamic state (Line 2) with no remaining operations left to evaluate 
(Line 3) should set the activity status to WAIT _ TR (Line 4). 
Rule 3.1: All operations on a dynamic state evaluated: 
a E dorn<J1 
<JI (a) = mk_act(cs, is, INDS) 
<JI (cs).ops = {} 
uact=mk act(cs,ls,WAIT TR) 
Rule 4.1 defines when an activity is terminated which detects the end of a network's computation (all 
activities are TERM). 
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Rule 4.1: Tenninate an activity: 
a E domOI 
is_(ol (a),aet) 
r.=l ~tr E RTN(a).sm.ts·lr.sre = 01 (a).es 
~( s RTN,OI, xd -> (01 t{a I--> mk_ael(ol (a).es,ol (a).is, TERM)}, {}) 
Rules 5.1 & 5.2 both depend on whether the target state of a transition is a dynamic or static state. Should 
the target state be dynamic, then the operations specified on the dynamic state should be added to the 
dynamic environment for evaluation, as was the case in Rule 2.2. 
Rule 5.1: Transition to dynamic state: 
a E domOI 
01 (a) = mk_ael(es,ls, WAIT_TR) 
tr E RTN(a).sm.ts 
(tr,ol,xl) ~ true 
mk_Dynamie _Stale(id,. mk_Bounds( beel, bert, weel)) E RTN (a) .sm .ss /\ id = es 
3tl E indsxl ·l::sE;XI(I.)1\I1 +beel~ lenxi < II +weet 
~t2 E indsXI ·t2 ~ tl" lcs Ei+1 7t1{t2) 
ins{ol(tr.trg)) = INDS 
uael = mk_aet(tr.trg,ls,INDS) 
~ trgs= mk dySt([op I op E s.ops·s E RTN(a).sm.ss/\s.id= tr.trg]) tr-dySt ( s { RTN,OI, x.) -> (01 t a I--> /wet,tr.trg f-> trgs}, { jJr.src, ltr.trg}) 
Similarly, should the target state be static, the activity should be set to wait for a valid transition from this 
target state. 
Rule 5.2: Transition to static state: 
a E domol 
0\ (a) = mk_aet(es,ls, WAIT_TR) 
tr E RTN(a).sm.ts 
(tr,o\,x.) ~ true 
mk_DynamicState (id, , mk_Bounds(beet, bert, weet)) E RTN{a).sm.ss /\id = cs 
3 t\ E inds 7t1 'l::s E; XI (t.)" ~ t2 E inds 7t1 . t2 ~ tl/\ l::s E;+ I 7t\ (t2) /\ 
t\ + beet ~ len XI < tl + weet 
ins(o\ (tr.trg)) = INSS 
uaet = mk aet(tr.trg, Is, WAIT TR) ~ (RTN,OI,XI) 2.. (0"\ t {a I--> /wet},{ jJr.src, ltr.trg}) 
Rules 6.1, 6.2 & 6.3 define a new relation (tr, 0"1, x.) .!!.. lE which evaluates whether or not a transition 
(tr) is valid from a configuration (Ir, 0"1, 7t1)' This relation has a similar role to evaluating an arithmetic 
operation in a programming language semantics. 
Rule 6.1 evaluates a transition which is bound by lower & upper time bounds. Line 2 stipulates that from 
entering the state at tl then it is still possible to leave with the bounds, whereas Line 3 stipulates that the 
state exit event has not occurred before the lower bound nor later than the upper bound. 
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Rule 6.1: A time-triggered transition: 
is_(tr.l, TzmeBound) 
3tl E indsxI . tsrc Ei XI (tt) I\l.lower::; lenxl-tl ::; I. upper 
~ ~t2 E indsxI' ltrg Ei XI (t2) 1\ l.upper < lenxl-t2 < 1.lower 
tt-tr ( k .. ( Ir 
m _transltlon src,trg,l),al,xt) -+ true 
Rule 6.2 evaluates that a transition labelled with an event is valid in a given (tr,a\,x.). That is. that the 
labelled event has occurred since entering the state. 
Rule 6.2: An event-triggered transition: 
is_(tr.l, Event) 
~ 3tl, t2 E indsxI . tsrc Ei XI (tl) I\tr.l E XI (t2) 1\t2 > tl 
ev-tr (k .. ( I) Ir m _transItIOn src,trg, ,a\,x.) -+ true 
Rule 6.3 evaluates an expression, which labels a transition in al. 
Rule 6.3: An expression-triggered transition: 
is_(l,Expression) 
(I, al) ..:..... true ~. Ir (mk_transltion(src, trg,l),al, x.) -+ true 
Additional SOS rule for the operational semantics for IDA components are given in Appendix C, these 
rules also define To but are not presented here to aid presentation. 
5.2.1.2 Fault Transition System Specification for RTNs, TI 
We have a transition system specification, To which defines the operational semantics for non-faulty RTNs. 
We now present the operational semantics for the fault actions we consider for RTNs, which form the tran-
sition system specification, TI. To preserve the existing semantics we wish to add the operational semantics 
of faults in a conservative approach, such as to define the new RTN actions as additional behaviours. We 
define a new fault relation as: 
L :((RTN-Types x r. x II) x (r. x Event-set)) 
This relation defines the fault actions of an RTN, which are for example taking a late read transition I upon 
a late read fault, or taking a late exit transition when observing a late exit fault. However, given the trace 
semantics for RTNs are specified by the ~ relation (which in tum is specified as the small-steps under the 
~ relation) we must define new ~ SOS rules to add the fault action to the operational semantics. This is 
achieved by specifying, as premises, the hypothesis a fault action occurs from some faulty configuration. 
A typical rule structure would be: 
fault configuration hypotheses 
I I fault action: (RTN,al,xt) L (a2,es) 
. fault-rule. s (RTN,al,xt) -+ (a2,es) 
I Remember state-machine transitions are the primary specification mechanism for defining faults and fault action behaviour. 
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The fault configuration hypotheses will observe a fault configuration such that some component is in an 
(anticipated) erroneous state. Given this observation, the fault action hypothesis specifies some fault action 
occurs which generates a new state (<J2) and an event set (es). The proviso that each new SOS rule under 
the.!.... relation has a premise of the new -fresh-relation L ensures our conservative extension result (c.f. 
Section 5.3). Further, is is not possible to observe a fault unless a fault action exists to deal with the fault 
as no rule in .!.... will be fireable. Therefore the set of L rules define the fault behaviours that exist in the 
operational model. 
Rule 7.1 describes the late exit behaviour from a dynamic state. This rule has two noticeable characteristics: 
Lines 1-4 observe the fault occurrence, whilst Line 6 specifies what fault action to take. This rule is not 
of a fault tolerant nature, but specifies the action desired when a fault is observed - otherwise our fault 
semantics would be totally non-deterministic! 
Rule 7.1: Dynamic State, late exit fault: 
a E dom<J1 
<JI (a) = mk_act(cs, ls, INDS) 
mk_Dynamic_State(id,_, mk_Bollnds(beet, bcrt, weet)) E RTN(a).sm.ss Aid = cs 
:3 tl E inds 1t1 ·l:'s E 1t(tJ) /\tl + beet ~ tl + weet < len 1t1 A 
~t2 E inds 1t1· .¥:s E 1t(t2) /\t2 > tl 
uaet = mk_act(es, ls,mkJault(LATE_EXIT)) 
(RTN,OI t {a f-+ uact},1t1 f\.[{late exitJault}]) L (02,es) 
I dy-late-exit-fault I (RTAT ) S ( ) 
. . llY, <JI, 1t1 --+ <J2, es 
Rule 7.2: Static State, late time exit fault: 
a E domol 
<JI (a) = mk_aet(cs,ls, WAIT_TR) 
:3t E RTN(a).sm.ts· mk_Transition(src,trg,mk_1imeBollnd(l, II)) A srr: = es 
:3tl E inds1t·lcs Ei 1t(tl) /\t) +l ~ tl +11 < len 1t A 
~t2 E inds 1t. Jcs Ei 1t(t2) /\(2 > tl 
uact = mk_act(cs,ls,mkJault(LATE_EXIT)) 
(RTN,o) t{a f-+ lIact},1t1 f\.[{late exitJalllt}]) L (02,es) 
I st-late-time-exit-fault I (RTN,<JI, 1tI).!.... (<J2,es) 
Rule 7.1 fires on the occurrence of a late exit fault and specifies that there should exist a fault-labelled 
transition in the static specification, RTN for which that transition is made. Rules 7.1 and ?? combine to 
form the semantics of a late exit fault of a state-machine state. 
Rule 8.1 describes the late read behaviour for a dynamic state. Lines 1-5 specify a late read fault has 
occurred if the read event has not occurred before the best case execution time (BCEl) time bound. Line 
6 hypotheses that a fault action will be taken to generate a new state (02) and an event set (es). This 
intermediate configuration is also the result of the rule. 
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Rule 8.1: Dynamic State, late read rault: 
a E dorn<r\ 
<r \ (a) = mk_aet( es, ls, INDS) 
mk_DynamicState( id, ops, mk_Bounds( beet, ben, weet)) E RTN (a ).sm.ss II id = es 
mk_OperationL._,_, in-p,out-p,_,_) E ops II in-p # nil 
3t\ E inds1t\ . ts E 1t(t\) 1It\ + beet < len1t\ II 
~t2 E inds1t\·rds(in-p) E1t(t2)1It2 >t\ 
uaet = mk_aet(es,ls,mkJault(LATE_READ)) 
I I (RTN,<r\t{al-+uaet},1t\f"\.[{late readJault}])L(<r2,es) 
dy-late-read-fauIt (RT.'N ) S ( ) 
,<r\,1t\ --+ Cf2,es 
Rule 9.1 states that there should exist a transition, label1ed for a late read. which is taken given a late read 
fault is observed. 
Rule 9.1: Fault Transition: 
a E dOrnCf\ 
Cf \ (a) = mk_aet( es, Is, mkJault(f) ) 
I fault-transition I f"\. J 
L...-__ ---' (RTN,Cf\, 1t\ res]) --+ (Cf\ t{a 1-+ mk_aet(trg, ls,insf(trg))},esU if, ~s, ltrg}) 
3t E RTN(a).sm.ts ·mk Transition (src,trg,I) IIsre - cs 111-f 
The remaining rules that form T\ are presented in Appendix C. as the differences in each rule follow closely 
to the fault definitions given in Chapter 4. The important observation with respect T\ is that the new rules 
under the ~ relation are specified with afresh relation which guarantee the conservativity result we discuss 
in the next section. 
5.3 An Operational Conservative Extension 
Given the two transitional system specifications. To and T\ we consider their combination. The rules of 
TSS T\ are an extension to the RTN-SL operational semantics so we consider the extended TSS. denoted 
To EEl T\. as the operation extension of TSS To. A property we require to be true. is that the TSS To EEl T( is 
a conservative operational extension to TSS To. Often one wants to add new operators and rules to a given 
transition system specification (TSS). An (operational) conservative extension requires that an original 
TSS and its extension prove exactly the same closed transition rules that have only negative premises and 
an original closed term as their source [AFV99]. In this thesis. the new operators are the fault actions 
considered for an RTN. 
Our idea is to build on the theoretical TIS layer of our SOS semantics for RTNs and then use the results 
from Aceto et al [AFV99] to show our additional RTN-SL language features. T\ a conservative extension 
to To. This result is necessary to show the properties proved of an RTN before the consideration of faults 
are true in our extended TSS under the assumption that no faults occur. From this. we can then set about 
showing the fault tolerant mechanism we propose do indeed tolerate the faults considered. 
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5.3.1 Definitions 
We begin by defining the notion of source-dependency of variables [FV98] which is an important ingredi-
ent of a rule format to ensure that an extension of a TSS is operationally conservative. In order to conclude 
that an extended TSS is operationally conservative over the original TSS, we need to know that the vari-
ables in the original transition rules are source-dependent. In the literature this requirement is sometimes 
overlooked. 
Definition 5.8 (Source-dependency) The source-dependent variables in a transition nile p are defined 
inductively as follows: 
• all variables in the source of p are source-dependent; 
• ift ~ t' is a premise ofp and all variables in t are source-dependent, then all variables in t' are 
source-dependent. 
A transition rule is source-dependent if all its variables are. 
Source-dependency is a more liberal formulation of the syntactic criterion "pure and well-formed" for 
formal variables in formal rules. From [FV98] it states: 
• that rules have either 'formal' or 'actual' variables 
• formal variables are found from FV(t*) 
Definition 5.9 (Formal Variables) FV(a) denotes the set offormal variables that occur in the formal 
term t* 
Definition 5.10 (Sum of TSSs) Let To and T\ be TSSs whose signatures 1:0 and E\ agree on the arily 
of the function symbols in their intersection. We write To EB T\ for the union of1:o and E\. 
The sum of To and T(, notation To EB T\, is the TSS over signatures 1:0 EB E\ containing the niles in To 
andT\. 
We now state the main theorem and show for an example that its semantics are first source-dependent and 
then that the fault semantics are a conservative extension to To· 
Theorem 5.1 (Cons.Extn) Let To and T\ be TSSs over signature 1:0 and E\ respectively. Under the 
following conditions, To EB T\ is an operational conservative extension of To· 
1. Each p E To is source-dependent. 
2. For each p E T(, 
• either the source of p is fresh, 
• or p has a premise of the form t ~ t' or tP, where: 
- t E If(1:o); 
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- all variables in t occur in the source of p; 
- 1', a or P isfresh. 
For example, consider the transition rule for tick. 
Example 5.1 We consider the 'Term' -rule which was introduced in Section 5.1.2, which sets the statlls 
of an activity to TERM should it be in a state with no successors. This prevents faIse faults being 
observed, such as a late or crashfault. 
a E domcrl 
is_(crl (a),act) 
r::=l ~tr E RTN(a).sm.ts· tr.src = crl (a).cs 
~ s (RTN, crl, Ttl) -> (crl t{a 1-+ mk_act(crl (a).cs,crl (a).Is, TERM)}, (}) 
Since the source of 'tick' is (RTN,r.,TI) and (RTN,r.,TI) contains only formal variables, it follows 
(RTN,r.,TI) is source-dependent (defn 3.16( 1) I FV98j). Since the term-rule has hypotheses 
~tr E RTN(a).sm.ts· tr.src = crl (a).cs 
and 
a E domcrl 
where 
FV(~tr E RTN(a).sm.ts· tr.src = crt (a).cs) = {RTN,crl ,Ttl} 
and 
it follows that each premise is source-dependent (defn 3.16(3) I FV98 J) 
Similarly, each rule in To (in Section 5.1.2) follows the same rule format and structure and has been found 
to be source-dependent, verified by the LETOS tool, described later in Section 5.3.3 
5.3.2 Faults are a conservative extension 
Given the TSS To is source-dependent and TI (as defined previously), we examine whether To if) T\ is a 
conservative extension of To. 
Corollary 5.1 Given To and T\ as specified previousl): To EI1 T\ is a conservative extension of To. 
PROOF We are required to show that each rule is source-dependent and each new rule in T\ has a 
premise which isfresh. 
Each rule in To and T\ is source-dependent by inspection, and has been verified by the LETOS tool. 
For each rule in TI which has conclusion of the .l... relation, it has a premise defined by the fresh relation 
L. That is to say, to make the transition specified for.l... in T\ new behaviours not specified in To must 
have occurred. Therefore, the rules in T\ prove to be a conservative extension. 
• 
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5.3.3 Animating SOS rules with LETOS 
The methodology of LETOS is to provide a lightweight tool that offers the most important facilities - type 
checking, IM}3Xscripting, animation and a derivation tree - at a minimal cost. 
Hartel addresses the crucial issue of non-determinism in a convenient/compatible way to our own. Hartel 
[Har97] states: 
An SOS yields a derivation sequence, whereas a natural semantics delivers a derivation 
tree. To put the two on a level playing field, it is convenient to add another rule to the SOS 
specifications. This new relation ~ given below computes the transitive closure of the rela-
3 tion ~ , and selects the final state: 
((S,state) -+ state) 
3 I-<SI,S> ~ <S;,s' > 
o 1-< S;,s' > J. s" 
J. 1-< SI,S > ~ s" 
One further benefit of the LETOS tool is the feature to check for source dependency of a rules premise. the 
base condition for the conservative extension result we use found true of our semantics. 
One key feature of LETOS is the ability for a Miranda program (generated by LETOS) not only to caIcu late 
the final state, but also the entire derivation tree, given an initial state. This derivation tree forms a proof in 
a natural deduction style, for which LETOS will render (in fe.T}3X). 
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This chapter first gives an introduction to the theory of inductively defined relations, of which presentations 
of operational semantics are examples. This principle of induction. specifically mle induction, is used to 
define the action based set of behaviours for a RTN. An inductive definition consists of introduction rules 
which define the least closed set of values, or configurations, that satisfy the relations. It specialises to 
proof rules for reasoning about the operational semantics of RTNs. 
We first identify the objectives for formal ising a soundness argument which are highlighted through an 
example. The example demonstrates the necessity of a formal proof and serves to highlight the structure 
we pursue. We then outline a method to formalise our approach in IsabellelHOL [NPW02]. 
6.1 Objectives 
Regarding semantics, there are three important questions we must face: 
CHAPTER 6. A SOUNDNESS ARGUMENT FOR THE AXIOMATIC SEMANTICS 
I. How can we say our semantics are sound? 
2. How can we guarantee our semantics are complete? 
3. How can we say there will not be any redundant axioms among all our rules? 
These questions are usually addressed in terms of the concepts of soundness and completeness. 
Soundness: An axiomatic semantics is called sound if it is consistent with an operational (or denotational) 
model that has already been formulated 
Completeness: The completeness of an axiomatic semantics is to check if the axioms are sufficient to 
specify all the behaviours of a model the axioms define. There may also be too many axioms in a 
system. Redundant axioms may add new features to our language, but these features actually do not 
exist in our language originally. Therefore we want to detect and avoid these redundant axioms in 
our system. 
First, and foremost, a semantic model should be sound, so that validation of system designs can proceed 
with confidence in the results. We wish to undertake our formal reasoning in Chapter 8 using the extended 
axiomatic semantics and therefore require first to show the axioms sound. 
6.2 Approach 
We suggest an approach based around the derived principle of definitions in HaL - the inductive definition 
of relations [CM92, Nip98]. The key element is a derived rule which allows a relation. in our case the 
transition rules, be defined by giving a set of introduction rules for generating its elements. Structural 
induction is often inadequate to prove properties of operational semantics. often it is useful to do induction 
on derivations. A derivation takes the form of a tree, which includes derivations to the premises of a rule 
instance. Rule instances are got from rules by substituting actual terms or values for meta-variables (or 
formal variables) in them. 
Our operational semantics define a trace model for RTNs, with which we now require to show the axioms 
sound. The form of a trace is got from the SOS rules, such that properties of a derivation -or trace- can be 
inductively reasoned about. The properties we wish to prove are the interpretations of the RTN axioms in 
the trace model, not just for a trace but, for all traces reachable which are specified by the SOS rules. 
6.2.1 An Example 
Because the transition system from the structured operational semantics (SOS) is given by rules. we have 
an elementary, but very useful, proof technique for proving properties of the operational semantics of 
RTNs. The simple proof of the equivalence of the axiomatic semantics with its operational unfolding 
exhibits an important technique: in order to prove consistency it is helpful to consider the various possible 
forms of derivations [Win93]. This approach is illustrated in Section 6.2.3, but the idea is used again and 
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true 
Figure 6.1: Example fragment of an RTN-SL Design 
again, though never in such detail. Later we shall show how ntle induction, in principle. can fonnalise the 
technique used here. 
Consider now, as an example, the exit transition from a dynamic state. Figure 6.1 shows the arrangement 
of a dynamic state, B which has an exit transition labelled true that transitions to static state C. The design 
also stipulates that the exit transition must occur not earlier than 11 time units after entering state B nor later 
than U 1 time units. 
We wish to show the axioms (given below) generated from this fragment via .Q are sound with respect to 
our operational model using our elementary proof technique. This requires we show the existence of a 
derivation for which the axioms hold, such that the relationship of events specified in an axiom does exist 
in an operational sense. Section 6.2.1.1 illustrates the axiomatic semantics which describe this example. 
while Section 6.2.1.2 shows the operational counterparts. 
6.2.1.1 Axiomatic Specification 
The axiomatic model, from [PAHoo], of our example is described by the following axiomatic specifica-
tions: 
Alax3: Vi,j: Occ,t: Time· (0(lB, i, t) 1\ c'P(true,j, t)) ~ 0(lC, i, t) 
AlaxSb: Vi:Occ,t:TIme·0(lC,i,t) ~ 0(lB,i,t) 
Alax6: Vi,j:Occ,t: TIme·0(lB,i,t) ~ 3tl: TIme·t+ll :S tl :S t+uI1\8(jB,i,td 
6.2.1.2 Operational Model 
The operational model defined over the relation (rtnl ,crl, xd ~ (cr2.X2) (which was described in Section 
5.2) is the transition from a configuration containing the static specification of our system (rtn I)' the current 
state -or dynamic- properties (crd and the history of events, a trace (xd. To use our elementary proof 
technique upon our example, we must define (partially) the starting configuration: 
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( 
{al ~ m.CActivity({p1 },{P2},-,{opl}, ) 
( ) _ mk_SM({B,C},{mk]ransition(B,c'tnte)},-»}. rtn, 01, 1t1 - {PI ~ vl,p2 ~ v2,B ~ mk_dySt([oplj)}, 
[{ lB}] 
The relation ~ specifies the evaluation of all possible actions from some configuration to generate the next. 
where ~ specifies the evaluation of a single action. We therefore wish to find a sequence. or derivation. 
of actions (i.e. ~steps) to show our axioms can be true. We leave it until later to show soundness, which 
requires there does not exist a derivation showing our axiom false, by considering all derivations specified 
under the ~ relation. The rules which are of interest in showing axiom AJax6 true, and transform this 
starting configuration, are shown below: 
a E domOI 
ol(a) =mk_ael(es,ls,INDS) 
01 (es).ops = {} 
uaet = mk_aet(es,ls, WAIT_TR) 
fdySil s ~ (RTN,OI ,1t.) --> (01 t{a ...... uaet}, {}) 
a E domOI 
01 (a) = mk_aet(es,ls, WAIT _TR) 
tr E RTN(a).sm.ts 
) 
Ir (tr, 01, 1t1 --> true 
mk_Dynamie_State(id"mk_Bounds(beet,bert, weet» E RTN(a).sm.ss/\ id = es 
:3 tl E inds 1t1 . t"s Ej 1t1 (tl) 1\11 +beel $ len 1t1 < II + weet 
~ t2 E inds 1t1 . t2 ~ tl/\ Tcs Ej+1 1t1 (12) 
ins( 01 (Ir.lrg» = INDS 
nael = mk_aet(tr.trg,ls, INDS) 
Irgs = mk dySI([op I op E s.ops· s E RTN(a).sm.ss /\s.id = tr.trg]) 
~ (RTN,OI ,1t.) ~ (01 t{a ...... IUlet,tr.trg ...... trgs}, { .lfr.src, ltr.trg}) 
~ )'r (mk_lransilion(src, Irg,I),OI, 1t1 --> true 
is_(l, Expression) 
(1,01) ~ true 
6.2.2 Correctness Specification 
We are interested in axiomatic specifications, specified in RTL, which often take the following forms: 
Vi: Oee, tl : Time· 8(el ,i,l.) => :3j: Oee, 12: Time· 8(e2,j,12) /\ P{t\, (2) 
and 
Vi: Oee, t: Time· 8(e\, i, I) /\ 4>(c,i, t) => 8(e2, i,l) 
Given the defined relations ~ & ~ (described in Section 5.2), we seek to represent the equivalent ax-
iomatic specification over our operational semantics. We have discussed in Section C.5.1 the evaluation of 
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this relation and the set of pennutations it generates. We therefore require an interpretation of relating a 
typical axiomatic specification onto our SOS model on which to define our propositions. 
We have seen, in Section 4.1, the definition of the RTL event model and the syntax of its fonnulas. We now 
define a semantic function, 9r£ that defines the value of RTL fonnulas (fRTL) in terms of our SOS (trace) 
semantics. The semantic function, 9r£ performs case analysis on the components of the concrete syntax 
and defines the meaning of RTL fonnulas thus: 
9r£ : fRTL -+ fsos -+ B 
An auxiliary function which makes the semantics more presentable is Ei which states that an event is 
occurring for the ith time in a trace: 
e Ei 1t(t)~ card {t E inds1t· e E 1t(t)} = i 
The Semantic Function 9r£ 
9r£ [PI II P2Ea,It /:;. 9r£ [PI Ea.1t II 9r£ [P2Ea,1t 
9r£ [PI V P2Ea,It /:;. 9r£ [PIEa,1t V 9r£ [P2Ea.x 
9r£ [PI => P2Ea,It /:;. 9r£ [PIEa,1t => 9r£ [P2Ea,x 
9r£ [, PEa,1t /:;. ,9r£ [PEa,1t 
9r£ [3 i: Occ, t: TIme· P(i, t) Ea,lt /:;. 3i': Occ,t' E inds1t·M[PDa,lt(i',t') 
9r£ [Vi: Occ, t: TIme· P]a,1t /:;. Vi':Occ,t' E inds1t·9r£[PDa,lt(i',t') 
9r£ [8(e,i,t)]a,1t /:;. if t E inds 1t then e Ei 1t( t) else false 
This is intended to capture the interpretation of RTL formulas in our operational model. One careful 
consideration was with respect the 9r£ [,PEa,1t definition. We wished it be ,9r£ [PDa,x which drove out a 
careful construction of the guard of 9r£ [8(e, i,t)Da,lt. 
Consider as an example a typical RTL theorem: 
Q =.Vi: Occ,tl: TIme·8(el,i,t') => 3j:Occ,t2 :TIme·t2:::; tl + II II 8(e2,j,t2) 
then 
9r£ [QDa,1t /:;. 
/:;. 
9r£ [Vi: Occ, tl : TIme· 8( el, i, tl) => 3j: Occ, t2 : TIme· t2 :::; tl + u II 8(e2,j, t2)Da,lt 
Vi: Occ,tl E inds1t· 9r£[8(el,i,t') => 3j:Occ,t2: TIme·t2:::; tl +uIl8(e2,j,t2)Da,x 
/:;. Vi: Occ,tl E inds1t· 9r£[8(el,i,t.)]a,1t => 9r£ [3j:Occ,t2 :TIme·t2:::; tl +1l1l8(e2,j,t2)Da,l! 
/:;. 
/:;. 
/:;. 
Vi: Occ, tl E inds 1t . if tl E inds 1t then el Ei 1t( t.) else false => 3 t2 E inds 1t. M[t2 :::; tl + II t\ 8( e2,j, t2) Da,x 
Vi: Occ, tl E inds 1t. e E; 1t(t) => 3 t2 E inds 1t. t2 :::; tl + II t\ if t2 E inds 1t then e2 Ej 1t(t2) else false 
Vtl Einds1t'el E;1t(t.) => 3 t2Einds1t·t2:::;tl+ulle2 Ej1t(t2) 
which we believe is a correct translation to the conjecture in the SOS model as 9r£ [fRTLDa.lt E $: 
Vtl E inds 1t. el E; 1t(t.) => 3t2 E inds 1t. t2 :::; tl + II II e2 Ej 1t(t2) 
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6.2.3 An informal argument 
Consider the problem of evaluating I the tr-dySt rule in some configuration (rtn,OI, XI). This amounts to 
finding a derivation which concludes to the source of the tr-dySt rule therefore satisfying its premises. 
The search for a derivation is best achieved in a upwards fashion: Start by finding a rule with a conclusion 
matching the premise of the tr-dySt rule; if this is an axiom the derivation is complete; otherwise try to 
build derivations up from the premises until successful. In general, more than one rule has a source that 
matches a given configuration. To guarantee finding a derivation tree, all paths must be considered. All 
possible derivations with conclusions of the correct form should be constructed in parallel. 
We now show one possible derivation of the operational semantics which shows the axiom (A 1ax6) sound 
with respect to the operational model. 
Proposition 6.1 From our previous example, let 
be sound with respect the configuration (rtn, 01, xI). 
PROOF We want to show 
Alax6 f::; M[[\fi:Occ,tl:TIme·0(lB,i,tI) =? 3t2:TIme·tl+II:::;12:::;tl+III/\0(lB,i,12)Da.Jt 
f::; Vtl E inds 1t. iB Ej X(tl) =? 3t2 E inds X· tl + iJ :::; t2 :::; tl + 111/\ lB Ej X(t2) 
is sound and consistent with the configuration (rtn,OI, 1tI) and all derivations there from, i.e. (rtn, 01, xd ~ 
(02, X2). 
To assert our conjecture for all x, we are required to show the conjecture holds for all possible forma-
tions of x. That is, to show for each step of the construction of x, our conjecture is true. In our work, 
the next value ofx is defined by the ~ relation, such that (rtn,ol,xI) ~ (02,X2). Subsequently, for 
each new X2 by~, we show its formation with respect~. We are therefore required to show that the 
proposition is true first for the (rtn, 01, XI) configuration -our induction hypothesis- and for the induc-
tion step, We argue first that there exists a derivation from the configuration (rtn, 01, xd to some X2 
which shows Al ax6 true. Each possible value of 1t2 is specified as a transition (i.e. the next step) under 
~ where 1t2 is the concatenation2 of XI and es for which Al ax6 remains true. 
Suppose Alax6 is true for the transition (rtn,OI, 1tI) ~ (02, X2) for traces XI, X2, then there must exist 
a derivation of (rtn, 01, 1t1) ~ (02, 1t2)' Inspecting the SOS rules for a possible sequence of transition 
steps, we find that the final rule of the derivation must be the tr-stSt rule: 
I We stated earlier, this informal discussion considers the sequence of actions under the 2.. relation, and not the complete evaluation 
of a time instance. as specified by ~. 
21n the derivation sequence, the ~ transitions aren't shown. Rather, between each 2.. transition there would exist the evalualion 
of the ~ relation (c.f. Section 5.2) to ramify the small-step transitions. 
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(Ir, crl, 1t1) .!!... true 
311 E inds1tI'18Ei1tI{tI)/\~12 E inds1tI'12 ~II/\ 18Ei+l 1t1(12)/\ 
II + beet :S len 1t1 < II + weel 
In this case, we consider the derivation follows from the dySI rule and has the form 3: 
a E dom crl = mk_ael(B, Is, INDS) 
crl (B).ops = [J 
(Ir,crl,1tI).!!... true 
3 II E inds 1t1 ·18 E; 1t1 (II) /\ ~ 12 E inds 1t1 . 12 ~ '1/\ 18 Ei+ I 1t\ (t2) /\ 
'I +11 :S len1t1 < II +,,1 
We can continue the derivation to see we previously must have evaluated the operation specified, which 
includes a read action, we therefore add first the dySI-op-rd rule which must follow the Ir-dySI rule 
which states we entered state B in the first place: 
3 Double horizontal lines indicate the conclusion of rules within the derivation. as well as the final conclusion concluding our 
axiom is sound. 
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a E dornO"\ 
uact = mk_act{B, Is, INDS) 
trgs = mk_dySt{[op I op E s.ops·s E RTN{a).sm.ss /\s.ill = B]) 
(rtn\ ,0"\, 1t\) ~ {O"\ t{a 1-+ uact,B 1-+ trgs}, { Jlr.src, tB}) 
(pI,O"I) ~ v 
Is' = 1st {PI 1-+ v} 
(post, Is') ~ true 
(nn\ ,0"\, 1tI) ~ {O"\ t{B 1-+ !I 0"\ (B).ops,a 1-+ mk act{B,Is', INDS)}, {"(pi}) 
a E dornO"\ = mk_act(B,ls, INDS) 
0"( (cs).ops = [] 
(nn\,O"\,1tI) ~ (O"( t{al-+mk act(B,ls,WAIT TR)},O) 
a E dornO"( = mk_act{B,ls, WAIT_TR) 
(tr, 0"(, 1tI) :.:.. true 
3t( E inds 1t( ·18 Ei 1t( (td /\ ~ t2 E inds 1t\ . t2 2:: t(/\ 18 Ei+ 11t( (t2) /\ 
t( +11:::; len1t( < t( +ul 
Noting the premise that all operations specified on B are completed must indicate we have entered B 
(fB) previously and specified the operations to execute on it. Therefore we continue the derivation to 
find in some previous trace we entered B (lB) noting the tr-stSt rules conclusion matches our upper-most 
premise to see: 
Thus 
AIax6 ~ Vt\ E inds1t· lB Ei 1t(tI) =} 3t2 E inds1t·t( +/1:::; t2 :::; tl +UI/\.JB Ei 1t{t2) 
• 
Although we have shown the existence of a derivation that suggests our axiom sound, it does not do so 
conclusively. Rather, we must consider all possible derivation trees and therefore the exclusion that another 
derivation path showing the axiom inconsistent with the operational semantic. We therefore require a more 
formal argument, which appeals to this approach but is formally sound. 
6.3 Trace Induction 
We have elaborated previously (c.f. Section 5.2) that the ~ relation specifies a small step in an RTN. for 
which many such steps can fire from some configuration. The history -or trace- of an RTN is got from the 
~ relation which specifies the transition from configuration to configuration which ramifies each small 
step to yield a new configuration. Therefore. the trace is inductively defined. such that: 
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tl : (rtn,cro, []) ~ (crl, res]) 
t2 : (rtn, crl, res]) ~ (cr2, res] r+ [es']) 
t3: (rtn, cr2, res] r+ [es']) ~ (cr3, res, es'] r+ [es'1) 
which suggest we can inductively reason that our axiomatic semantics for RTNs are sound over the length 
of a trace, 1t. 
6.3.1 Model Space 
Recall from Chapter 5, the model space of our operational semantics is that of a trace structure: specifically 
those RTN traces which are reachable by the SOS rules. The formal presentation below is derived from 
standard sequence (or list) and set induction principles. We discuss these rules, their proofs and the model 
space we consider for giving a rigorous argument to the soundness of the axiomatic semantics with respect 
to our SOS rules. 
As a reminder, the data types we are interested in are as follows. IT is the type of traces, where each trace 
is a sequence of sets of events, each set representing the events taking place at a time. 
Event = Token 
ES = Event·set 
IT = ES* 
Rather than reason in this model space, which requires repetition of work to argue the traces are valid RTN 
traces, we prefer to develop a model theory for RTN traces in their own rights. The traces which are valid 
for a given RTN form a subtype of IT. We will therefore need inference rules that support reasoning over 
this SUbtype. 
A particularly useful strategy when considering a theory describing some subtype of a type which as an 
associated induction rule is to develop a specialisation of the induction rule for that subtype. In general, 
formulating this rule amounts to putting additional constraints on the induction step (in the form of extra 
premises in the sequent hypothesis which represents it in the rule) to ensure that it steps from one value 
of the subtype to the next. Also it is necessary to modify the typing information throughout the rule, and 
possibly the base case as well if the base case for the main type is not a member of the subtype. For RTN 
traces, it is easy to see that the induction base case cannot be the empty sequence as this is not a member 
of the subtype. Rather, these non-empty traces require the property is valid for the singleton sequence (our 
special case for RTN initialisation). Additionally, it is foreseeable that the induction step can be restricted 
to step only between RTN traces if an additional constraint is imposed to the effect that the current history is 
reachable from the history of the last time instance. The restricted data types and their auxiliary definitions 
are given below. 
Event = Token 
ES = Event·set 
s-step( rtn : RTN, cr: E, 1t : TIrln , hb : ES) r: ES 
post if (rtn, cr, 1t) -J.. then r = hb 
else :lei: E· (rtn, cr, 1t) ~ (ei,es) 1\ 
r = s-step(rtn, ei, 1t,hbUes) 
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The s-step function implicitly builds an handbag (hb) of events that occur for a single step. From some 
configuration, s-step recursively builds the handbag of events until no further single-steps can fire from 
the previously generated intermediate configuration (rtn, cr', x). Note, for each recursive small-step the 
transition rule ~ is fired from x which enforces out atomicity model. 
init-rtn(rtn: RTN) a: E 
is not yet specified 
TInn = ES+ 
inv xl'"\. [s] ~ if x = [] then 3a: E· (rtn, init-rtn(rtn) , []) ~ (a, [s]) 
else 3a\, a2 : E· s = s-step(rtn, a\, x, { }) " 
(rtn, a\, x) ~ (a2, xl'"\. [s]) 
The TIrm type invariant above states that each the current trace was reached from a previous RTN trace by 
some collection of small-steps. This allows one to reason inductively over the subtype. 
Our decision not to specify an individual invariant on ES is due to the close dependency between ES and 
fInn. Instead, we give only an invariant on fInn (which is an RTN trace with which we wish to show 
the axioms sound) and an auxiliary function, s-step to restrict the event-sets we concatenate to a RTN 
trace. Binding the invariant to a data type was a design decision made in VOM in the 1980's, and which 
separates it from Z [Hay93, W096]. Previously the invariant was an auxiliary function separate from the 
type definition. However, the tight binding between the data type definition and its invariant allows the 
introduction of the invariant predicate into a proof at the necessary stage. Specifically with our model 
theory, the invariant on TInn states the step between values is defined by the ~ relation, which in tum 
states that each small step is defined by the ~ relation, allowing a proof to only be concerned by valid 
traces. This allows each proof to extract the properties we wish to show are sound. 
6.3.2 Induction Rules 
The traces which are valid for a given RTN form a subtype of TI. We will therefore need inference rules 
that support reasoning over this subtype. We first consider the induction rule for non-empty sequences: 
s:A+ 
a:A \- P([a]) 
I . I a:A,s':A+,P(s')\-P(s'I'"\.[a]) 
A+-mdn P(s) 
Considering now a restricted type of A + we specify 
B=A+ 
invb~/(b) 
we derive our induction rule to be: 
b:A+ 
a:A \-I([a]) ~ P([a]) 
~a:A,s':A+,1(s') ~ P(s')\-/(s'I'"\.[a]) ~ P(s'I'"\.[a]) B-indn /(b) ~ P(b) 
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or using inv-b : A + -+ lR 
b:A+ 
a: A I- inv-B([a]) ~ P([a]) 
~ a :Z,s' :A+ ,inv-B(s') ~ P(s') I- inv-B(s'r\. [a]) ~ P(s'r\.[a]) ~----.:.--~-:........:.--~~-~~---!::~-.:....--=-~--':~ 
inv-B(b) ~ P(b 
We now apply the same derivation to our data types and derive a rule for non-empty sequence of event sets: 
1t:ES+ 
es: ES I- inv-TInn([es]) ~ P([es]) 
I . I es: ES, 1t' : ES+ , inv-TInn (1t') ~ P( 1t') I- inv-TInn (Jt' r\. res]) ~ P( Jt' r\. res]) 
. n"n-mdl _ inv-TInn(1t) ~ P(1t) 
and prove it trivially 
PROOF (TIrln-IND 1) 
from 1t:ES+ 
es:ESl-inv-TIrln([es]) ~ P([es]) 
es:Es,1t':ES+,inv-TIrtn (1t') ~ P(Jt') l-inv-TInn(1t'r\.[es]) ~ P(Jt'r\.[es]) 
from es:ES 
infer inv-TIrtn(es) ~ P([es]) 
2 fromes:ES,1t':ES+,inv-TI rtn (1t') ~ P(Jt') 
infer inv-TIrtn (1t' r\. res]) ~ P(1t'r\. res]) 
infer inv-TIrtn (1t) => P(1t) 
sequent{h2.I.h I) 
sequent{h3.2.h 1.2.h2.2.h3) 
A + -ind(l.2) 
• 
The first rule below is our induction rule over the restricted type: RTN Traces. TInn} and the second is the 
induction rule over event sets that arise at each point in the trace. 
s: ES, inv-TIrtn([s]) I-s P([s]); 
es:ES, 1t':TIrtn , P(1t'), inv-TIrtn(1t'r\.[es]) 1-ll',tS P(Jt'r\.[es]) I nrtn-indn I P(1t) 
1t: TInn; 
s:ES,P(1t),s= {} I- P(1t r\.[{}]) 
es: ES, s': ES, P(1t r\. [s']), inv-TInn(1tr\. [s']), s' nes = {} I-es P(1tr\. [s' Ues)]) ~ P(1t r\.[s]) 
The proof below makes use of the previous inference rules for trace induction: 
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PROOF (TInn-INDN) 
from 7t: TIrln; 
s:ES, inv-TInn([s]) r-s P([s]); 
es:ES, 7t':TInn, P(7t'), inv-TInn(7t'r\.[es])r-It',es P(7t'r\.[es]) 
TI:ES+ 
2 fromx:ES 
2.1 from inv-TInn([x]) 
infer P([x]) 
infer inv-TInn([x]) => P([x]) 
3 fromx:ES,7tx :Es+,inv-TInn (7tx ) => P(7tx ) 
3.1 from inv-TInn(7tx r\. [x]) 
3.1.1 inv-TInn(7tx) 
3.1.2 7tx : TInn 
3.1.3 P(7tx) 
infer P(7tx r\. [x]) 
infer inv-TInn(7tx r\. [x]) 
4 inv-TInn(7t) => P(7t) 
5 inv-TInn(7t) 
infer P(7t) 
PROOF (ES-INDN) 
from 7t : TI rln ; 
hl,TInn 
sequent h2(2.h 1,2.h 1,2.I.h I) 
=>-1(2.1) 
Lemma I 
TInn ,3.h2,3.1.1 
=>-E(3.h3,3.1.1) 
sequent h3(3.hl,3.1.2,3.1.3,3.1.1) 
=>-1(3.1) 
TInn-indn( 1,2,3) 
hl,TInn 
=>-E(5.4) 
• 
s:ES,P(7t),s= {} r- P(7tr\.[{}]) 
es: ES, s': ES, P(7tr\. [s']), inv-TInn(7tr\. [s']), s' nes = {} r-es P(7tr\. [s' U es)])7t: TInn 
from s:ES,P(7t),s = {} 
infer P( 7t r\. [{ }]) sequent h2( I.h I,h 1,I.h3) 
2 from7tx ,es:ES,s':ES,s'nes= {},inv-TInn (7tx) => P(7tx) 
2.1 from inv-TInn(7tx r\. [S' Ues]) 
2.1.1 inv-TInn (7tx r\. [S']) 
2.1.2 7tx r\. [s'] : TInn 
2.1.3 P( 7tx r\. [s']) 
infer P(7tx r\. [s' U es]) 
infer inv-TIrtn (7tx r\. [s' Ues]) => P(7tx r\. [s' U es]) 
infer P(7t r\. [s]) 
The following lemmas where made use of: 
Lemma2(2.I.h I) 
TInn 
=>-E(2.h5) 
sequent h3(2.h2,2.h3,2.1.3,2.1.I,2.h4) 
=>-1(2.1 ) 
set-indn(l,2) 
• 
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1t:ES+ 
es:ES 
I Lemma! I inv-nr1n (1t r+[esj) 
inv-nnn (1t) 
1t:ES+ 
s:ES,es:ES 
snes= {} 
I I inv-n nn (1t r+[sUesj) 
. Lemma2. r+ 
inv-nnn (1t [s]) 
6.4 RTN Soundness argument 
Given the axiomatic schema for RTNs, we wish to show each axiom sound with respect to our SOS model. 
However, given the comprehensive presentation of the schema in Chapter 4, we show here only specific 
examples of this schema sound, specifically those generated by our running example. However, the exam-
ple specification does explore the more challenging side of the semantics. Therefore, for each axiom Ax I 
through Ax13 we propose its interpretation in terms of our SOS model (described in Section 6.2.2) and 
argue its soundness. 
Each axiom is phrased as a conjecture over 1t: nnn which are the results of each axiom under the semantic 
(interpretation) function M [], such that P{1t) must hold. We therefore must show, for each axiom it holds 
for all1t, i.e. V1t: nnn' P(1t). This implicit quantification is left assumed. Not every proof is shown in the 
body of the thesis, and the reader is referred instead to Appendix B for the complete rigorous proofs, and 
for the proofs of useful lemmas that we identify and use in the following arguments. 
6.4.1 Ax6 
We now show Ax6 sound with respect to our SOS model. We repeat the RTL definition ofAx6 from Section 
6.2.1.1 above: 
Alax6: Vi,j: Occ,t: Time·8(jB,i,t) => 3t\ : Time· t+/1 :S t\ :S t+UI 118{.I8,i,ll) 
We define -to aid presentation- the axiomatic specification as P{1t) which is the interpretation ofAx6 using 
the M [] semantic function: 
P(1t)~Vtl E inds1t·ls" E; 1t(tt)/\len1t?: tl +u => 3t2 E inds1t· .j$E;1t{t2) Al2:S tl +U 
Our approach is first to induct over the length of 1t, and for each step we can take from some configuration 
(nn, cr\, 1t1) we show the derived trace (1t2) satisfies our property P(1t2) by trace induction. 
Intuition for Ax6-Soundness :: Proof 6 
The form of P(1t) suggests a structure for a proof. Given that a state entry entry event Os) should cause 
a state event (.j$) within some time of the first, we are required to show that for the case ls" is recorded in 
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X, some j,s event occurs also. The interesting case is when the deadline (len x n. lsI = II + II) is reached 
for this event. At this deadline (len x n. lsI = II + u), we must show that either the event (~) has occurred 
previously or does so in the final step. This is shown by Proof 7. 
PROOF (Ax6-s0UNDESS) 
fromrtn:RTN; 0:1:; x:llnn; II,U:NI; II Eindsx 
from es:ES, inv-llnn([esl) 
1.1 len res] = I 
1.2 len res] < II + U h4 
1.3 ls Ei [es)(ll) 1\ len res] ~ II + U => 312: Time· J.s Ei [esJ(12) 1\12::; II +u vac-=>-I(1.2) 
infer P([esl) folding 
2 from XI : llrtn; s: ES;P(xI); inv-ll(x\ n. [sl) 
2.1 lenxI n.[s] < II +U V lenxI n.[s] > II +uV lenxI n.[s] = II +11 V-I 
2.2 from len XI n. [s] < II + U 
infer P(XI n. [sl) =>-I-right-vac(2.2.h 1) 
2.3 from len XI n. lsI > II + II 
2.3.1 from J.s E s 
2.3.1.1 12 > len XI n. lsI 
2.3.1.2 12> II +u 
infer -'P(XI n. [sl) 
infer P(XI n. [sl) 
2.4 (rtn,ol,xI) ~ (02,XI n.[sl) 
2.5 from P(XI);(rtn,ol,X') ~ (02,XI n.[sJ); 
lenxI n. lsI = II + It; rs Ei XI (I.) 
infer P(XI n. [sl) 
infer P(XI n. [sl) 
infer "Ix : llrm . P( X) 
Intuition for Lemma3 :: Proof 7 
11,It:N; rtn:RTN; 01,02:1:; x:llrtn ; 
P(X); s:ES; (rtn,ol,X) ~ (02,Xn.[sl); 
3 II E inds x· rs Ei X(I.) 1\ len X n. lsI - II + It I Lemma31 n. [ ]) P(x s 
-, -=>- I(h5,2.3. 1.2) 
contradiction(2.3,2.3.1) 
unfolding(2.h3 ) 
Lemma3(2.5) 
V-E(2.1,2.2.2.3.2.5) 
llnn-indn( 1.2) 
• 
From the knowns, we must show that the exit state event Os) has either already occurred in XI (i.e. by 
hypothesis), or happens in the next RTN-step. We therefore show, by induction over the next steps that if 
the exit state events has not occurred, then it does so. Given more than one smalI-step can occur in each 
RTN-step, we prove this by induction on s. 
Given that some small-sleps have already been taken, recorded in s. then we show in the induction step that 
again. ~ has either occurred in s or does so in some .2..-step - namely the Ir-slSI step. 
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PROOF (LEMMA3) 
from tl,U: N; rtn: RTN; 0"1,0"2: L; 1t: TIrtn ; 
P(1t); s:ES; (rtn,O"I,1t) ~ (0"2, 1t f""\-[S]); 
3tl Einds1t· ts"E;1t(tl)Alen1tf""\-[s]=tl+U 
O:ES 
2 3tl E inds1t· ts" E; 1t(tI) 
3 3tl Einds1tf""\-[O]'ls"E;1tf""\-[O](tl) 
4 from3tl Einds1tf""\-[O]' lSE;1tf""\-[O](tdAlen1tf""\-[O]=t\+1I 
4.1 3IzEinds1t· J,s-E;1t(Iz) 
4.2 len1tf""\-[O] = succ(len1t) 
4.3 len1t < len1tf""\-[O] 
4.4 Iz ::; tl + II 
4.5 31z E inds1tf""\-[O]' j$E;1tf""\-[O](Iz) 
infer 31z E inds 1tf""\- [0]' j$ E; 1tf""\- [O](Iz) A Iz ::; tl + II 
5 3tl E inds1tf""\- [0]' ls E; 1tf""\- [O](tI) 1\ len1tf""\- [0]2 t.+ U 
=> 31z E inds1tf""\-[O]' J,s-E;1tf""\-[O](Iz)A1'2 ::;tl +11 
7 "itl E inds 1t f""\- [0]' ls E; 1t f""\- [0]( tI) A len 1t f""\- [0] 2 tl + II 
=> 3IzEinds1tf""\-[O]' J,s-E;1tf""\-[O](Iz)I\Iz<t'+lI 
S P(1tf""\- [0]) 
9 from es:ES; s' :ES; P(1tf""\-[s']);inv-TIrtn (1tf""\-[s']); s'nes = 0 
3tl E inds1tf""\-[s']· lSE;1tf""\-[s'](tl)Alen1tf""\-[s'] =tl +11 
9.1 (rtn,O"I,1tI) ~ (cr',es) 
9.2 j$ E es V J,qt es 
9.3 from j$ E es 
9.3.1 3tl E inds 1t1 . ls E; 1t1 (td 
9.3.2 ~ Iz E inds 1t1 . j$ E; 1t1 (Iz) A Iz 2 tl 
9.3.3 3 tl E inds 1t\ f""\- Is' u eS]·len 1t1 f""\- Is' u es] ::; tl + II 
let 1'1 = len 1t1 f""\- Is' U es] 
9.3.4 1'1::; tl +11 
9.3.5 j$ E; 1t1 f""\- Is' U es] (len 1t1 f""\- Is' U es]) 
9.3.6 31'1 E inds 1t1 f""\- Is' U es]· j$ E; 1tds' U es](t'1) 
infer 31'1 E inds 1t1 f""\- Is' U es]· J,s- E; 1t1 Is' U es] (1'1) A 1'1 ::; t\ + II 
9.4 from j$ ¢ es 
9.4.1 j$ E s' 
infer 3~ E inds1t1 f""\- Is' Ues]· J,s- E; 1tds' U es](~) 1\ 1'1::; tl + II 
infer 31'1 E inds 1t\ f""\- Is' U es]· j$ Ei 1tds' U es](t'1) A ~ ::; t\ + II 
10 3 tl E inds 1t f""\- [s']. ls E; 1t f""\- [S'](tl) A len 1t f""\- Is'] = tl + II => 
11 P(1tI f""\-[s'ues]) 
infer P(1t1 f""\- Is]) 
31'1 E inds 1t\ f""\- Is' U es]· j$ E; 1tds' U es](1'D 1\ 1'1 ::; tl + II 
ES-fonn 
3 -1\-E-right(hS) 
preserve(1,h4,h7.2) 
fi nd- j.s-(h 7 ,hS, \) 
len-f""\-( {},h4) 
n<succ(n)(4.2) 
rewriting(4.3,hS) 
preserve( l,h4,h7A.I) 
1\-1(4.5,4.4) 
=>-1(4.h 1.4) 
'1-1(5) 
folding(7) 
unfolding(9.h4) 
E-V-¢ 
3 -1\-E-right(hS) 
otherwise P(1t\) holds 
3-I\-E-left(hS) 
rewriting(9.3.3) 
rtn-step(9.1,9.3.h 1) 
3-1(1';,9.3.5) 
1\-1(9.3.6,9.3.4) 
hypothesis 
as 9.3 
v-E(9.2,9.3,9.4) 
=>-1(9.h6,9) 
folding( 1 0) 
ES-indn(S,11 ) 
• 
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The following lemmas have been used. 
It is obvious to see the length of a sequence, concatenated with a singleton sequence is the succent of the 
length of the sequence: 
~ a:A,s:A* ~I-. -----::::-----.:-----
- lensf+ [a] = succ(lens) 
Assuming RTN steps only ever add events to a trace -which they do- then the occurrence of an event at 
time, to must occur for the same occurrence at to in the extended sequence. 
t,t',i:NI; rtn:RTN; 01,02:r.; 1t:TInn; e:Event; s:ES; 
(rtn,OI,1t) ~ (02, 1t f+[S]) 
3t E inds1t·e E; 1t(t) 
1 preserve-'" 1-1 ---------=-----=----.:,,;..-------
. . 31' E inds 1t f+ Is], e E; 1t f+ [s](t') 
The find- J,v lemma asserts that if the length of the next RTN step requires an event should occur to meet its 
deadline, then it must occur in this step. A RTN step is only complete only when all small-step rules that 
can fire, have done so. Further, the SOS rules state that a state exit event must occur before its deadline. 
Therefore, having shown our semantics sound, we conclude by contradiction this lemma is true. 
rtn:RTN; 0(,02:r.; 1t:TInn; t(,u,i:N(; 
(rtn,o(,1t) ~ (02,1tf+[S]); 
~ 3t( Einds1t· ~E;1t(tJ)/\len1tf+[s]=t(+u; J.s~s 
~ 3izinds1t· J.s E; 1t(iz) 
The rtn-step lemma asserts that if an event occurs in the current step, then it can be found at the end of this 
trace. This value, len 1t f+ [s] marks the next time increment from which the event will be visible. 
rtn: RTN; 0,0': r.; 1t: TIrtn ; e: Event; es: ES; 
(rtn,o,1t) ~ (o',es);e E es 
~---~-e~E~1t-f+~~-]~(le-n-1t-f+~[-s]-)----
Should there exist a time at which an event occurred, then it can be said there existed a previous configu-
ration from which a small-step rule generated the event. This holds true by the definition of the trace data 
type invariant. 
Ilemma41 , . S -I' ) 30',0' .r.. (rtn,o',1t(I, ... ,t)) --+ (u ,es /\e E es 
i,t:N(; 1t:TIrtn ; 
3t E inds1t· e E; 1t(t) 
Similarly, should the final associated operations to a dynamic state have been evaluated, then there exists a 
configuration change recording this state. 
rtn : RTN; 0,0' : r.; 1t: TInn; 
(rtn, 0, 1t) ~ (o',es) /\o'(a).status = INDS; 
letcs- o'(a).cs; o'(cs) # [] 
1 evai-ops 1 30": r.. (rtn, 0', 1t f+ [s U es]) ~ (0", 1t f+ [s U es, {}]) /\ 0" (cs) = [] 
PROOF (FIND- J,v) As an example, the proof ofjind- J.s is shown below: 
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from rtn:RTN; 0"1,0"2:E; 1t:nnn ; tl,u,i:NI; 
3tl Einds1t· tyEi1t(t!)t\len1t"'[O]=tl+U 
1 3tl E inds1t· ty Ei 1t(t!) 
2 3cr. ,cr'{: E,es: ES· (rtn,cr., 1t(I, ... , t()) 2.. (cr'{ ,es)t\ ty E es 
3 from cr. ,cr'{: E,es: ES; (rtn, cr., 1t(I, ... ,tl)) 2.. (cr'{,es)t\ ty E es 
3.1 (rtn,cr.,1t(I, ... ,t!)) 2.. (cr'{,es) 
let 1t' = 1t(I, ... , t!) 
3.3 (rtn,cr.,1t') 2.. (cr'{,es) 
3.4 ls E es 
3.5 2.. :tr-dySt 
3.6 cr'{(a).status = INOS 
3.7 cr'{(s) = [ ... ] 
infer (rtn,O"; ,1t') 2.. (cr'{, es) t\ cr'{ (a ).status = INOS 
4 (rtn,O";,1t') 2.. (O"~,es) t\O"'{(a).status = INOS 
6 3cr'{' : E, s' : ES· (rtn, cr'{, 1t' '" [s' U es]) ~ (cr'{', 1t' '" [s' U es, { }]) t\ 
cr'{'(s) = [] 
7 from O"~' : E, s' : E; 
7.1 
7.2 
7.3 
8 
(rtn, cr'{, 1t' '" [s' U es]) ~ (cr'{', 1t' '" [s' U es, 0]) t\ cr'{' (s) = [] 
cr'{'(a).status = INOS 
s = cr'{'( a) .es 
O"'{'(es) = [] 
lel1t" = 1t' '" [s' U es, { }] 
3-I\-E-right(h?) 
lemma2(h?) 
I\-E-right(3.h2) 
rewriting (3.1 ) 
I\-E-left{3.h2) 
which-rule(3.3.3A) 
conc-tr-dySI( 3.3.3.5) 
conc-tr-dySt(3.3.3.5) 
t\-1(3.3.3.6) 
3-E(2.3) 
eval-ops( 4) 
is-prem-dySt 
enter s (h5). not \eft yet 
is-prem-dySt 
conc-dySt(7.1.7.3) 
3-E(6.7) 
9 
infer (rtn, cr'{', 1t") 2.. (cr'{' t {a ...... mk_aetC,_, WAIT _TR)}, {}) 
(rtn, cr'{', 1t") 2.. (cr'{' t{a ...... mk_aetC,_, WAIT _ TR)}, { }) 
(rtn,cr'{' t {a ...... mk_aetC,_, WAIT _ TR)}, 1t" '" [s" U {}]) ~ (0"2, 1t" '" [s" U {}, {}]) RTN-Tick 
let 1t''' = 1t" '" [s" U {}, {}] 
10 3tr E RTN(a).sm.ts· (tr,0"2,1t''').!!.. true 
11 len 1t''' < tl + weet 
12 (rtn, 0"2, 1t''') 2.. (<iz,{ Js,ltr.trg}) 
must at least be one tr valid by wf-rtn 
13 (rtn,<iz,1t''''''[s'''U{ Js, 1tr.trg}]) ~ (cr';,1t'''''' [s'''u{ .].s, ltr.trg}.{}]) 
prem-tr-stSt 
conc-tr-stSl 
RTN-Tick 
let 1t2 = 1t''' '" [s" U { .].s, ltr.trg}, 0] 
let t2 = len 1t2 
14 Js Ei 1t2(t2) 
infer 3t2 E inds1t· Js Ei 1t(t2) 
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6.5 Review 
The soundness proofs we have presented in this chapter are based upon existing techniques for operational 
semantics. We have presented a model space which our SOS semantics define and the axiomatic semantics 
should be sound with respect to. The level of rigour of the soundness proofs is sufficient to provide a 
convincing argument that the axiomatic semantics are sound. However, it is obvious to state that a formal 
proof would extend the evidence as would a mechanised proof in an automated proof assistant. such as 
Isabelle/HOL. 
The first attempt to formalise this style of approach was described in [CM92], which described a suite of 
HOL tools for the definition of a set of functions which took as an argument a list of formation rules and 
automatically proves the defining properties of the relation inductively defined by them. More precisely, 
this derived HOL inference rule builds a term that denotes the smallest relation closed under those rules. 
Nipkow [Nip98] formalised the opening loo-pages of [Win93] from which our approach in Section 6.2.3 
is based upon. This formalisation was undertaken using the IsabelleIHOL proof assistant. 
The structure and formal model underpinning our proofs is influenced by the work of [CM92, Nip98, 
Win93] such that we inductively define over the derivations our operational semantics. 
Once the reader is convinced by the validity of our induction arguments of the RTN semantics, then the 
proofs for each axiom follow quite easily. By providing such induction principles we have allowed for 
concentration at the primary task: to give a concise and constructive operational semantics for RTNs. This 
allows for clear presentation of the concurrent and interleaving model, and the fine detail of each RTN 
Action separately, to avoid undue confusion or mistake. 
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In this Chapter, we detail several design templates of classical fault tolerant strategies appropriate for 
RTNs and RTN-SL designs. Each template design is given as a RTN-SL design fragment and a graph 
grammar representation which provides for a mechanism to instantiate each template into a design. For 
each template we give an infomlal description and then specify the fault assumptions, or fallit hypothesis, 
made for each template. We attempt to follow [801"98] as closely as possible which has found acceptance 
in the UK Defence industry for designs of RTNs to provide a standard template structure which is familiar 
to designers and engineers. Additionally, we give RTL theorems and proofs of the fault tolerant propertie, 
of each template under the givcn fault hypothesis. It is hoped these can then be used in the verification 
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Events Fau lts Dynamic States Static States Activity 
1s earl y 
late 
value 
omit 
commit 
Js early Early DyEx il EariySITimeEx ir & 
EarlySIEvEx il 
late LaleDyEx il LaleSITimeEx ir & 
LaleSrEI'Ex ir 
value 
omit 
commit 
rds early Ea rlyRead 
late LareRead LareAclRead 
value ReadValli e 
omit OmilRead 
commit 
wds earl y Early Wrile 
late Late Wrile 
va lue WrireVa llle 
omit Omil Wrire 
commit 
progress Crash Crash 
Table 7 . 1: Faults prev iously considered in Chapter 2 
of des igns, such that these theorems tate the given functi onality of the component the template replace. 
when considerin g the fau lt-hypothesis. 
We repeat Table 4.2 from Chapter 2 which illustrated the fa ult cia es we consider for RT s. The repeated 
table in Table 7. 1 illustrates the coverage of the proposed templates for the fault con idered. 
Some templ ates seem very compli cated for little reward . Thi s is part ly due to the design n Lation and the 
RTN architecture, which - for example- makes exp licit each communicati on path. For some templates. 
the graph grammar presentati on i straightforward , however the specificati on and semantics are more in -
tricate, altern ative ly, those graph grammar presentati ons which seem overl y compli ca ted do have a more 
strai ghtforward and si mpl istic semantic description. 
In Chapter 3, we proposed to use graph grammars as our transform ati onal methodology which replaces 
a component in a design wi th another - template of- component(s) that achieves some degree of fa ult 
tolerance. Given thi s template has been the runnin g example throughout the earlier chapters -e pecially 
Chapter 3- we conclude th at example in Secti ons 7.1.2.7. 1.3 & 7.1.4 \ hich details the fa ult-hypothesi 
RTL fornl ulas and proofs of, the fault tolerant properties thi s templ ate provide. 
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7.1 Passive State Replication Template 
7.1.1 Description 
The first template we consider is termed passive state replication (PSR). Though this template seems 
straightforward (given that activities in RTNs are sequential) it represents the extent of replication pos-
sible at the activity level. However, this template provides for several fault tolerant masking solutions 
to a broad array of faults. This replication strategy offers timing and omission tolerance internally to an 
activity. This is achieved by using the extended RTN-SL language to specify fault transitions in a state-
machine specification. For passive state replication and a fault hypothesis of timing and omission faults, we 
specify transitions for late, early and omission events either for ports (read/write/stirn) or state-transitions 
(entry/exit) actions. This template, in its current -intentional- generic format can tolerate: 
• Late reads at port, pA; 
• Omission faults at port, pA 
We clarify the range of faults the PSR template tolerates with respect to the context a transformation is 
proposed for. For the example shown in Figure 7.1, the dynamic state we propose to transform reads an 
input and writes a result. It is a requirement that the transformation -at is neighbourhood- maintains this 
context and is therefore interface preserving. 
7.1.2 Transformation 
Graph Grammar Representation 
Four permutations can exist for the passive state replication template. We elect to describe the case that 
the existing component reads and writes an input/output respectively. The other cases are that a component 
only reads an input; only writes an output; or does neither. The case we have chosen covers three of the 
four cases so is ideal to describe concisely the detail. 
Given the original component reads and writes the template must similarly do so. Again, permutations of 
the permutations could be laboured here, given the various choices (Pool, Signal, Channel or Constant) of 
each data port. However, we elect to describe the case that the input port is a channel and the output be a 
pool to highlight the issues the protocols raise. 
The characteristics of an incoming channel and an outward pool are that the reader may be held up whereas 
the writer has no such restriction. In addition to the protocol blocking a reader, a read action would also 
consume the data which is an important consideration for the PSR template. These characteristics motivate 
two design choices for the template: 
• Replica's rpJ & rp2 must speculatively read, replica rp3 -as originally did- reads normally); 
• Only one replica will succeed in writing to the port as only one replica can succeed 
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C={ 
(sm,OI ,c*,1pI,c*, IN) 
(SI_SI,OI ,c*,1p1 ,c*, IN) 
(dYsl,OI,c*,1p1 ,c*, IN) 
(sm,OI ,C*, {1pI,1p2,1p3},c*,OUT) 
(scsl,OI,c*, {1pI, 1p2, 1p3},c*, OUT) 
(dy_SI,OI ,C*, {1p1 ,1p2,1p3},c*, OUT) 
Figure 7.1: Template #1 - Passive state replication 
The embedding relation (c) in Figure 7.1 specifies how the neighbourhood of the parent in the host graph 
is re-linked to the daughter in the rest graph. Here, we have used some notational freehand to say that, on 
the incoming arcs, each node connected to 01 in the parent graph should be connected to rp 1 with the same 
label. The context graph B (the second graph in Figure 7.1) specifies how the daughter graph is connected 
to the context graph A of the mother (the first graph in Figure7.l ). 
Fault Hypothesis 
Given the specification for a late write fault related to the input at pA, the initial fault may have been either 
the input (at pA) or the computation within the dynamic state to generate the output to pB. However, as no 
mention is made in the fault hypothesis of any fault at pA, we must therefore examine that a dynamic state, 
given a timely input, fails to produce its output timely. 
A fault that causes a component to produce the expected value for a given nonempty input sequence too 
late will be termed a late timing fault, which in RTL can be defined as: 
LATE_FAULT: Event x Occ x IntervaL -+ B 
LATEJAULT(e, i,l) !=. 
3t': Time·t' 2:: 1.11 1\ 8(e,i,t') 
The basic RTL formula states that an event, e occurs for some occurence, i at some time, t. Th LATE_FAULT 
formula states that an event (e) occurs for the of the interval (I). This auxiliary function (and the fault axiom 
stated below) are discussed further in Section 4.2 when the Real-Time Logic (RTL) is introduced. The aim 
of the auxiliary function is to state the characteristics of the specific fault (Similar functions are defined 
for Early, Omit and Commit faults) so that the fault axioms can clearly identify the observable interval an 
event should occur within. 
I The default read action normnlly is a destructive read which may be held-up. 
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Specific to our example a late write at port p4, in RTL, is specified to identify the time the read event 
occured (for the same occurence) and that the write event occurs later than some deadline (X). 
LateWrite(p4, i, t) ~ 
3t': TIme· I :::; t /\ e(Rp\,i,l) /\ 
LATE]AULT(Wp4,i, [I,t' + X]) 
An alternative definition may have been to relate the write event to another event. Such causal relationships 
are supported by the RTN-SL semantics, where -for example- the link axioms state: 
'v't:TIme·(3i:Occ·e(Wp4,i,t)) # 3j:occ·e(JnU,j,t) 
This casual relationship is used later for our reasoning. We therefore consider late exit faults in our reason-
ing. 
RTN-SL Design Fragment 
The RTN-SL specification of the template is shown below. We highlight the specification details with 
regards the incoming port (PA) and the fault transitions between replica's. 
The transformation necessitates we read speculatively from pA at replica's rpl and rp2 to guarantee the 
same value is available for the subsequent replicas should one fail. This necessitates the protocol at pA 
be changed from a normal one to a speculative one on the readers side. This does not however break the 
interface requirement that the interface remain constant as we only propose changing the readers side. We 
are however required to show the blocking and destructive behaviour is retained by the transformation. 
Should replica's rp I or rp2 succeed, then we must destructively read from pA before the next occurrence 
of entering rp I. Given pA is speculative, no wait state (static state) is required and we know we can read 
from pA if rp 1 has succeeded (and no omission fault at pA has occurred), we therefore perform ajlllsh type 
operation to pA where we (destructively) read a value and simply perform no computation. 
The essence of the PSR template are its fault transitions specifications. The template states that should a 
late write fault be observed at rpl then the RTN should transition to rp2, similarly that rp2 should transition 
to rp3. However, the assumption at most two of the replica's will fail prohibits rp3 from failing, therefore 
only a successful transition exists from rp3. Given the fault must occur within the dynamic state, we specify 
the fault transition as an exit transition. However, should a fault not occur then condition c2 must hold and 
therefore a timely write is made to pB. We note that only one write can occur to p8 for each occurrence 
that we enter rp 1. 
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-Q\ 
adt dtl is 
type A is token; 
type B is token; 
end adt; 
activity temp! is 
with dtl i 
ports 
Thesis-temp1.rtnsl 
pA : (Channel, dtl.A, in, SPECULATIVE); 
pB : (Pool, dt1.S, out); 
end ports; 
auxiliary definitions 
constant I_rpl : Time; 
constant 1_rp2 : Time; 
constant 1_rp3 : Time; 
constant weet_rpl : Time; 
constant wcet_rp2 : Time; 
constant wcetJp3 : Time; 
constant u_rpl : Time; 
constant u_rp2 : Time; 
constant u_rp3 : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
operations 
op foo (input mise. A) ; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end 0Pi 
op fooJpl <input_rpl misc.A) output_rpl mise.S; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
op foo_rp2 Cinput_rp2 misc.A) output_rp2 mise.S; 
pre true; 
poat true; 
end op; 
op foo_rp3 (input_rp3 mise .A) output_rp3 mise. B; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
end Opel' at ions; 
~;t dtf~:J 
dynami~ Ipl 
np too_I'pl peep:] from pA WI'itE"3 to pSi 
t i~,ing [1_I'pl, wcet_I'pl, u_rplJ; 
rl -> tldn3iti()n goes to rp2; 
tr~nuition goes to flush on c2; 
"i1d stolt e; 
dY:1d:Ti,' tp2 
op t{hl_t pI peeps from pA writes to pB; 
t 1m i rhJ [1_I p~, w"t-~t_I-P,~, u_rp2) ; 
Fl.· tld:1sitio:1 goes to rp2; 
tI.lfwition goes t" flush 0:1 c2; 
... nd state; 
dyrl,l:;',i,' q' \ 
('p flll' lpl [t:-',ld~l tt0:1', pA 10.'1 ite~, to pB, 
ti,.i:lq Il_lpl,wcet_lp3,u_rp3]; 
t[.l:\:iitio:I q083 to flunll on ~2; 
I-'",j stolt Pi 
01\':1,"" iI' ! 1\1:,11 
'Ji' t "(l reads t I ();- pAl 
ti;i:\ll [l,w,'~t,\I1; 
'l",:\~1it 1,):1 '11)1-':': t{' rpi on tIUt:'; 
end state; 
initial rpl; 
end states; 
end activity; 
rtn templ is 
end rtn; 
theory 
Theorem : THEOREM 
Thesls-temp1.rtnsl 
FORALL (input: dtl.a, output: dtl.b): 
end; 
pre_foo(input) AND post_foo(input,outputl IMPLIES 
(pre_foo_rpl(input) AND post_foo_rpl(input,output) AND 
pre_foo_rp2 (input) AND post_foo_rp2 (input, output) AND 
pre_foo_rp3(input) AND post_foo_rp3(input,output)) 
g 
> ~ 
;-I 
t'Il 
== ~ 
Z 
~ 
~ 
== ~ 
i 
~ 
~ 
~ 
== i 
~ 
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7.1.3 Design 
This section concludes the fonnal reasoning of the running example which began in Chapter 3. We have 
seen above the transfonnation proposed and its specification to tolerate the fault hypothesis identified. 
Below we give the modified semantics (instantiated from nf) from that given in [PAHoo]. We have retained 
the same naming convention (except that our activities are named A and B instead of A 1 and A2 respectively) 
to illustrate the changes. 
The example introduced in Chapter 3 was the faulty behaviour of a single dynamic state that was hypothe-
sised to potentially write late. We then illustrated how the passive state replication template can be applied 
to the host design to tolerate this behaviour. The template design essentially replaced a single dynamic 
state with an arrangement of three replica's. The template allows for -at most- two faults which define the 
state-machine transitions within the template, and therefore activity. The generated semantics differ from 
the original at the interface between the components, for example, the state-machine transition target states 
are now the replicas. Within the template, the transitions are dependant on the replicas' behaviour. 
The modified theory for activity B is now: 
B2_D: Vi: Occ, t: Time· 8(.\D, i, t) => 
8 (TE'_rp I, i, t) 
B3_E' _rpl: Vi,k: Occ,t: Time· 8(lf'Jpl,i,t) => 
((LATE_FAULT(lf'Jpl,i, [t-rpl_u,t-rpU]) /\ 
3j:Occ·8(TE'JP2j,t)) V 
(, FAULT /\ <I>(true,k, t) /\ 8(jD, i + I, t))) 
B3_E'_rp2: Vi,k: Occ,t: Time·8(lf'Jp2,i,t) => 
((LATE_FAULT(lf' Jp2, i, [t-rp2_u, t-rp2_1]) /\ 
3j: Occ· 8(TE' JP3j,t)) V 
(,FAULT /\ <I>(true,k, t) /\ 3j: Occ· 8(lD + I ,j, t))) 
B3_E'_rp3: Vi,k: Occ,t: Time· 8(lf'Jp3,i,t) => 
,FAULT /\ <I>(true,k, t) /\ 3j: Occ· 8(lD + I,j,t) 
B4_D: Vi,j: Occ, t: Time· 8(lD, i, t) => 
(i=OV 
((i> 1/\(8(lf'_rpl,j,t) V 
8(lf'Jp2,j,t) V 
8(lf' JP3,j, t)) 
)) 
B5_D: Vi: Occ,t: Time· 8(jE'Jpl ,i,t) => 
8(.\D,i,t) 
B6_E' _rpl: Vi: Occ, t: Time· 8(jE'_rp 1, i, t) => 
((31': Time· t+ 12 ~ I' ~ t+ u2/\ 8 (If'Jp1 , i, 1')) V 
(LATE_FAULT(lf'Jpl,i, [t+rpU,t+rp1uj/\ 
31" : Time· 1" > t + rp Ut/\ 8( JE'_rp 1, i, 1"))) 
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B6_E'_rp2: Vi: Occ,t: TIme·0(fE'_rp2,i,t) =? 
((31: Time· t+12 ~ I ~ t+u2/\0(jE'_rp2,i,I)) V 
LATE_FAULT(jE'_rp2, i, [t + rp2_1, t + rp2_u]/\ 
31': Time· I' > t + rp2_u /\ 0(JE' _rp2,;,I'))) 
B6_E' _rp3: Vi: Occ,t: Time· 0(fE'_rp3,i,t) =? 
(31: Time· 1+ 12 ~ I ~ t+u2/\0(JE' _rp3,i,l) 
B9_E'_rpl: Vi: Occ,t: Time· 0(jE'_rpl ,i,t) =? 
((31: Time· t+ rpl_1 ~ I ~ t+ rpl_u /\ 0(fE'_rpl,;,I)) V 
LATEJAULT(jE'_rpl ,i, [t-rpl_u, t-rpl_~)) 
B9_E'_rp2: Vi: Occ,t: Time· 0(jE'Jp2,i,t) =? 
((31: Time· t+ rp2_1 ~ I ~ t + rp2_lt /\ 0(lE'_rp2, i, I)) V 
LATEJAULT(jE' Jp2, i, [t-rp2_u, t-rp2_~)) 
B9_E'_rp3: Vi: Occ,t: Time· 0(jE'Jp3,i,t) =? 
(31: TIme·t+rp3_1 ~ I ~ t+rp3_lt/\0{lE'_rp3,i,l) 
7.1.4 Rigorous Proof 
The original presentation of our example in [PAHoo] gave two proofs to show the end-to-end specifications 
are satisfied by the design. We now investigate proving the same theorems to show the transformed -more 
fault tolerant- design satisfies the specification under the assumed fault hypothesis and assumption that 
at most only two components can fail. We proceed to suggest a modification to the proofs that retain the 
original structure, which is desired of our transformational design methodology. 
The two theorems we wish to prove are Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. Theorem 3.1 crucially depended 
on a lemma that activity B steps: given an input to p3 an output is produced to p4 within the specified time 
bounds. This is specified in Lemma 7.1. The original proof of this lemma showed that entering state E on 
the Rp3 event meant leaving the state timely. We are therefore required to show an equivalent lemma holds 
for the template specification which is specified in Lemma 7.2. 
Lemma 7.2 (Temp2Steps) Vi: Occ,tl : TIme· 0(fE',i,tI} =} 3t2: TIme· 0(lD,i + 1,(2) I\tl + X ~ 12 
Note, Lemma 7.2 asserts entering state D (lD) for the next occurrence rather than leaving state E( lE), but 
it is clear from the semantics these are equivalent. 
PROOF Informally, Lemma 7.2 can be seen to hold by realising that an output must have occurred if 
Activity B enters state D for the next occurrence, which in tum can only occur if E' is entered because of an 
attempt to read data from the channel. As state D is entered for the next occurrence then at most only two 
faults could have occurred; if only one fault had occurred, then the exit from rpl would have transitioned 
to rp2 which must have succeeded and transitioned, in tum, to state D; if two faults had occurred then 
rp2 would have transitioned similarly to rp3 then in tum to state D; if no faults occurred then rpJ would 
transition similarly to state D again. 
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from Activity B Theory 
I from i: Occ,t2: Time, 9(jD, i, t2} 
1.1 9(jE'_rpl,i,t2} 
2 
2.2 
3 
4 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
5 
6 
6.1 
6.2 
7 
8 
from LATE_FAULT(jE'_rpl,i, [t2 + E'_rpU, 12 + E _rpl_u]) 
9 (jE'_rp I , i,t3} At3 > t2 + E'_rpl_u 
9(jE'JP2,j,13} 
from LATEJAULT(jE'_rp2,j, [13 + E' _rp2_1, 13 + E'_rp2_1]) 
9 (jE'_rp2,j, 14} 1\ 14> 13 + E'_rp2_u 
9(TE'JP3,k,14} 
9(jE'Jp3,k, 15} At4 + E'_rp3_u ~ 15 ~ (4 + E'_rp3_1 
9(TD,i+ 1,t5) 
infer LATE_FAULT(jE'_rp2,j, [13 + E'_rp2_1,13 + E'Jp2_"]) => 
315: Time· 9(TD,i+ 1,15} At4+ E'Jp3_" ~ 15 ~ 14 + E'_rp3_1 
from -,LATE_FAULT(jE'_rp2,j, [13 + E'_rp2_1,t3 + E'_rp2_II]) 
9(jE'JP2,j,16} 1\13 + E'_rp2_u ~ 16 ~ 13 +E'_rp2_1 
9(TD, i + I, 16} 
infer -,LATE_FAULT(jE'JP2,j, [13 + E'Jp2_1,13 + E'_rp2_"]) => 
316: Time· 9(TD,i + 1,16} At3 + E'Jp2_u ~ (6 ~ 13 + E'_rp2_1 
9(jD,i+ 1,f7}At7 ~ 16 ~ 15 
to infer LATEJAULT(lE'_rpl, i, [12 + E'_1,12 + E'_u]) => 
317 : Time· 9( jD, i + I, 16} 1\ 17 ~ 16 ~ 15 
II 
11.1 
I\,2 
from -,LATE_FAULT(lE'_rpl,i, [12 + E'_rpU,12 + E'_rpl_"]) 
9 (jE'JP I , i,lg} At2 + E'Jpl_u ~ 19 ~ 12 +E'_rpU 
9(lD, i + I, 19} 
12 
13 
infer -,LATE_FAULT(lE'JPI,i, [12 + E'_rpl_I,12 + E'Jpl_"]) => 
31g: Time· 9(TD,i + 1,1g} At2 + E'Jpl_" ~ 19 ~ 12 + E'_rpl_l 
9(jD,i + I ,19} At9 ~ 17 ~ 19 
14 infer 9(lE',i,12} => 319 :TIme·9(TD,i+ 1,19} At2 + MAX ~ 19 
infer Vi: Occ, 12: Time· 9(lE', i, 12} => 
319: Time· 9(TD,i + 1,19} 1\12 + MAX ~ 19 
B2_0(1) 
AI 
B6_E' _rp I (l.l) 
B3_E'_rpl(2.2) 
AI 
B6_E' _rp2(3,4) 
B3_E'_rp2(4.1.4) 
B6_E'_rp3(4.2Al 
B3_E'_rp3(4.3,4) 
3 -intro(4.4) 
B6_E' _rp2(3,6) 
B3_E'_rp2(6.I,6) 
3-intto(6.2) 
V-E(5,7) 
3-intto(8) 
B6_E'_rpl(l.l,1 \) 
B3_E'_rpl(1.2,11) 
3-intto(l\.2) 
V-E(IO,12) 
3-into(I4) 
'i-intto(l4) 
• 
The essence of the proof was in establishing the conjecture that from leaving state D for the i1h occurrence, 
there exists a time later that we enter state D for the i + 11h occurrence. We proved this conjecture in the 
presence of faults, which therefore necessitated we consider the disjunction that a fault does, or does not, 
occur at each replica (though the assumption is the third replica cannot fail). 
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c={ (ida,Ol,rd*,ml,rd*,<in». 
(ida,Ol, we*, vi, we*, < OUI >)} 
Figure 7.2: Template #2 - Triple Modular Redundancy 
7.2 Triple Modular Redundant Template 
The second template we consider for RTNs is termed Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). This strategy 
employs three concurrent replicas to each calcu late an output given identical inputs. Each replica is passed 
the input to the parent node from a multicaster which it then processes. Each replica then writes its result to 
a voter which tests for consensus of the outputs. At least two outputs must agree. This template therefore 
provides for value, timing and omission (or crash) tolerance. Permutation of this template are discussed in 
Section 7.2.4. 
7.2.1 Transformation 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the graph grammar presentation which shows, in the context of one input path and 
one output path, the fcact (i.e. the activity to replicate) is replaced by an arrangement of the three replicas 
and the mentioned multicaster and voter. It is the multicaster and voter that read, and write to, the original 
input and output paths, respectively. This presumes the interface requirement, that no affect resonates to 
the surrounding network. Interestingly, the nature of the input and output protocols effects the design of 
the multi caster and voter components2• 
Although a context (graph) for the parent graph is specified for this template, no context (graph) is required 
for the daughter graph. Simply, the embedding relation (c) states that the IDA which theft_act node reads 
from is read by the multicaster (mI) node, similarly the IDA theft_act write to is written to by the voter 
(vI) node. 
2 It is feasible that graph grammar transfonnations can allow for the pennutations of protocols by describing transfonnation, for 
multicaster and voter components in the various contexts of input and output paths. These transfonnations however are not described 
here. 
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-Thesis-temp2.rtnsl 
adt dtl is 
type Tl is token; 
e!1d adtj 
activity ml is 
with dtl; 
ports 
pA : (Channel, dtl. TI, in); 
pS' : (Channel, dtl.TI , out, SPECULATIVE); 
pS' I : (Channel, dtl. TI, out, SPECULATIVE); 
pS' I' : (Channel, dtl. TI, out, SPECULATIVE); 
end ports} 
local state 
msg : dt1.Tl; 
end local state; 
operations 
op multicast_data () processed dtl.T1; 
ext read mag; 
pre true; 
post processed - msg-; 
end 0Pi 
op read_data (raw dtl.Tl)} 
ext write magi 
pre true; 
post mag - raw; 
end op; 
end operations; 
~;tdteG 
static stateA 
transition goes to stateS on read pAi 
end state; 
dynamic states 
op read_data reads from pAl 
timing (0,0,0]; 
transition goes to stateC' on true; 
end :Jtatei 
dynarr.ic stateC' 
np multicd!3t_d...tta writes to 
ti~.ioq {0,0,01; 
write failut~ -> tlan3ition goes 
write success -> transition goes 
.... 1d state; 
dynamic stateC" 
op multicast_data writ~:3 to 
timing (O,O,O); 
w(it.~ failull-' transition goes 
wlit~ success -> transition goes 
t:ond !ltate; 
dyn,l.~.ic 3t.1tf'Jr'" 
np multirast_d.lta WI ites to 
ti~ing [0,0,0]; 
pB' ; 
to stateC" on true; 
to stateC" on trup.; 
pS" ; 
to stateC'" on true; 
to stateC' r, on true; 
pB'" ; 
wIlte Llil\1l1-' tld:l:..<ltil':1 qoe~:; to ~;L\teA on tlue; 
Wtit~ success -~ tld:lsit 10:1 goes to stAteA on true; 
end Dt ,\tf'; 
~ I "'I<i l::~~,;:~:~; nLltpAI 
":111 ,\,'t iVlt y; 
.\ "f l". tty vi ia 
.... I t ~ \ I t 1 , 
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ports 
pl (Pool, dtl. Tl, inl 
p2 {Pool, dtl. Tl, inl 
p3 (Pool, dtl. Tl, in) 
p4 {Pool, dtl. Tl, out 
end ports; 
local state 
msg-pl : dtl. Tl; 
mS9-p2 : dtl.T1i 
msg-p3 : dtl. Tl; 
consensus : bool; 
end local state; 
operations 
op vote () processed: dtl. TI; 
ext read mS9.....,pl, msg.....,p2; 
pre true; 
post (ms9.....,plams9.....,p2 implies processed - mS9-pl- and consensus-true) or 
(msg.....,pl-msg-p3 implies processed - mS9.....,p1- and consensus-true) or 
(ms9.....,p2-msg.....,p3 implies processed - mS9.....,p2- and consensus-true); 
end op; 
op read_data (raw: dtl.TI); 
ext write mS9.....,pl; 
pre true; 
post mS9.....,pl - raw; 
end op; 
end operations; 
states 
dynamic stateA 
op read_data reads from pl; 
op read_data reads from p2; 
op read_data reads frorr. p3; 
timing [O,O,OJ; 
transition goes to stateV on true; 
end state; 
dynamic stateV 
op vote writes to p4; 
timing (0,0,0]; 
transition goes to stateA on consensus - true; 
transition goes to stateT on CO:lSo:o:lSUS - false; 
end state; 
static stateT 
end state; 
initial stateA; 
end states; 
end activity; 
acti'Jit~' rpl is 
with dt1; 
put t:J 
pl : (Channel. dtl.Tl, in); 
p2 : (Pool, dtl.Tl, .)ut)1 
end ports; 
operations 
op too (l :lpUt 
pre tru~; 
post tru~; 
end OPI 
end operat ions; 
states 
·tt 1. Tl' .J'JtI_ut dtl.Tl; 
-...! I~ N N 
i ~ lI!:I _. ;-I 
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static stateA 
transition goes to stateS on read pI; 
end state; 
dynamic stateS 
op foo reads from pI writes to p2; 
timing (0,0,0); 
transition goes to stateA on true; 
end state; 
initial stateAi 
end states; 
end activity i 
activity rp2 is 
with dtl; 
ports 
pI : (Channel, dtl. T1, in); 
p2 : (Pool, dtl. T1, Qut); 
end ports; 
operations 
op faa (input 
pre true; 
post true; 
end 0Pi 
dtl.Tl) output dtl.Tl; 
end operations; 
states 
static stateA 
transition goes to stateB on read pI; 
end state; 
dynamic stateS 
op faa reads from pI writes to p2; 
timing [O,O,OJ; 
transition goes to stateA on true; 
end state; 
initial stateAi 
end states; 
f,!nd ;)ctivity; 
activity rp3 io 
with dtl; 
POt t ~l 
pI : (Channel, dtl.Tl, in); 
p2 : (Pool, dtl.Tl, out)1 
e:ld pOt-t~1; 
')P,~t ,it ion:3 
op too (l:Jpllt 
pr .... t 1 ue; 
post t ruf'; 
e:1d op; 
tit 1 . TI) output dt I. TI; 
end npPl ,\t 10:1:.'1; 
!It,,tp~ 
!,t,)t l" :It,lt+-'A 
tl~:l~ltll):1 goes to stateS on I.-ad pl; 
p:1d c;t.lt ... ; 
dy:',l;-l~' sta.teB 
l)l' fl),) 1f'~Hj~l ttl":- 1-'1 WI itl":3 to p..'; 
t i'~ i!'lq (0, ('I, n 1 ; 
tL\'\:litil':1 q,)t>:; to ,,;,[,'It ... A ,"!'l tlu • .-·; 
.. :\,1 ::t "lei 
initial stateA; 
end states; 
end activity; 
ida ml_ida is 
Kind SPECULATIVE Channel; 
Datatype dtl.Tl; 
end ida; 
ida m2_ida is 
Kind SPECULATIVE Channel; 
Datatype dtl. Tl; 
end ida; 
ida m3_ida is 
Kind SPECULATIVE Channel; 
Datatype dtl.Tl; 
end ida; 
ida vI_ida is 
Kind Pool; 
Datatype dtl. Tl; 
end ida; 
ida v2_ida is 
Kind Pool; 
Datatype dt 1. TI; 
end ida; 
ida v3_ida is 
Kind Pool; 
Datatype dt 1. TI; 
end ida; 
rtn tempI is 
ml.pS' writes to ml_ida; 
ml.pS/ writes to m2_ida; 
ml.pB" I writes to m3_ida; 
rpl.pl reads frorr, ""I_ida; 
rpl.p2 writes to vI_ida; 
rp2.pl reads from m2_ida: 
rp2.p2 writes to v2_ida; 
rp3,pI reads fro~ m3_ida; 
rp3.p2 writes to v3_ida; 
vI.pl reads {rorr. VI_ida; 
vl.p2 reads fro:- v2_ida; 
vl,p3 r~ads from v3_ida; 
end rt:li 
theory 
end; 
Thesis-temp2.rtnsl 
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Fault Hypothesis 
Again, from the RTL definition of faults for RTNs in Section 4.2, we can define a value and crash fault 
(specified in RTL) as: 
WriteValue(p,i,t)~ 
31: TIme· 1< t /\ 8(~,i,l) /\ 8(J,s, i,t) /\ 
pre_(s.in-p(I) , 'v (I)) /\ 
--,posc(s.in-p(I), 'v(I), v(t),s.out-p(t)) 
The second fault hypothesis we consider for the template is a crash fault, but as stated in Section 4.2.1.2 we 
map activity faults to their state-machine counterparts. Therefore, the abstract definition of a crash activity 
fault is: 
Crash(s, i, t)~ 
3 I: TIme· 8(ls', i, I) /\ 
OMIT(J,s,i, [I + s.bcet, t)) /\ 
OMIT(ls, i + I, [I + s.bcet, t)) 
which in tum is specified as: 
[is_Activity(act) J 
CrashAct(act, i, t)~ 
3s E act.SM.states· Crash(s,i,t) 
We consider both these definitions as our fault hypotheses when reasoning about this template. 
Axiomatic Semantics 
The axiomatic semantics that define this template are generated by the NetSpec tool for the specification 
given above. Examples of the semantics generated for a TMR template can be found in Chapter 8 when 
this template is used in the case study. 
7.2.3 Rigorous Proof 
The theorems we wish to show of this template, which will be used when reasoning about the fault tolerant 
properties of this template are that which state the liveliness of the template and the behaviour of the voter 
component. 
Lemma 7.3 (TMR-Liveliness) Vi: Occ,tl : TIme· 8(RpA,i,tl) =} 
3t2 : TIme· t2 ~ tl +u/\8(Wp4,i,t2) 
Lemma 7.4 (TMR-Value) Vi:Occ,t: TIme·8(rd-pA ,i,t) =} 
31: TIme· I > t/\8(we-p4,i,l) 
Informally, Lemma 7.4 states that an output should be produced, for each value read by the multicaster 
component, by the voter. For a value to be written as output from the voter, it must agree with at least one 
other value produced by a replica as specified in the specification. We therefore define this vallie domain 
fault in terms of observable events. 
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PROOF (PROOF OF LEMMA 7.4) 
from Assumptions, ActivityTheorems, LinkandChannelAxioms 
1 from i: Occ,tl: Time,0(rdJJA,i,tl) 
1.1 o (we_m1 ,pB',t6); o (we_m1 ,pB",t7 ); o (we_m 1 ,pBIII , t8) 
1.2 0(weJPl.p2, i,t3) 
1.3 0(weJP2.p2,i,t4) 
1.4 0( weJP3.p2, i, t5) 
1.5 0(rd_v l.p1 ,i, t3) 1\ 0(rd_vl.p2, i,(4) 1\ 0(rd_vl.p3, i, t5) 
1.5 0(weJJ4,i,t2)At2 > tl 
infer 3t2: Time· t2 > tl 1\ 0(weJJ4, i,t2) 
2 0(rdJJA,i,tJ) => 3t2:Time·t2>tI1\0(weJJ4,i,t2) 
infer Vi: Occ, tl : Time· o (rdJJA , i,tJ) => 3t2: Time· t2 > tl 1\ 0(weJJ4, i, t2) 
7.2.4 Permutations 
3-1(1.5) 
=?-1(1 ) 
V-1(2) 
• 
In this section we have illustrated only one pennutation of the TMR strategy. Several characteristics define 
a pennutation, notably the protocol characteristics (blocking or destructive read and writes) at the input and 
output ports. 
The pennutations are detennined by the communication paths (IDAs) and their associated protocols of the 
incoming and outward IDAs as specified in the context graph. For example, if an activity reads from a 
channel protocol (as in the template above) then the three active replicas must all receive the same value 
(at the same time) to concurrently execute the replicated design to -hopefully- produce agreeable results. 
However, a channel protocol states a reader is 
• blocked should no data be available to the read; and 
• any read operation is destructive. 
Therefore, each replica could not read from the same IDA (should it be possible 3) and be guaranteed the 
same result (we do not wish that the writer to the IDA must write its value three times as this then extends 
the templates neighbourhood - a requirement we state should not occur of our transfonnational method). 
Therefore, we must use additional components, such as mlliticaster (and later voters) to read from IDAs 
and communicate to each replica the value read (similarly, a voter reads each result and writes the agreed 
result to the original IDA). Furthennore, the design of a multicaster and voter is dictated by the protocol. 
The effect to the design of multicasters and voters is complicated, as mentioned, by the protocols. There-
fore, when a multicaster reads from a channel, it must first record this value to its local state then write 
the value to each replica. The protocol we associate with this intennediate IDA -between multi caster and 
3 RTN-SL version 3.1 prohibits multiple readers and writes at IDAs 
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replica- must be the same as the multicaster reads from to preserve the stimulate behaviour to fire each 
replica in sync. 
Fortunately, our approach in using graph grammars to describe and -more importantly- control the trans-
formation, we can specify each permutation of the multicaster and voter components and the context they 
are applicable in. Furthermore, we can then specify the TMR template with non-terminal voter and multi-
caster nodes. 
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ft act 
01 
read ACT write 
02 
Figure 7.3: Template #3 - A Watchdog Timer 
7.3 Watchdog Timer Template 
The watchdog timer template is a simple arrangement of a single activity which has a loop back data 
connection to itself via an explicit IDA path. The template provides for (late) timing & omi"illTl fault 
tolerance only. The functionality (described in detail within its RTN-SL specification) of this template i\ to 
mask the timing & omission faults to a crash fault. but a critical application to write an output given some 
input, then the watchdog template, provides for a 'default" output within a deadline. 
Graph Grammar Representation 
Figure 7.3 illustrates the graph grammar presentation of the watchdog template, including the embedding 
relation, c. 
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adt dtl is 
type A is token; 
type B is token; 
end adt; 
activity temp3 is 
with dtl; 
ports 
Thesls-temp3.rtnsl 
pA (Stimulus, dtl.A, Qut); 
pB (Stimulus, dtl.A, in) i 
pI (Channel, dtl. B, in); 
p2 (Channel, dt1.B, out); 
end ports; 
auxiliary definitions 
constant 1 ; Time; 
constant weet : Time; 
constant u : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
operations 
op watchdog Bet dtl.A; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end 0Pi 
op foo (input dtl.BI; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end 0Pi 
end operations; 
states 
static stateA 
transition goes to wI on [Il,u!]; 
transition goes to stateS on read pI; 
end state; 
dynamic wI 
op watchdog writes to pAi 
timing [l,wcet,u]; 
transition goes to wait on true; 
end state, 
~tatic wait 
trdnnLtlon goes to stateS on read pI; 
t~dnoition goes to stateC on stim pS; 
end stilte; 
dynar.li \' :jtat~B 
op f no re.id~l from pl; 
ti~d;)q Il,wcet,u); 
tl~:):llti,)n goes to stateA on false; 
tl,I~\~litio~\ goes t,) stateC on true; 
end :lta.tp; 
dynd~ ic stateC 
op Cl itlcal WI itea to p2; 
timi:HJ II.w,~pt,uJ; 
t[,\:I:1iti!l:1 qne~~ to tel'm on true; 
... :\(j :It,ltt'; 
~\t at i " t"'l:"' 
t"nd (it "t 1->; 
init i.11 :Jt.\t ... A; 
""1.1 3t .lt~!ll 
.. 1.\ .I,·t 1 '.' It y; 
[t n tt..,·-!,.I 1!1 
end rtn; 
theory 
Theorem : THEORE~ 
FORALL (i:Occ, tl:Time): 
(th(rd...pl,i,tll AND 
Thesls-temp3.rtnsl 
(EXISTS (j:Occ): LateWrite{p2,j,tl) OR OmitWrite{p2,j,tl») IMPLIES 
EXISTS (t2:Timel: th(we"p2, i.t21 AND t2 <- tl + X 
end; 
~ 
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Fault Hypothesis 
The faults to which this template is tolerant, as defined in Section 4.2 are: 
and 
RTL 
LateWrite(p2, i, I)fc 
"3 (, (' : Time· ( ~ t ~ (' /\ 8 (15. i,t') /\ 
8(].5, i, t") /\ 
LATE (Wd5(P2) , i, [t' + 5.bcet. t' + s.wcet]) 
OmitWrite(p2, i, t)"3 t', t" : Time· ( ~ t ~ t" /\ 8(].5, i, t') /\ 
8(ls',i+ I,t") V 8(wds(s.Ollt"'p), i+ I.t')/\ 
OMIT( we(p2), i, [t', t"]) 
The emergent property we assert for this template are: 
Vi: Occ, t\ : Time· 8 (rd"'p I, i, t\) /\ (LateWrite(p2, i, t) V Omit\\'rire(p2, i, t)) => 
"3 (. 12: TIme)t2 ~ t\ + X /\ 8(we...p2, i, l;c) 
That is, despite the normal RTN-SL deadlines, we assert a l\'e"'p2 will occur within some critical deadlim:, 
7.4 Template Variations 
We briefly introduced several more design templates which are applicable to RTN-SL designs. These 
templates are instantiated in the case study, so their description, specification and reasoning to not presented 
here in such detail as the templates above for space considerations. 
7.4.1 Temporal Redundant IDA 
The redundancy strategy termed Temporal Redundant IDA employs true concurrent data communication 
paths which are controlIed by the mlliticaster and voter-like activity components. The difference between 
this strategy and TMR is that a value written is guaranteed to be read by its destined target rather than a 
correct output from a given input. 
The tolerance characteristics of this template are: value (masking), omission & timing. Each value that 
is written to the intendedft_ida is guaranteed to be delivered to its recipient in a timely manner only if it 
agrees with the second value. Unlike for TMR, we can't vote on the correct value, so if they don't agree, 
no value is written which masks the value fault. 
Graph Grammar Representation 
The graph grammar presentation illustrated in Figure 7.4 shows the context-sensitive production rule that 
transform a single ft_ida to an arrangement of parallel IDA's with multicaster and voter type componenh. 
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ft ida .. 
01 
Figure 7.4: Template #4 - Temporal Redundant IDA 
Additionally, a feedback IDA is shown which signals (like the watchdog template) whether both values 
received agreed. 
Fault Hypothesis 
The specific faults, as specified in Section 4.2, for this template are: 
RTL 
WriteVa[lIe(s.oll(pB,i,t) ~ 
31: Time· I ~ t/\8(ls",i,I)/\8(~,i,t)/\ 
pre_(s.inyB(I) , v(I))/\ 
-,posUs.inyB(I), v (I), v(t), s.olltyB(t)) 
OmitWrite(s.olltyB, i, t) ~ 
3 I, I' : Time· I < t ~ I' /\ 8(~, i. I) /\ 
(8(ls", i + I ,t") V 8(wds(s.olltyB), i+ I, til) /\ 
OMIT( we(s.olltyB),i. [1,1']) 
LateWrite(lI"eyB,i,t) ~ 
31: Time· I + III < t /\ 8(Ts. i. I) /\ 
LATE(weyB,i, [I +11,1 +111]) 
The specific property we propose this template offers is described in RTL as: 
Yi:Occ.tl : Time· 8(lI"eyl,i,tl) => 
3 t~ : Time· t2 ~ tl + X /\ 8(rdy2, i, t2) 
7.4.2 Fail-Signal (Activity) 
The added functionality of this transformation is to mask certain failures to one expected lype such lhal 
they may be corrected or tolerated by a further transformation or component. This template extends those 
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Figure 7.5: Template #5 - Fail Signal 
presented previously, by using a feedback mechanism to detect the failures. The tolerance behaviour is to 
fail-silent whenever a fault is detached. This behaviour is desirable when spurious output of non-timely 
data is harmful to a system overall performance. Whereas the watchdog timer template wrote a default 
output, this template should terminate silently. 
Graph Grammar Representation 
The transformation proposed is illustrated in Figure 7.5. It is obvious to see the feedback mechanism 
signals to the tolerant activity if an output was successfully received. Given the absence of this signal then 
the activity should terminate, hence failing silently. 
Fault Hypothesis 
The specification which defines this behaviour is that defined as a crash fault, defined in Section 2.1.3 as: 
Crash(act, i, t) ~ 
31': Time· l' < tA0(1s",i,1') A 
OMIT(~, i, [1' +s.bcet,t]) I\OMIT(1s",i+ I, [1' +s.bcet,tj) 
7.4.3 Fail Stop (Activity) 
A further variation to discuss is inspired by [SS83] who introduced fail-stop processes. The benefits for ex-
tending the TMR template to include fail-stop activities allows the overall tolerance of the TMR templates 
to accommodate a wider degree of faults. For example, if each activity were itself tolerant to timing faults. 
then the TMR template also to tolerant to value faults, then the overall tolerance is greater. 
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The aim of this Chapter is to illustrate each theoretical point presented earlier with a real-life system design. 
one which is common to the British Defence industry. 
We first outline the motivation and reasons for choosing this case study which describes a software de-
sign fragment of a hypothetical Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) launch system. We 
summarise the SHARD analysis for the initial abstract design and draw our fault-hypotheses (FH I from 
the studies findings. We then show each stage of our design methodology to transform the initial design 
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Mode Name Mode Number 
PUC I 
Pre-Launch 2 
Abandon 3 
Ready-to-Launch 4 
Launch 5 
Flight 6 
Acquisition 7 
Terminal 8 
Abort 9 
Table 8.1: Mode Encoding 
to one more tolerant to the faults identified and show justification of our claims that i) a graph grammar is 
a suitable design technique, ii) a transformation is localised (i.e. faults are a conservative extension) and 
finally iii) that this structured approach lends itself to structured formal verification. 
8.1 Identification 
The case study we have chosen describes aspects of a Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) 
in sufficient detail to enable our investigations. Although this study does not report on a specific product 
development, it is hoped that any design engineering techniques which are applicable to the case study 
presented here will also be applicable to real products. 
The benefit of choosing this example has been its use previously to develop safety & design engineering 
techniques [PayOlc, PayOlb, PayOla] in a collaborative study. This study raised a number of interest· 
ing challenges [PayOla] for anyone wishing to apply formal techniques to the specification, validation or 
verification of RTS. 
8.2 Design overview 
The design is based around a number of modes the system can operate within. Dependant on the modes are 
he behaviours and reaction a system can generate. The possible modes and the transitions between them 
are specified in Table 8.2, where the modes are numbered as defined in Table 8.1. 
8.2.1 Abstract Design description 
This section contains an informal description of each of the activities identified in Figure 8.1, the reader is 
referred to [PayOlc] for a fuller description. This level of detail is a common starting point for real-time 
systems. 
Mode Controller, MCa The Mode Controller activity loops, reading "events" from the Mode Events, ME; 
channel to determine the next system mode to enter, given the current mode and the event read. The 
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Figure 8.1: A BVRAAM Launcher Design 
Event \ Current Mode 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
BIT ok 2 - - - - - - - -
BIT fails 3 - - - - - - - -
Cross-Check Fails - 3 - - - - - - -
Cross-Check ok - 4 - - - - - - -
Umbilical cut - - - 5 - - - - -
Clear (a timeout) - - - - 6 - - - -
Acquired - - - - - 7 - - -
Arrived - - - - - - 8 - -
Fuzing Timeout - - - - - - - 9 -
Table 8.2: PreviouslNext Mode Table 
133 
CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY - "A BVRAAM LAUNCH SYSTEM'" 
deterministic choice of which mode transition to taken is shown in Table 8.2. The new mode is 
written back into the M; pool. The activity then begins the loops again. As the activity reads from 
the ME; channel, if there are no new events to process the activity is held until an event occurs. which 
is processed as specified in Table 8.2. 
Inertial Navigation, INa The Inertial Navigation, INa activity loops, attempting to read the periodically 
generated Body Motion, BM; data from the missile IMU, IMUss subsystem. The INa activity is 
responsible for generating the integrity mode events, written to ME;. Should no check fail. then the 
INa activity writes the body motion data of the launch vehicle to the separation autopilot, and via a 
pool to the transfer alignment activity. Effectively. this activity loops at the frequency of the [MUll 
subsystem, determined by the IMU clock, elkl. 
Seperation Autopilot, SAa The Separation Autopilot. SAa activity loops. reading the Missile State. MSlj 
data from the initial navigation activity INa. The current mode then determines whether initialisation 
or launch sequence data is calculated for the Actuators. Ass subsystem. Otherwise the activity loops 
until such functionality is required. 
Transfer Alignment, TAa The Transfer Alignment. TAa activity loops. comparing the data from the Air-
craft INS Data, AID; signal and the Missile State. MS; pool to ensure the IMU is operating within 
some defined tolerance which raises either a "Cross-Check" pass or fail accordingly. 
Read Aircraft Messages, RAMa The Read Aircraft Messages. RAMa activity loops. writing incoming tar-
get position, missile initial position and aircraft INA data to the Target Position. TP; pool. Initial 
Position, IP; pool and Aircraft INS Data. AID. signal respectively. until the Umbilical CIIt event is 
detected, which is raised to the ME; channel. 
Write Aircraft Messages, WAMa The Write Aircraft Messages, WAMa activity loops, reading the stirn 
event from clock, elk3. It reads the Missile Identity. MI; and Missile Status Summary, MSSj pools 
and writes this information to the AO; pool. 
Interlock Handler, IHa The Interlock Handler. IHa activity loops. waiting for a tick from clock. elk4. It 
then checks the current mode. and if it is "Abandon". it sets the firing interlock in an attempt to 
prevent the launch. 
Status Reporting, SRa The Status Reporting. SRa activity loops. reading status reports from the Status 
Report. SRi signa\. It writes a compiled report to the MSS; pool. 
Manage BIT, MBa The Manage BIT. MBa activity loops. awaiting BIT commands from BIT Command. 
BC; signal. The activity then performs a series of built-in-tests and reports the success or failure to 
SR;andME;. 
Timeout Generator, TGa The Timeout Generator, TGa activity loops. waiting for timeout requests from 
the MCa. Upon being reactivated. the activity sends the timeout (clear) events to ME;. 
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Figure 8.2: Host Graph 
8.3 The Initial (Host) Design 
The initial MASCOT design taken from [PayOlc] illustrated in Figure 8.1 serves as the basis for our case 
study. This design specifies only the network layer: identifying those activities (described previously) 
and communication paths between activities necessary. Some design decisions have already been made, 
choosing the protocols of each IDA specifies the synchronisation between the activity components. 
In the next section we identify the graph grammar representation of the initial design which is termed our 
host graph. From this, we illustrate the 24-rule grammar adequate to derive the application layer for the 
RTN. That is, to refine the abstract activity description into state-machines which read and write to the 
identified communication paths. We then present the RTN-SL specification of the transformed host graph, 
which specifies the RTN behaviour without faults being considered. 
135 
CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY - "A BVRAAM LAUNCH SYSTEM" 
Be. 
Figure 8.3: Neighbourhood of RAMa 
8.3.1 Transformations 
The (host) graph depicted in Figure 8.2 is the graph grammar abstract representation of the initial design 
from Figure 8.1. Below we show as examples, the derivations of activity (ACn nodes to their state-machine 
representation. 
8.3.1.1 Refining the Read Aircraft Messages, (RAMa) Activity 
We present in Figures 8.3-8.9 a derivation from the ACT node in Figure 8.2 which represented RAMa. We 
follow a series of transformation steps to refine the activity first to a state-machine (SM) which implements 
the desired behaviour, as specified in the activity descriptions in Section 8.2.1. 
The neighbourhood of the node labelled RAMa is shown in Figure 8.3. Incident to the node being trans-
formed are six IDA components which form the neighbourhood of the node. The connections from the 
existing neighbourhood nodes determine the new connection as specified by the embedding relations of 
each production rule. 
The transformation from Figure 8.3 to Figure 8.4 is by way of several steps. Nodes Ali and TPi are both 
transformed by production rule 1 net-p2( I ).The other transformation net-p3( I );net-p4( J) to node RAMa 
indicates rule net-p3( J) is first applied, then net-P4( J) to its result below. This transforms the ACf node 
to the most abstract state-machine representation. Note, each communication link which was established 
to the ACT node remains connected to the SM node. 
The applied transformation from Figure 8.4 to Figure 8.5 depicts the non context-sensitive state-machine 
production rule, net-p5( 3). Here, the incoming data communication from node Alopt to re-establish to both 
node Sl and RAMsM indicating the port may be read by more than one dynamic state (later we shall see the 
context sensitive counterpart where a incoming connection is enforced to connect to only one node). 
The transformation from Figure 8.5 through to Figure 8.8 further refines the state-machine specification. 
However, the final transformation illustrated from Figure 8.8 to Figure 8.9 shows an example of a context-
I The bracketed number indicates the sub rule of a family of production rules. 
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Be; 
Figure 8.4: RAMa - pI 
sensitive production rule being applied. The transformation net""p6(b) applied to node SM. in Figure 8.8 
transforms a state-machine with multiple port (and IDA) connections to a single state node which now 
only has one connection, that to an associated port. Existing state-machine transitions are restored by the 
embedding relation. 
The remaining transformation are not shown here in such detail, the reader is referred to the RTN-SL 
specification for the complete specification of the RAM a activity. 
8.3.1.2 Refining the Transfer Alignment, (TAa) Activity 
Similarly, we present below a derivation from the ACT node in Figure 8.2 which represented the activity 
node for TAa. 
The series of transformations from the abstract ACT node, TAa to its (flat) state-machine definition is 
detailed in Figures 8.10 through Figure 8.14. Similarly to the transformation of RAMo, we gradually refine 
the state-machine specification to a collection of states which read from, and write to, specific ports and 
IDAs. The transformation between Figures 8.12-8.13 illustrates another example of a context sensitive 
production rule, as does the transformation between Figures 8.13-8.14. 
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Figure 8.5: RAMa - p2 
B AM, 
Figure 8.6: RAMa - p3 
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Figure 8.7: RAMa - p4 
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Figure 8.8: RAMa - p5 
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Figure 8.9: RAMu - p6 
Figure 8.10: Neighbourhood of TAa 
1-11 
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Figure 8.11: TAu - pI 
Figure 8.12: TAa - p2 
142 
CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY - "A BVRAAM LAt::\CH SYSTBl" 
Figure 8.13: TAu - p3 
ort 
MS2", 
ME, 
Figure 8.14: TAu - p4 
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Failure Categorisation 
Service Provision Value 
Component Omission Commission I Timing I Early I Late Subtle Coarse 
Pool No Update Unwanted Update N/A Old Data Incorrect N/A 
Signal No Data Extra Data Early Late Incorrect Inconsistent 
Channel No Data Extra Data Early Late Incorrect in Range Out of Range 
Dynamic State No Update Unwanted Update Early Exit Late Exit Incorrect in Range Out of Range 
Static State N/A N/A Early Exit Late Exit N/A N/A 
Activity Crash N/A Early Late N/A 
Table 8.3: Table of guide words applicable to RTNs 
8.3.2 RTN -SL Specification 
The design specification that is found in Appendix A.I is a complete RTN-SL specification of the initial 
design introduced previously. It defines in greater detail each activities behaviour and its communication 
paths between sub-systems and other activities. The IDA specifications define the communication protocol 
and their synchronous behaviour. 
Only those components we foresee to be of interest to our methodology are fully specified. the remaining 
components are simplified so the RTN-SL design is well-formed; this simplification is normally a triv-
ial post-condition on operations. However. the complete RTN-SL specification is of sufficient detail to 
generate the event model required for the formal reasoning. 
8.4 A SHARD Analysis 
We now report the findings from a SHARD analysis of our initial design. as advocated in Section 2.5.1. 
We first repeat the guide words applicable for such an example. followed by selected presentation of the 
analysis. We aim to show the obvious benefit of such an analysis and draw our fault hypothesis (FH) from 
which we apply our technique. 
8.4.1 Guide Words 
The guide words in Table 8.3 (repeated from Table 2.3) are the least set which we are confident should 
prompt consideration of the plausible failure modes for RTNs. 
8.4.2 Analysis Results 
N/A 
Consider the design of Figure 8.1 and the permutations of guide words (from Table 8.3) to each dataflow 
component of our design. then it is obvious a full SHARD analysis is not appropriate here. We are not 
advocating a new safety analysis technique. rather one which given scope for possible failures. addresses 
each in a systematic approach to make the design more tolerant. However. given the SHARD analysis is 
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a valuable tool, we therefore undertake such an analysis into key areas of the design where the abstract 
descriptions hint at possible failure modes to tease out the specific faults and their failure modes. 
We present here only a fragment of the tabular result set which are most appropriate. Each table that follows 
has the following format: 
• A name & reference for the drawing/design being analysed; 
• the data flow Id, protocol & type; 
• Any additional information deemed necessary; 
• For each guide word in Table 8.3, we 
- identify any deviation from the specification the guide word prompts, 
- its possible causes and detection mechanisms 
- any co-effectors 
- the observed effects 
_ whether the fault is meaningful, which determines whether we address the fault in our technique 
_ the SHARD justification for not considering it meaningful or the desired action necessary for 
any tolerance technique. 
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Host-Design (c.f. Figure 8.1) 
Top Level Design 
AIMi 
Signal 
Image.Raw _Image 
Drawing Ref 
Drawing Name 
FlowID 
Protocol 
Data Type 
Additional Information This is the input feed from the Aircraft sub-system. In-coming messages from the aircraft will be propagated along different 
paths depending on their type. 
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Detection / Pro- Co-effectors Effects M? Justification / Design Proposals 
tection 
Late No new image Late read @ pI3 Undetectable Delayed updated N Justification: By design. RAMa is 
sent to RAMa to rest of system designed to wait for the signal from 
AIMi 
Value. coarse Impossible data Communication CRC ensures Lost Communica- N Justification: Due to feedback 
fromAH corrupted corrupted tion loops, Ass will attempt to rescnd 
messages fail 
silent 
-- -
Table 8.4: SHARD analysis of flow AIMi of the BVRAAM Launch system top level design 
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Host-Design (c.f. Figure 8.1) 
Top Level Design 
MS2j 
Pool 
Missile_State.lMU _Data 
Drawing Ref 
Drawing Name 
FlowID 
Protocol 
Data Type 
Additional Information This is the information calculated from the INa activity which calculates the body motion of the aircraft which is sent to the 
TAa activity via MS2j. 
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Detection / Pro- Co-effectors Effects M? Justification / Design Proposals 
tection 
Value, subtle Comparison Byzantine fault Comparison Failure @ Non- Y Action: Make fault tolerant 
with p20 fails @ p20 or p21; check fails RAMa or INa deterministic 
Transmission state 
error; com-
munication 
error 
No Update No IMU Data Communication Comparison Old data used in Y Action: Make fault tolerant 
sent to TAa failure; INa check fails comparison check 
failure 
- --
Table 8.5: SHARD analysis of flow MS2j of the BVRAAM Launch system top level design 
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Drawing Ref 
Drawing Name 
FlowID 
Protocol 
Data Type 
Additional Information 
Guide Word Deviation 
Host-Design (c.f. Figure 8.1) 
Top Level Design 
MSl j 
Signal 
Missile_State.status 
This is the information calculated from the INa activity which calculates the body motion of the aircraft which is sent to the 
SAa activity via MSI j. 
Possible Causes Detection / Pro- Co-effectors Effects M? Justification / Design Proposals 
tection 
Value, Incorrect status Byzantine Fault SAa & TAa Inconsistent inter- Y Action: Make fault tolerant 
Coarse sent nal state of sys-
tem 
Omission No signal sent INa fails to Latency N Justification: By design 
write signal 
Late, write Delay to INa Latency Y Action: Make fault tolerant 
Table 8.6: SHARD analysis of flow MSlj of the BVRAAM Launch system top level design 
Host-Design (c.f. Figure 8.1) 
Top Level Design 
BMj 
Signal 
Image.Processed_Image 
Drawing Ref 
Drawing Name 
Flow ID 
Protocol 
Data Type 
Additional Information This is the body motion data of the aircraft sent periodically from the aircraft. A" sub-system. 
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Detection / Pro- Co-effectors Effects M? 
tection 
Extra Data Unexpected ar- Period of elk I Missed Data Y 
rival 
Value, subtle Repeated datn Stuck at Value Comparisons SA" & TAa Events raised Y 
with local state from unconsid-
ered modes 
Justification / Design Proposals 
Action: Reconfigure elk I 
Action: Make fault tolerant 
- ---
Tnble 8.7: SHARD nnnlysis of flow MB; of the BVRAAM Launch system top level design 
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8.5 Fault Hypotheses for the BVRAAM Launcher Design 
We now interpret the SHARD analysis to form our own fault hypothesis, FH. We have identified five 
meaningful faults which we consider should be addressed in response to the SHARD analysis to continue 
to study the initial safety analysis given the admissions offaults. These faults are listed below: 
FHl: The alignment between the missile INS data and that of the launch aircraft may exceed some toler-
ance value; and 
FH2: The actuator commands may not satisfy the specified post-condition; and 
FH3: The "Abandon" command may not be actioned within the specified deadline; and 
FH4: The ordering of events read by the Mea from the MEj IDA may not be processed in the actual order 
they were sent; and finally 
FH5: The SAa activity may generate actuator commands late, i.e. beyond the specified deadline. 
We will refer in future to these fault hypotheses as FHl, FH2, ... , FH5. 
8.5.1 RTL Specifications of FH; 
For each FHj identified, we now give RTL specifications which are the actual specifications from Section 
4.2.1 and the initial design. Theses specifications will be used in the formal reasoning of the eventual 
transformed design 
FHl 
The "Transfer Alignment" (TAa) activity receives a vector (Missile_State.pos) from the missile IMU and 
a second vector (Image. Vector) from the aircraft, both of the same type (Image. Vector). A vector: (x,y,z) 
which gives the objects position in a 3-D space. Given the timing of receipt, the two positions may not 
agree for two principal reasons: 1) the vectors were 'valued' at different times (the aircraft and missile 
IMU will certainly work at different periods) or 2) the missile position on the aircraft 'offsets' the position. 
In both cases, a degree of tolerance between the values is acceptable, as long as the difference remains 
constant, or doesn't drift. The function which calculates the comparison is Missile_State.compare: 
function compare (IMU, AC, offset : Image.Vector) 
return res : bool; 
pre true; 
post align (IMU, offset) AC; 
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faulCthml: 
3i: Occ,t\ ,t2: TIme· 0('JTA_C,i,tt} 1\0(.ITA_C,i,t2) 
=} ..., post_TA_Check_Missile_Alignment(TA_incomingJns(t\ », TA_input(t\»( TA_MS( t2» 
FHl permits the post-condition of Missile_State.compare not to hold at some time, t2, which in turn con-
tradicts the exit transition from TA_C. We therefore must tolerate this fault, such that a transient fault 
-possibly due to the period of inputs- does not affect the system behaviour. 
FH2 and FH5 
The "Separation Autopilot" (SAo) activity must produce updated actuator commands to p I 0 from the input 
at p9 in both a timely and value tolerant fashion. On receiving updated missile IMU data on p9, the SAo 
activity calculates updated actuator commands whilst in flight to prevent spinning. 
The SAo activity receives input from the Inertial Navigation system mode, from the Mode (M j ) IDA. Given 
the system mode may be "Launch", the actuator commands received from the Inertial Navigation activity 
-to prevent the launch craft being hit- are calculated to be the launch commands for the actuators. This 
sequence of events must be timely, else the inertial commands become dated, such as the launch vehicle 
changing course. 
Value: 3i: Occ,t\ ,t2: TIme· 0(rd"p9,i,tl) 
=} o (we"p 10, it2) 1\ ...,posCSA_launch(SA_MS(tt),SA_CM(tt»(SA_launch_cmd(t2}} 1\t2 :'5 tl + 1/ 
faulClhm5: 
Time: 3i: Occ,t\, t2: TIme· 0(rd"p9,i,tl) 
=> 0(we..p1O,i,t2)l\poscSA_launch(SA_MS(tt),SA_CM(tt})(SA_lallnch_cmd(t2»1\t2 ~ tl +11 
FH3 
The "Interlock Handler" (lHa) activity must activate the firing lock upon receiving the "Abandon" com-
mand. The abandon mode would be received via the Mode (Mj) IDA, read at portp3. Given the implications 
of this request not being performed, it is necessary to guarantee the firing lock is activated timely upon its 
request. 
fauIUhm3: 
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FH4 
The nature of this fault hypothesis prohibits an RTL specification as FHI. FHc,FH3&FH5 have provided. 
Instead, the SHARD investigation has highlighted a necessary behavioural characteristic. The design/allit 
to this hypothesis is that a multi-writer channel has been decided upon that can prevent crucial messages 
being read promptly. For example, non-critical messages may be before a "Abandon" command -for 
example, the "Launch" command- in this FIFO data structure. 
8.5.2 RTL Safety Theorems for FH; 
Given the specification of the faults admissible to our design, we must now state the ,afety theorems we 
must prove to hold for the transfonned design. 
Vi:Occ,tl : Time· 0(rd...)J21,i.ld =} 0(we...)J23.i.ll) 
safety_thm2: 
Vi: Occ, 11,12: Time· o (rd...)J9 , i. II) /\ 0( we...)J I 0, i, (2) =} posUp9(tl ).p I O(tl)) 
safety-thm3: 
safety _ thmS: 
Vi: Occ, II : Time· 0(we...)J5. i,ll) =} 312: Time· 12 ~ tl + X /I 01 we...)J23 , i,lt} 
8.6 The Transformed Design 
8.6.1 Transformations 
We now present the graph grammar transfonnations to the host graph which tolerate each fault hypothesis. 
8.6.1.1 Addressing FHI 
The transfonnation illustrated in Figure 8.15 shows the PSR template applied to provide tolerance to FH I· 
From Figure 8.I-L we have applied the PSR template described in Chapter 7. to node dS3· The resulting 
transfomlation now provides for a degree of tolerance to the output produced to p23. 
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Figure 8.15: TAa - pFT 1 
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8.6.1.2 Addressing FH2 and FH5 
Given the same transfonnation tolerates both the faults defined by FH2 and FH5, we will present the 
transfonnations as one. We propose to apply Template #2 from Chapter 7 to node SAa in our host design. 
Although the precise context to SAa is not that shown in Figure 7.2, it does follow the structure discussed 
in Section 7.2.4. The precise characteristics of the design of SAa allow for the transfonnation are that there 
exists only one output, therefore only one output needs exist from the transfonnation. 
Consider the other inputs to SAa would necessitate further multicaster components to rely the inputs to 
each replica. Given no faults are considered for these communication links, and the SHARD analysis did 
not indicate any potential faults from those components, we abstract the transfonnation to iIIustrate the 
transfonnation and reasoning for the given fault hypothesis. 
8.6.1.3 Addressing FH3 
We are required to guarantee the firing lock is in place in a timely manner. Therefore. allowing for the 
possibility of delayed inputs at p3, we propose to apply a watchdog timer strategy which guarantees to 
write a default output if no input s received at p3 for some lengthly period. 
8.6.1.4 Addressing FH4 
The fourth fault hypothesis found by the SHARD analysis identified that critical message to the multi-
writer/reader at IDA ME; could be blocked (or held-up) by non-critical messages given the FIFO behaviour 
characteristics of a channel. It is therefore proposed to replace -or transfonn- this IDA component to that 
of an activity and in addition, replace the critical data path with the transfonnation presented as Template 
#4 in Chapter 7. 
FH4 is therefore addressed in two stages: i) the ME; IDA is replaced by a simple activity which reads from 
each producer to ME;; ii) the communication path between this new activity is transfonned as iIIUSlTated in 
Template #4. 
8.7 Axiomatic Semantics generated by ilf 
We iIIustrate in Appendix A.2 the modified semantics generated by the aforementioned transfonnations. 
The axioms in Appendix A.2 which are then used in the rigorous proofs that follow to show the safety 
theorems listed above, which are shown to be correct under the assumption no faults occur remain true 
under the modified semantics. 
8.8 Validation 
PROOF (SAFETY _THM I) We first prove the safety theorem holds under the assumption no faults can 
occur. 
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from Assumptions ,ActivityTheorems, LinkAxioms, NO Faults 
from i: OCC,tl : Time, 0(rd--p21 ,i, tl) 
1.1 0(lTA_C,j,tJ) 
1.2 0(lTA_C,j, t3) J\t3 > tl 
1.3 posCTA_checkmissi/e_a/ignmentO 
1.4 0(lTA_D,j,t3) 
1.5 
1.6 0(we--p23 ,i,t4)J\t4>t3 
infer 3 t2 : Time· t2 > tl A 0( we--p23 , i, t2) 
2 0(rd--p21,i,tJ)::} 3t2: Time·t2 > t) A0(we--p23 ,i,t2) 
infer'v'i:Occ,t) : Time· 0(rd--p21,i,tl) ::} 3t2 : Time· t2 > tl A0(we--p23,i,t2) 
TA_rds_p21_ax( l.h3) 
TA_ax_17(l.l) 
TA_ax_31 (1.1.1.2) 
TA_ax_5( 1.2) 
TA_ax_18(1.4) 
TA_we_p28_ax(1.5) 
3-1( 1.6) 
=?-I( 1) 
'v'-1(2) 
• 
PROOF (FT _SAFETY _ THM 1) We then prove the safety theorem holds in the presence of the hypothesised 
faults. 
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from Assumptions, ActivityTheorems, LinkAxioms, FH 1 
from i: Occ,tl : Time,9(JTA_B, i,tl),FHI 
1.1 9(lTA_IP 1, i, tI) 
1.3 9(rds--p21,i,tI) <=> 3j:Occ·9(lTA_'P1,j,tl) V 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
9(rds--p21 ,i, tI} 
9 (JTA_'P 1 , i,t3) 
9(lTA_'P2,j,tl) V 
9(lTAJP3,j,tl) 
.post]A3heckO V posCTA3heckO 
1.6 from .poscTA3heckO 
1.6.1 9(lTAJP2,j,t3) 
1.6.2 9(rds--p21,k,t3) <=> 3j:Occ·9(lTA_'PI,j,t3) V 
1.6.3 
1.6.4 
1.6.5 
1.6.6 
9(rds--p21 ,k,t3) 
9(lTA_IP2,j,t3) V 
9(lTAJP3,j, t3) 
9(JTA_IP2,k,t4) At4 > t3 
.post_TA_checkO V post_TA3heckO 
from .poscTA_checkO 
same structure as above for rp3 
infer 9(we--p23,i,ts) Ats > t4 
1.6.7 from poscTA_checkO 
I.7 
1.8 
same structure as above for rp3 
infer 9(we--p23,i,ts) Ats > t4 
infer 9{ we--p23, i, t2) At2 > tl 
from posCTA_checkO 
as above 
infer 9{ we--p23, i,t2) At2 > tl 
infer 3 t2 : Time· t2 > tl A 9{ we--p23, i, t2) 
2 9(JTA_B,i,tI} AFHI => 3t2: Time·t2 > tl A9(we--p23 ,i,t2) 
TA_ax_ 4_rp I (l.h3) 
TA_rds_p21_ax( 1.1) 
<=> -E 
TA_ax_17_rpl(l.I) 
TA_ax_31_rp I (1.1.1.4) 
TA_ax_5_rpl 
TA_rds_p21_ax 
<=> -right-E( 1.6.1) 
TA_ax_17 _rp2( 1.6.1) 
TA_ax_31_rp2(1.6.1.1.6.4) 
V-E(1.6.5.1.6.6.1.6.7) 
infer Vi: Occ,tl : Time· 9(JTA_B,i,tI} A FHI => 3t2: Time· t2 > tl A9(we--p23,i,t2) 
V-E(I.5.1.6.1.7) 
3-1( I.h 1.l.h2.l.h3) 
=>-1(1) 
'1-1(2) 
• 
PROOF (SAFETY_THM2) We first prove the safety theorem holds under the assumption no faults can 
occur. 
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from Assumplions, ActivityTheorems, LinkAxioms, NOFAULTS 
from i: Occ, II ,12 : Time,0(rd..]J9,i,tI),0(we-plO,i,12) 
1.1 0(,JSA_A,i,ll) 
1.2 0(jSA_Check_MS,i,ll) 
1.3 0(,JSA_Check_MS,i,t2)/\t2 > II 
1.4 00SA_Check_Mode, i, (2) 
1.5 0(,JSA_Check_Mode, i, (3) /\ 13 > 12 
1.6 0(,JSA_Check_Mode,i,13)::} SA_CM(13 #launch/\0(lSA_A,j+ 1,13) V 
SA_CM(13 = INIT /\0(lSAjnil_acl,j,13) V 
SA_CM(13) launch /\ 00 
SA_Calc/raj, i,13) 
1.7 from SA_CM(13 # launch/\0(jSA_A,j+ 1,13) 
1.7.1 SA_CM(13) # launch 
infer posUaunch(p9(1J),p 10(13» 
1.8 from SA_CM(13 = INIT /\ 0(lSAjnicacI,j, 13) 
1.8.1 SA_CM(13 = INIT 
infer posUaunch(p9(1J),plO(13» 
1.9 from SA_CM(13) = launch /\ 0(jSA_Calc,raj, i,13) 
1.9.1 0(TSA_calClraj,j,13) 
1.9.2 0(,JSA_calc_lraj,j, (4) /\t4 > 13 
1.9.3 0(jSA_launch,j,14) 
1.9.4 0(,JSA_launch,j, (5) /\t5 > 14 
infer posUaunch(p9(11),pIO(13» 
SA_aJU9(l.h3.1.h4) 
SA_ax_2( 1.1) 
SA_ax_I4( 1.2) 
SA_ax_3( 1.3) 
SA_ax_I5( 1.4) 
SA_ax_ 4( 1.5) 
A-E-right 
contradiction 
/\-E-righl 
contradiction 
A-E-Ieft 
SA_ax_15( 1.9.1) 
SA_ax_5( 1.9.2) 
SA_ax_18( 1.9.3) 
SA_ax_30(I.9.3.I.9.4) 
infer posUaunch(p9(1J),plO(12» v-E( 1.6.1.7.1.8.1.9) 
2 SA_CM(12) = launch /\ 0(rd"'p9, i, II) /\ 0(we-plO, i,(2) ::} posUaunch(p9(ld,p 10(12» =?-I 
infer Vi: Occ, II ,12: Time· SA_CM(12) = launch /\ 0(rd"'p9,i,ll) /\ 0(we"'plO, i,(2) ::} W-I 
posUaunch(p9(11 ),p I 0(12» 
• 
PROOF (FT _SAFETY _ THM2) We then prove the safety theorem holds in the presence of the hypothesised 
faults. 
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from Assumptions, ActivityTheorems, LinkAxioms, FH2 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
2 
from i: Occ,t"t2: TIme,0(rd-pX,i,tl ),0(we-pY, i,(2),FH2 
0(vl_we-pY,i,t2) {:} 3j:Occ·0(lvl_stateV,j,t2) 
3j: Occ· 0(lvl_stateV,j,t2) 
313: TIme· 0(lvl_stateV,j,t3) 
infer posC(PX(tt},PY(t2)) 
0(rd-pX, i, tt} /\ 0(we-pY, i, t2) /\ FH2 
vl_aJU(1.h3,1.h4) 
{:} -right-E(I.l,1.h3,1.h4) 
v l_ax_2( 1.2) 
v l_ax_3( 1.2.1.3) 
~I(l) 
'1-1(2) 
• 
PROOF (SAFETY_THM3) We first prove the safety theorem holds under the assumption no faults can 
occur. 
from Assumptions, ActivityTheorems, LinkAxioms, NO FA U LTS 
from 
l.l 
1.2 
1.3 
0(11H_Abandon_Check,j,tl) 
o (JIH_Abandon_Check,j, (2) /\ II + II S 12 
currencmode =F Abandon /\ 0(lIH_A,k,12) V 
currencmode = Abandon /\ 0(lIH _lockJiring, k, (2) 
1.4 from currencmode =F Abandon /\ 0( 1I H _A, k, (2) 
1.4.1 cllrrenCmode =F Abandon 
infer 0( weJJ4, i, (2) 
1.5 from current_mode = Abandon /\ 0( 1I H _lockJiring, k, (2) 
1.5.1 0(lIH_lockJiring,k,12) 
1.5.2 0(JlH_lockJiring,k, (3) 1\t31\t2 
1.5.3 0(we-p4,i,13) {:} 0(JlH_lockJiring,k,13) 
infer 0(weJJ4, i, (2) 
1.6 0(we-p4,i,12) 
infer 312: TIme· II +X ~ 12/\ 0(weJJ4,i,12) 
2 Thela(rd-p3,i,ll) => 3'2:TIme"I+X~12/\0(we-p4,i,12) 
infer Vi: Occ, tl : TIme· 0(rd-p3, i, tl) => 312: TIme· tl + X ~ '2/\ 0(weJJ4, i,t2) 
IH_rds_p3 _ax ( I.h3) 
IH_ax_9( 1.1 ) 
/\-E-right( 1.4.h I) 
contradiction 
/\-E-Ieft 
IH_ax9( 1.5.1) 
IH_we_p4_ax 
{:} -E-right(1.5.3.1.5.2) 
v-E( 1.3,1.4.1.5) 
3-1(1.l.hl.1.6) 
=>-1(1) 
'1-1(2) 
• 
PROOF (FT _SAFETY _ THM3) We then prove the safety theorem holds in the presence of the hypothesised 
faults. 
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from Assumptions,ActivityTheorems, LinkAxioms, FH3 
trom i: Occ,ll: TIme, 0(rd-p3,i,II), FHI 
1.1 0(stim3Ik4, i, (2) A 0(llH_A, i,(2) V 
II +1 $ t2 $ II +uA0(llH_A,i,12) 
1.2 trom 0(stim_clk4, i, (2) A 0(llH_A, i, (2) 
as before 
infer 0(weJJ4,i,t2) Atl +X $ 12 
1.3 from II +1 $ t2 $ II +uA0(llH_A,i,t2) 
1.3.1 0(tIH_walchdog,j,12) 
1.3.2 0(llH_watchdog,j,13) At3 > (2) 
1.3.3 0(we-pB,j,t3) 
1.3.4 0(tIH_wait,j,t3) 
1.3.5 0(stim_clk4,k, t4) A 0(llH_wait,j,t4) V 
0(stim-pB,k,t4) A0(llH_wait,j,t4) 
1.3.6 from 0(stim3Ik4,k,t4) A 0(llH_wait,j,t4) 
as before 
infer 0( weJJ4, i, t2) A tl + X $ t2 
1.3.7 from 0(stim-pB,k,t4) A 0(llH_wait,j, t4) 
as before 
infer 0( weJJ4, i, t2) A II + X $ t2 
1.3.8 0(we-p4,i,t2) Atl +X $ t2 
infer 0(we-p4,i,t2) Atl +X $ t2 
1.4 0(we-p4,i,t2) At\ +X $ t2 
infer 3 t2 : TIme· tl + X $ t2 A 0( weJJ4, i, t2) 
IH_ax_2'(I.3.hl) 
IH_ax_18( 1.3.1) 
link axiom 
IH_ax_19( 1.3.2) 
IH_ax_20 
V-E(1.3.5,1.3.6,1.3.7) 
2 0(rd-p3,i,tl}AFHI ~ 3t2:TIme'I\+X$t2A0(weJJ4,i,t2) 
infer'v'i: Occ,tl : TIme· 0(rd-p3,i,tI) AFHI ~ 3t2: TIme· tl +X $ t2 A0(weJJ4,i,t2) 
v-E( 1.1, 1.2,1.3) 
3-1(1.4) 
*1(1) 
'v'-1(2) 
• 
PROOF (SAFETY _THM5) We first prove the safety theorem holds under the assumption no faults can 
occur. 
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from Assumptions, ActivityTheorems, LinkAxioms, NOFAULTS 
1 from i: Occ, tl : Time, 9(rd...[J5, i, tt} 
1.1 9(VN_A,j, tt} 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
9 (.\write_spec, k, t3 ) 
9(we...[J6,k,t3) {:} 9(.\write_spec,k,13) 
9(we...[J6,k,t3) 
9(rd...[J9,k,t4) 
9(jSA_A,m, (4) 
9(jSA_A,m,t4) 
1.8 9(jSA_Check_MS,n, (4) 
1.9 9(jSA_Check_MS,n,15) 
1.10 9(jSA_Check_Mode,n, (5) 
1.11 9(we...[J1O,n,t6)M6>15 
infer 312: Time· t2 :::; II + X 1\ 9(we...[J1O,i, (2) 
2 9(rd...[J5,i,ll) => 312: Time· 12 :::; II +X 1\9(we...[J1O,i,12) 
infer Vi: Occ,tl : Time· 9(rd...[J5, i, II) => 312: Time· 12 :::; II + X 1\ 9 (we...[J 10, i, (2) 
8.9 Evaluation 
INav_we_p6_ax 
{:} -E-right( 1.3.1.2) 
link axiom 
SA_rs_p9 _ax( 1.5) 
3-1(\.11) 
=>-1(1 ) 
'1-1(2) 
• 
The case study has illustrated that the transformational methodology in earlier chapters is applicable for 
transforming real-time systems designs, specifically the design method advocated in this thesis: RealTime 
Networks (RTNs). The fault-tolerant templates described in Chapter 7 have been instantiated in the RTN-
SL design to tolerate those faults found by the SHARD analysis. The encapsulated reasoning aided the 
formal verification task. 
Although each template described in Chapter 7 was found to be applicable in the case study, the fine 
detail required to define each graph grammar transformation made the templates seem over complicated. 
However, it is accepted that the explicit nature of the RTN-SL specification contributed to this and must 
therefore be accommodated. 
A further criticism is that the formal verification effort is time consuming and should be ideal for mechan-
ical assistance. Given the pre-defined reasoning provided for each template, these conjectures should be 
readily available with an automated prover for an engineers tool-kit. 
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This chapter summarises the thesis. highlights its contribution and suggC\t\ some directions for further 
work. 
9.1 Summary 
The work reported in this thesis has demonstrated that it is possible to introduce fault tolerance into Real 
Time Networks in a sound. formally-based manner. In particular. the transformational method"logy which 
has been demonstrated allows practitioners to hypothesise component faults and use well kno\~ n strategies 
to provide fault tolerance. Furthermore. these transformations suggest the formal structure with which to 
reason about emergent fault tolerant properties. 
The argument underpinning the thesis was outlined in Chapter I: 
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We argue that transfonnations, expressed over a graph grammar syntax, do integrate hypo-
thetical fault analysis and design techniques. Further, providing a semantic framework allows 
to reason about such emergent properties, such as fault tolerance. Such transfonnations are 
constrained to respect the well-fonnedness of designs and their design language principles. 
We also argue that extending the existing semantics to make faults explicit, does not violate 
existing properties of a design. 
This thesis has defined and demonstrated an approach to providing a transfonnational design methodology 
for RTNs. The RTN architecture makes explicit the distinct components and their interactions with other 
components through well-defined interfaces within an RTN. This enabled the clear specification of faults 
to be investigated for each component and provide for fault containment at the component level. Building 
upon an existing architecture allowed for the focus to be the consideration of faults. Not just the specifi-
cation of a fault, but the effect this causes on the existing semantics and highlights the changes necessary. 
This made clear the assumed absence of faults in the existing semantics. 
The operational semantics specified for RTNs allowed for the understanding of an RTN in a constructive 
way. It enabled the step-wise construction of a semantic model which pennitted investigations of concur-
rency and non-detenninism. The eventual, two-tier, model separated out the behaviours of RTN actions 
and time. This allowed for the LTS specification-like presentation of the semantics and expressed neatly 
the behaviours of this concurrent architecture. This was justified by showing the soundness of the existing 
axiomatic semantics. 
The semantic framework for faults and RTNs are shown to be useful in a transfonnational design method-
ology expressed in graph grammars. The graph grammar specification of fault tolerant transfonnations 
based on the abstract syntax of RTN-SL -itself expressed in a graph grammar- allows for the controlled 
application of fault tolerance. 
The contribution of this thesis lies in four areas: 
• A semantic framework to define, tolerate and reason about faults in RTNs, which includes a classifi-
cation of faults; 
• A transformational method for applying well-known fault tolerance strategies to RTN-SL designs; 
• An operational model for RTN-SL; 
• A soundness argument for the existing axiomatic semantics of RTN-SL with respect to our opera-
tional model. 
9.2 Evaluation of RTN-SL for specifying faults 
The applicability of the RTN-SL specification language to support an investigation of faults and support 
specification of classical fault tolerant strategies is discussed in this subsection. We first consider the RTN-
SL language extensions proposed, then the extended axiomatic semantics of the new language features. 
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9.2.1 RTN-SL Language Extensions 
Supporting fault tolerance in real-time networks has necessitated extensions to the RTN specification lan-
guage. Without these extensions the definitions of faults in RTNs would not have been possible. The 
original language semantics stated only normative behaviours could occur without allowing for the pos_ 
sibility of faults. The extensions we have proposed state explicitly the behaviours we have incorporated. 
Allowing for faulty behaviours has exposed the assumption that only non-faulty behaviours were con-
sidered, regardless of the implementation found. Using Off-the-Shelf (OTS) components may mean this 
perfect implementation is not possible, and the system design not satisfiable. The implications of such an 
assumption are that it may lead to poverty in some design languages where a set of behaviours feasible are 
not considered in the design. 
We have presented a thorough examination of speculative read and write access methods to IDAs which 
were introduced into version 3.1 of the RTN-SL language, but not fully defined. This examination incor-
porated our intention to model faults -internal to activities- a~ state-machine transitions. That is. transition 
guards specify the conditions in which state-machine transitions can be taken when non-normal behaviour 
occurs. Specifically, either incomplete read and write accesses at IDAs or faults specify fallit transitions 
should be taken, rather than those transitions specified for normal behaviours. or state values. having oc-
curred or being true. By distinguishing fault transitions as reactive measures to faults. we allow ourselves to 
specify tolerant, containment or corrective actions that should not occur in the absence of faulty behaviours. 
9.2.2 Fault Semantics, ilf 
The extended axiomatic semantics that specifies the behaviour of faults in RTNs has been specified that 
subsume the existing semantics. The existing semantics specified nothing of faults. and crucially. nothing 
about the omission of faults. It was found that each fault behaviour considered is seen as an alternative 
behaviour, which is reflected in the structure of the specified extended semantics. Where no faults are 
considered or feasible, we state this to keep the semantics consistent and sound and provide for a formal 
framework with which to reason about an RTN. 
9.3 RTN Operational Semantics 
Though an existing axiomatic semantics existed for RTN-SL version 3.1, it was "unclear how to define an 
operational [or denotational] semantic for RTNs" [Pay02]. This meant the axiomatic semantics remained 
to be shown sound. 
9.3.1 SOS & LTS 
Our choice to specify an operational semantic for RTNs in a Plotkin SOS style was made for three reasons: 
• The set of SOS rules for RTNs form a labelled transition system (LTS) for which we specified a 
trace semantic model. The trace model allows for conjectures -namely the axiom interpretation- to 
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be proven inductively over the length of a trace. Although the axiomatic semantics assert the causal 
behaviours, such as the requirement a leave state event (~) will follow a state entry event (ls) timely. 
the associated trace-based inductive assertion must be valid for all traces. That is. should a trace 
not have reached the length for which the event should have occurred in. then the conjecture would 
be false. Instead, we only allow for causal assertions if sufficient time has elapsed, i.e. the trace is 
sufficiently long to include the event. We then reason inductively over the length of the trace to show 
the soundness of the axiomatic assertions. 
• The intuitive appeal of SOS rules allowed for the close examination of each aspect of an RTN (com-
ponent) in isolation. Each rule specified a single behaviour of an RTN (e.g. read access or state-
machine transitions) by stating the condition in which the rule is valid, or fireable. and the conclu-
sions state the effect on the RTN state and the events raised. The suitability of the SOS approach is 
further vindicated by the ease and effectiveness of adding new rules for the fault specifications . 
• The LTS approach allowed for the "meta-level", which defines how, and when, each rule can fire to 
be defined and specify the model of concurrency and non-determinism in RTNs cleanly. 
9.3.2 Conservative Extension 
It has been shown that additional language features proposed do not conflict with the existing semantics 
through the result that the extended TIS is a conservative extension to the existing semantics. This result 
was argued with the understanding that faults are alternative behaviours and. given the hypothesis that no 
faults occur, then existing axioms in the existing semantics remain true. The conservativity result supports 
our approach to defining the semantics in an incremental way and justifies our decision to use an SOS style 
approach. 
9.3.3 Soundness 
The claim that something has been proven should eliminate doubt. Unfortunately, informal arguments can-
not create such certainty. Our ambition to show the axiomatic semantics sound with respect the operational 
model therefore requires an argument, or proof, which convinces the reader of its correctness. Two options 
exist: i) A Rigorous Proof which borrows the ideas of carefully structured and line-by-Iine justifications 
from a formal proof, but omits obvious hypotheses, uses abbreviations or appeals to general theories for 
justifications rather than to specific rules of inference; ii) A Mechanised Proof is one which each step and 
inference rule is encoded in the logical framework of a prover and each step is justified by appealing to a 
formally stated rule of inference. 
We elected to present rigorous proofs as evidence the axiomatic semantics are sound, and are confident 
these proofs can be made formal or verified (as described below) by a proof tool. The benefits of this 
approach enable the proofs to be readable, such that a reader can follow and understand the intuition, rather 
than having to accept the correctness of the tool- if the tool is incorrect, or the encoding of our semantics 
and validation conjectures misrepresented, then the verification by the tool is worthless. 
Showing the axiomatic semantics sound with respect our operational model has reiterated the correctness 
which has previously been inferred from the axioms being usable in a formal proof. However, our attempts 
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to show the soundness provides a firm rigorous argument irrespective of past experience and examples and 
allows for the examination of our argument, rather than searching for a counter example. However. as 
outlined in Section 6.5, a formalised proof of our soundness arguments, possibly using IsabelleIHOL or 
PVS, would support our claims of soundness. 
Having argued the axiomatic semantics are sound, we can now proceed with verification of RTN-SL de-
signs as described previously using the PVS Theorem Prover. 
9.4 Suitability of graph grammars and application of methodology 
We have proposed a transformational design methodology, using a context-sensitive graph grammar. which 
permits the removal of a faulty design component from its host design and its replacement by an arrange-
ment of non-ideal components which provide for a tolerance to some hypothetical fault. We examine the 
suitability of using a graph grammar and the application of this methodology (using the case-study) below. 
9.4.1 Transformational methodology 
Providing for graph grammar productions as our transformational method, we allow for a step-wise ap-
proach. That is, a design is transformed to the next by applying one (or more) productions that replace 
one (or more) components with an arrangement of design components. This allows a designer to explore, 
for a given context, each valid production to decide the best trade-off between the cost of a fault tolerance 
strategy and the improved reliability sought. 
Although the design templates we propose have been successfully applied to a realistic design. it is antic-
ipated the flat graph grammar will not be sufficient for more complex templates. Rather than the graph 
grammar not being expressive enough to specify such templates, it is thought the designs produced will 
be intractable for cohesion with the existing design and the designs will not suggest a structure for the 
validation which is beneficial. 
9.4.2 Case Study Evaluation 
To test the applicability of our design methodology and suitability of representing a RTN in a graph gram-
mar syntax, we undertook a sizeable case-study. The results of this study are summarised below: 
• The graph grammar syntax was suitable for representing the graphical syntax of RTN-SL, but not the 
supporting concrete syntax; 
• The necessity of a context-sensitive grammar allowed for the derivation of standard RTN designs; 
• It was realised, as hoped, that the formal reasoning was structured as the productions were presented, 
often properties prescribed of a templates were used as lemma's when reasoning at the activity and 
network level; 
• Although the structure of each template provided insight into the proof effort, the repetition was 
tiresome and it is expected the repetitive steps are appropriate for automation. 
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• Acquiring the graph grammar representation of a RTN-SL design should be automated. 
Overall, the case study has justified our decisions to use RTN-SL, graph grammars and the PVS theorem 
prover to show the applicability of this methodology. 
9.5 Further Work 
Hierarchical Graph Grammars: Our attempts to represent a structural RTN in a flat graph grammar 
has caused the loss of the RTN structure. Instead of an activities state-machine being seen as internal to 
an activity at the RTN level, our grammar shows the flattened RTN, with all components visible. This 
makes the RTN level transformations more tiresome -yet possible- whereas it is considered a hierarchical 
grammar would retain the RTN structure and make the RTN level transformations more tractable. 
Modal Logic: Our choice to use RTL to model faults was primarily decided to give compatibility with 
the RTN-SL semantics, which are specified in RTL. Another consideration may be to use a modal logic, 
as it seems attractive to consider operators such as eventually. Given our observation that faults are visible 
for distinct intervals, then these operators would seem appropriate, for example, to specify a late fault is to 
say a value is eventually produced after some specific time, otherwise it would be an omission fault. 
Paynter, in [Pay03], has begun to develop a new modal logic called Causal Real lime Logic (CRTL) 
which adapts the existing RTL logic to be capable of specifying and reasoning about causality in real-time 
networks (RTNs). The approach to model the history of an RTN is similar to our concept of a trace. 
lsabelleIHOL: To mechanically verify our soundness proofs, as suggested in Section 6.5, would add 
further conviction to our argument. Although the rigorous arguments we have give are believed to be 
true, it would be an interesting exercise to take the next obvious step and use a theorem prover, such as 
Isabelle/HOL, to verify our conjectures. It would also be worth considering undertaking this task using the 
PVS theorem prover, which may then lead to an integration with the existing axiomatic semantics. 
Using such a mechanised approach may also provide the opportunity to show the axioms complete, but 
such an approach is not known to-date. 
Further fault tolerant templates: Those templates proposed in this thesis are purposefully simple and 
only of well-known strategies to allow for the development of the methodology. It would now be interesting 
to examine other, more novel, strategies to test the bounds of the methodology. Devising new strategies 
specific to RTNs would be feasible given the structure of our approach to document and test new ideas. 
TheoremlProof Generator: As reported elsewhere [OE02], an integrated environment which interacts 
with the RTN-SL tool support, NetSpec and provides some graph grammar support for generating graph 
grammar representations of a design to allow a designer to apply our fault tolerant templates would provide 
the foundation for a larger objective: a theorem and proof generator. Given the structured approach of 
our methodology and our experience with the case-study, applying a transformation to a RTN design. it 
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should be possible to i) generate the theorems (or lemmas) that show a template is functionally equivalent 
to the existing components, and ii) discharge these lemmas with pre-defined tactics. Providing this type of 
environment would allow for the seamless introduction of our, and other, design templates. 
9.6 Epilogue 
Our initial objective was to investigate the addition of fault tolerance into Real-lime Networks. This 
necessitated the study and definition of faults in a real-time system architecture and the survey of existing 
fault tolerant strategies applicable to RTS. 
The methodologies developed have found the fault definitions, strategies and design methods applicable 
to designing fault tolerant RTNs. We have extended the semantic framework for RTNs and used it to first 
show the axiomatic semantics sound, then to use the axiomatic semantics to verify the transformed design 
are tolerant to the faults considered. 
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Part V 
Supplementary Material 
Appendix A 
Case Study Specifications 
We present here the complete RTN-SL specification of the case ,tudy design. The ,uh,c4ucllt subsection 
details the modified axiomatic semantics generated by the transfonnations described in Chapter 8. 
Thesls-caseStudyHostDesign.rtnsl 
Begin ADT Descriptions 
adt Image is 
type Raw_Image is token; 
type INS_Data is token; 
type Processed_Image is token; 
type Vector is (x,y,z); 
function Image_Processing(ri : Raw_Image) return pi : Processed_Image; 
pre true; 
post true; -- The functionality of this function is not given. 
end adti 
adt BIT_Test is 
with Image; 
type BIT~ssessment is (pass, fail); 
function Assessment Cri: Image . Raw_Image) return ass : BIT_Assessment; 
pre true; 
post true; -- The functionality of this function is not given. 
end adti 
adt Threat is 
type Threat.-Assessment is (high, medium, low); 
end adtj 
adt Pos is 
type coords is token; 
funct ion '::'alc-pos (r i : Image. Raw_Image) return ps 
pre true; 
post true; 
end adt; 
ddt INS_Data is 
wit h Im.lg8; 
t ypf':' pOfJ in Image. Vector I 
typf':' m:.:;q is token; 
i':!:1ri aot; 
adt Xi:I:;i 1.,.. State is 
with I:"d(JI-'; 
t ypl-~ po:.! i:3 I r:',dge. Vector; 
t yp'~ :;t.ltU:J ie. (model, modp2); 
'Y[l'-' !MU_Datd i ~~ token; 
F!lN(,TION: corr.p'H t-' (1 
DE~;C : 
coords; 
tunc 1 i,l:l ,~nrrl-'.\If-' (pi: Imaqe.Pto('to'!.:secL.lrrdqpj ll":!tUl:l res: bool; 
1'1 p 1111"; 
I",:;t tlU"'; -- Tlw fllr\ctit':1ality \l! this tu;a'~ti";a is not ql\,p:l, 
t·;ad .,dot i 
.tdt :·~,,,1 ... is 
t '/1'. :\ll:-"'Iwl is ;a,lt i 
~'"I' I .t· It I 
.I.H f;.'I)"11:1 is 
fy,'" status ls t,'kt>;aj 
*",01 "it; 
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adt Actuators is 
type cmd is token; 
type pas is token; 
end adt; 
adt Firing is 
type lock is token; 
end adt; 
adt Clock is 
type tick is token; 
end adt; 
Begin Activity Descriptions 
-- MC Specification 
-- The "Mode Controller" (MC) activity loops ... 
activity Me is 
with Clock, Mode; 
ports 
pO : (Stimulus, NULL, out); 
pI : (Channel, Mode. number, in); 
p2 : (Pool, Mode. number, outl; 
end ports; 
auxiliary definitions 
constant 1 : Time; 
constant wcet : Tin-,e; 
constant u : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
local state 
current~ode Mode.:lu~ber; 
end local state; 
operations 
op check_mode (newJt\ode : Mode.numbec); 
ext write currentJ,ode; 
pte true; 
post true; 
t-:uJ OPI 
op 8et_ti~eout () :Jt..it t 
pIe tlue; 
P')~lt truel 
r..~:llj OPI 
NULL, 
lJP t.li:J~_,""u.jlll () ev : Mode.nu~..berl 
.,.xt [".'1\.1 ..:u'rent-,~ode; 
PlO- tt'ue; 
f".J·.t true; 
"Old ')'~; 
end !Po-L1tl'<1~li 
:it.Jtt:"111 
stat ic XC_A 
t[..t:l:.lltiU:l golts to ~C_Ch.ck-,~ode on [.!"- j pil 
end state; 
dj'."\,):-lC ~~C_Che,=k_~od~ 
~ 
~ I~ ~ 
~ ~ ~ 
Z ~ 
I 
00 (") 
t""f > 
~ ~ til ~ ~ .... ~ 
til 
." 
~ 
9 (") 
~ 
0 
Z 
til 
-~ 
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op checkJnode reads from pI; 
timing (l,weet,uJ; 
transition goes to Me_Set_Timeout on currentJTIode = "TIMEOUT"; 
transition goes to MC.-Raise-.Mode on currentJnode /= current_mode-; 
end state; 
dynamic Me_Set_Timeout 
op set_timeout writes to pOi 
timing [l,wcet,u) i 
transition goes to MC-A on true; 
end state; 
dynamic MC.-Raise-Mode 
op raiseJnode writes to p2i 
timing (l,wcet,ul; 
transition goes to MC-A on true; 
end state: 
initial MC--.Ai 
end states; 
end activity; 
IH Specification 
The -Interlock Handler n (IH) activity loops ... 
-------------
activity IH is 
with Mode, Firing; 
ports 
p3 
p4 
pclk4 : 
end ports; 
(Pool, Mode.number, in); 
(Pool, Firing.lock, out); 
(Stimulus, Clock.tick, in); 
auxiliary definitions 
constant 1 : Time; 
constant wcet : Time; 
constant u : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
local :Jtdte 
CUllent_n',od", Mode.numbel; 
Prld l{)('.1l :3tate; 
npf:'r-at io~:; 
np dba~don_~'ht:ock (new_:-,ode : Mode. :1u:-bel ) ; 
~xt writ~ rurlent_mode; 
pIe lUle; 
pO~It. l'lllll:'~t_:i,odl-' - new_mode; 
I~nd op; 
op lock_tillnq (1 lock: flli:1g.1ock; 
~Xt 1 edd <'\ll reilt._:-:,.odei 
ptf:' true; 
pd:,f t tUei 
.~n(i <)Pi 
... nd opetat i<)!lS; 
:It.,tt·:; 
stl\)U 1.-1 bf> ., STI~ !lot I p,\d 
:It .If ic IH A 
t t.I:\:dt i,l" Qoes to IH-Abando!1_Check on to:".'ld pclk4; 
,4'1.1 :It.\t .. ; 
Thesis-caseStudyHostDesian.rtnsl 
dy~amic IH_Abandon_Check 
op abandon_check reads from p3; 
timing [l,wcet,u); 
transition goes to IH_A on false; --i.e. NOT abandon 
transition goes to IH-Lock_Firing on true; --i.e. abandon 
end state; 
dynamic IH_Lock_Firing 
op lock_firing writes to p4; 
timing [l,wcet,u]; 
transition goes to IH_A on true; 
end state; 
initial IH_Ai 
end states; 
end activity; 
IN Specification 
The "Inertial Navigation" (IN) activity loops ••. 
------------------------------------------------
activity INav is 
with Image; 
ports 
pS (Signal, Image.Processed_Image, in); 
p6 (Signal, Missile_State.status, out); 
p7 (Channel, Mode.number, out); 
pe (Pool, Missile_State.pos, out); 
end ports; 
auxiliary definitions 
constant 1 : Time; 
constant wcet : Time; 
constant u : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
local state 
bodYJnotion : Ir.'!.age. Processed_Image; 
end local state; 
operations 
op integrity_rr.ode (new.-bm Imaqe.Processed_Irr.age)} 
ext write body-,"r.otion; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
op W[ltl':'_~~Pt"'I..ltl')" ,) seperation_cMd Mlssile_State.6t.atuBI 
ext 1 ~..ld b01ji'_:""ot in:1; 
prt:' tLue; 
poat true; 
end op; 
op wrlt~_dlig:1~e:1t " ,tllCjJn Misaile_Statt:t.po9; 
ext lf1.l(j bndY_:-'JtlO:li 
pt e true, 
FHJ!.it true, 
e-:ld op, 
up t.:s 1 ~fo _ ~(J'1'! () ev : Mode. :lu~.ber I 
~)(t l~.I,j h'jrJ,/_~r)tlO~i 
pre true, 
post true; 
end OPI 
~ 
'=' ~ 
~ 
~ 
til 
~ 
til 
~ 
9 
('") 
~ 
o 
Z 
til 
-~ 
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end operations; 
states 
static INJ\ 
transition goes to IN_IntegritY.-Mode on read pSi 
end state; 
dynamic IN_Integrity_Mode 
op integrity~ode reads from pSi 
timing (1, weet, uJ; 
transition goes to IN..,.A on false; --1. e. fail 
transition goes to IN_Wrlte_Seperation on true; --i.e. pass 
end state; 
dynamic IN_Wrlte_Seperation 
op write_seperation writes to p6; 
timing [l,wcet,ul; 
transition goes to IN_Write-A1ignment on true; 
end state; 
dynamic IN_Write~lignment 
op write_alignment writes to pS; 
timing [l,wcet,uli 
transition goes to IN~aise~ode on true; 
end state; 
dynamic IN_Raise-Mode 
op raiseJnode writes to p7; 
timing (l,wcet,u)i 
transition goes to IN_we-p7 on true; 
end state; 
static IN_we-p7 
transition goes to IN.-A on write p7; 
end state; 
initial IN.-Ai 
end states; 
end activity; 
-- SA Specification 
-- The "Seperation Autopilot" (SA) activity loops ..• 
activity SA is 
with Image, Actuators, Missile_State, Mode; 
potts 
p<) (Signal, Missile~StatF!. status, in); 
plO (Signal, Actuators.emd, out); 
p11 (Pool, Mode.number, in); 
p12 (Pool, I~aqe.Proeessed_Image, in); 
':'1)(1 par 51 
.luxili.uy dt.>tinitin~13 
,'nll:1t ,l:lr 1 : Ti:-t"'1 
{'onstant weer : Ti!"',I'": 
I',)n~ta:\t u : Time: 
t'lf\d .1IlXili,uy definitionsl 
l0L'al st.lot ,. 
MS : Ml:1:'11t-'_StJ.t~'.:lt,HU~l; 
eM : Mnd .... :lll..-bpi : 
tl4j : 1f'"J.qt=o.f'n){'t'!3:.l~d_I:'!',lqt·i 
":101 1~1l'.11 :It J,tf"; 
'1"'1 .It i'):l~ 
')P dlPI'k ~s (CUllf3'!lt_ms Mlssl..le_~t4te.:Jt.)tuSI; 
ext write MS: 
pre true; 
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post MS - eurrent_ms; 
end op; 
op check_mode (current_mode Mode.number); 
ext write CM; 
pre true: 
post CM - current_mode; 
end op; 
op init_aet () lnlt_cmct : Actuators.cmd; 
ext read MS, CM: 
pre true; 
post eM "" 4 implies init_cmd _ "lnit a; 
end op: 
op cheek_tra) (current_traj Image. ProcessecLlmage) ; 
ext write traj; 
pre true; 
post tra) - current_traj; 
end op; 
op launch () launctLcmd Actuators.emd; 
ext read MS, eM; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
end operations; 
states 
static Sl;..A 
transition goes to SA-Check_MS on read p91 
end state; 
dynamic SA-Check-MS 
op check~S reads from p9; 
timing (1,wcet,u1: 
transition goes to SJ\......Check~ode on true; 
end state; 
dynamic SiLCheck-Mode 
op cheek~ode reads from pll; 
timing (1,weet,u1; 
transition goes to SA.....A on CM /- "LAUNCH"; 
transition goes to S"-.Init.-A,ct on CM - "INIT"; 
transition goes to SA....,.Calc_Traj on CM - "LAUNCH", 
end state; 
dynamic SA-Calc_Traj 
op check_tcaj reads from p12i 
timing (l,wcet,ul, 
transition goes to SA-Launch on true; 
end state; 
dy~.}:-"i" SA_I:'lit_Act 
\)P l'lit_.}ct \101( itf~!J t.'") plO, 
t i:-l[lq' [1, w,_'t-t, u]; 
t[d,~I:.Jitlu:1 goes to S"-,, on true, 
end :It,H .. ; 
dY~.1:"l(, SA_L<\unch 
op l,}U~l,'h writes to piO; 
ti:"'i:lq (l,wCH,u]; 
tl,)~l,jitll}tl gl)~!J to") SA....A on tllj"; 
~:1,1 !Jt.H~; 
in1tial S~, 
t=:ld states; 
e:-.d .!t.C'tl':iti'i 
I 
~ 
n 
~ 
~ 
c:Il 
~ 
~ Q 
:l (j 
~ 
.... 
o 
z 
c:Il 
-~ 
Thesis-caseStudyHostDesign.rtnsl 
RAM Specification 
Dese: 
1--
activity RAM is 
with Image, Pos, BIT_Test, INS_Data, Mode; 
ports 
p13 (Signal, Image.Raw_Irnage, in); 
p14 (Pool, Pos.coords, Qut)i 
pIS (Channel, Mode.number, out)i 
p1G (Pool, Image.Precessed_Image, out)i 
p17 (Signal, INS_Data.pos, out); 
pI8 (Pool, Pos.coords, out); 
pI9 (Signal, BIT_Test .BITJ\ssessment, out) i 
end port 
auxiliary definitions 
constant 1 : Time; 
constant weet : Time; 
constant u : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
local state 
input: Image.Raw_Imagei 
end local state; 
operations 
op Read_Image (raw: Image.Raw_Image)j 
ext write input; 
pre true; 
post input - raw; 
end op; 
op Process_Image (I processed: Image .Processed_Image; 
ext read input; 
pre true; 
post pt oceS3ed - Image. Image_Processing (input) ; 
end 0Pi 
op Raise_Event () evid Mode. number; 
ext read input; 
pre true, 
post evid - <); 
end OPI 
op BIT () vetdict : BIT_Test . BIT_Assessment; 
t-'xt If->.ld input, 
pt e t LIlA; 
po:Jt vt:'rdict - BIT_Test. Assessment (input); 
.·:H1 0Pi 
np Rt ... cotd_i~put () output: Image.Processed_Image; 
ext [I-:'d,j input; 
pre true; 
post (lutput - Image. Image_processing (input'; 
,,:Id 0Pi 
op Wt ite_Position t) position: Pos.coords; 
ext read input; 
pte t nJfl; 
P()!,t pO!Jiti():1 - PU~l.\~3.1c_p("!1(inputll 
t-''ld I)Pi 
IIp WI it~·_INS_[l.\t.\ t) INS_:,",!.'Iq INS_Data.pos; 
M)lit I p.\d input j 
pi f-t t 1 UP: 
post truel 
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end op; 
end operations; 
states 
static RA..~ 
transition goes to ~B on read pl3; 
end state; 
dynamic RruLB 
op Rea~Image reads from pl3; 
timing [1, wcet, uJ; 
transition goes to umb_cut on input - lIumb_cut"; 
transition goes to BIT_cmd on input - lBIT_cmd"; 
transition goes to write_input on input /- (1I umb_cut" OR ftBIT_cmd"); 
end state; 
dynamic umb_cut 
op Raise_Event writes to pIS; 
timing [1, wcet, uJ; 
transition goes to umb_cut_we on true; 
end state; 
static umb_cut_we 
transition goes to RAM...A on write pIS; 
end state; 
dynamic BIT_crnd 
op BIT writes to pl9; 
timing [1, wcet, uJ; 
transition goes to RAM-,A on true; 
end state; 
dynamic write_input 
op WriteYosition writes to p14; 
op Process_Image writes to p16; 
op write_INS_Data writes to pl?; 
op Write_Position writes to pIe; 
timing (1, wcet, uJ; 
transition goes to ~~ on true; 
end state; 
initial RA.MJ; 
end states; 
end activity; 
-- TA Specification 
-- The "Tra!lster Align:nent- (TA, activity loops •.. 
3.cti·lity TA Is 
with I:-..lqf:>, INS_Data, Mi8sile_:.t3.t~. Reports, 
ports 
p20 (Signal. IN:.i_[I..lt.:t.p')!l. in', 
p21 (Pool, :·~i~:Jl1.~_St..it".p,)!,. in', 
p22 (Channel, :~(lil~ . .'1u:-1H-"r. out" 
p23 (Signal, k ... !JLJtt:J.:JL'lttIJ.3, out)1 
p24 (Pool. ItI:",-[1.1LI.~:j[J, out' I 
end pl)rt 
.J,uxlll.u'l' detinitions 
·():)!Jt."~lt 1 : Tif!'.el 
constant w -.. t : T1:"'''i 
constant u : Ti:-~; 
end auxiliary .jf~t i:-.lt ll}~L!l; 
l()'~dl state 
1 :1put : U;S_:J,lt .. l. ~!1g'; 
>-~ 
~ 
~ 
E 
t.'!!l 
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MS : Missile_State.status; 
end local state; 
operations 
op Read_Image (inp : INS_Data.pos); 
ext write inputi 
pre true; 
post input - iop; 
end op; 
op Check~issile-Alignment (incoming~s 
ext write rns; 
pre true; 
post MS - incoming~s; 
end op; 
op Generate~eport () rp 
ext read MS; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
Reports.status; 
op Raise-Event () ev Mode.number; 
ext read MSj 
pre true; 
post true; 
end oP: 
op Wr He_INS () output 
ext read input; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
end operations; 
states 
static T1\....11 
INS_Data.msgi 
transition goes to T~B on read p20i 
end state; 
dynamic TA_B 
op Read_Image reads from p20; 
timing [l,wcet,uli 
transition goes to TA.-C on true; 
~nd state; 
dynamic TII_C 
Missile_State.pos)i 
OJ-> Chl"(:k_~'H3Sil~_Alignment reads from p21; 
ti:"1inq [l,wcet,u]; 
tr-dnsition gOEl::; to TA--D on true; 
end !itdt~; 
(1yna~ic TA_D 
op Genel,ltEl_RepIH t writ..,-:) to p23; 
timinq [l,wc~t,ul; 
tcan~~ition goe:3 to TA--E on tl'ue; 
t-lnd state; 
dyn.l:-i,' TA--E 
op R~i:)p_Evpnt writp3 tn p22; 
ti~i:HJ [l,we.-t,ull 
t ld.~l!.dt ion q()PS tn T"-.F on true; 
... :\(1 !.t,lt ... : 
:;t .,t ic TA __ f 
tlL"\'I:dt 1.','"'\ ql)t.'!; t" T~l' (':1 WI itt:' p~~; 
"':-Id :1I.lt ,.; 
di':hl:rL- 111._,; 
"1' Wllf.· __ IW, WI itf"~~ t" p":4; 
t l'- I :111 [1, w,' ... t, \11; 
tl,I'\·.ltio~ ~I""!l t,) TA-A on tllU'; 
end state; 
initial T~A; 
end states; 
end activity; 
-- ME Specification 
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-- The nManage BIT- (ME) activity loops .•• 
activity MB is 
with Mode; 
ports 
p25 (Signal, BIT_Test. BIT_Assessment, in); 
p26 (Channel, Mode.number, out); 
p27 (Signal, Reports. status, out); 
end por 5; 
auxiliary definitions 
constant 1 : Time; 
constant wcet : Time; 
constant u : Time; 
constant to : Time; 
constant tl : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
local state 
missile_state BIT_Test. BIT_Assessment; 
end local state; 
operations 
op tests (BITJTlsg : BIT_Test, 81T-Assessment) m Mode. number 1 
ext write missile_state; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
op write_report () rep: Reports,status; 
ext read missile_state; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
end operations; 
states 
static ~B_A 
transition goes to do_tO::'::It:i on read p251 
t:':1d ~>t at t"; 
dy:l.l:"'ic do_tests 
l)P teste reads trol'l" p25 writes to p261 
tl:"'l~\g 1~.IoI,:et.uJ; 
tl.l:)sitl()~l qf)t:'S t!) !o'.B_C on trlJ~; 
end state; 
:Jt _tt i,~ :,:b_C 
tl,ltlSU: i'l:1 goea t,! writeJeports O:l WI it" p2fil 
e:Hj state: 
dy~,'-l': "llt"_I~PO(t:l 
<)~' W[lt"" __ lf'!P<)lt write" tu p27; 
tl:1nq Il,wc8t,ull 
tC3~5lti0:1 908a to MB.-A on true; 
end 3tdte, 
1~it 1a1 !!II_A; 
end states; 
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end activity; 
TG Specification 
The -Timeout Generator" eTG) activity loops .•• 
----------------------------------------------
activity TG is 
with Mode, Clock; 
ports 
p34 : (Stimulus, NULL, in) i 
p35 : (Channel, Mode.number, out); 
end ports; 
auxiliary definitions 
constant 1 : Time; 
constant weet : Time; 
constant u : Time; 
constant to : Time; 
constant t 1 : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
operations 
op write_timeout () m Mode. number; 
pre true; 
post m _ "Timeout n; 
end op; 
end operations; 
otates 
--STIM not READ! 
static TG_A 
transition goes to TG_B on read p34i 
end state; 
static TG_B 
transition goes to TG_C on (tol,to2]; 
end state; 
dynamic TG_C 
op write_timeout writes to p35j 
timing [1,wcet,ul; 
transition goes to TG_D on true; 
end state; 
static TG_D 
transition goes to TG->' on w[' ite p35; 
end state; 
init 1a1 n,_A; 
end states; 
end activity; 
1--
IMU_SS Speci f i CLlt i 0;) 
Desc: Tilt'> "Iapltial MeasuI~:"""':lt U:lit" UXU) Sub-syste:-- loops. 
,ld 1 v it y IMll_SS is 
with lliol(]I_', Clork; 
P,ll t ~l 
pl'lkl 
polO 
... "d p,n tSI 
(Sti:-ulllS, C'l,h'k.tick, in); 
(Siq~hll. I:-"'aqt".PI\.)o.:'essed_I:-dqe. out); 
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auxiliary definitions 
constant 1 : Time; 
constant wcet : Time; 
constant u : Time; 
end auxiliary definitions; 
operations 
op write_data () output 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
end operations; 
--STIM not READ! 
states 
static lMU_A 
Image. Processe~Image; 
transition goes to IMU_B on read pclkl; 
end state; 
dynamic IMU_B 
op write_data writes to p40; 
timing [l,wcet,u}; 
transition goes to IMU_A on true; 
end state; 
initial I~U_A; 
end states; 
end activity; 
AC_SS Specification 
Dese: The nActuator" Sub-system loops ... 
activity AC_SS is 
with Image; 
ports 
p36 : (Signal, 
end ports; 
operations 
op write_data 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
end operations; 
states 
dynamic AC,J. 
--------------
Image.Raw_Image, out); 
() output Image. Raw_Image; 
op write_data writes to p36; 
tin'oing {1,wcet,u}; 
transition goes to ACj\ on truel 
end state; 
initial AC--", 
en,j Std.t~5; 
end .l,:t il/lty: 
A..-S5 Specification 
Desc: The -All' [ott' - sub-system loops •.. 
activity ,,"-55 1s 
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with Actuators; 
ports 
p38 : (Signal, Actuators.cmd, in); 
end ports; 
local state 
xyz : Actuators .pos; 
end local state; 
operations 
op read_data (in_cmd Actuators.cmd)i 
ext write XYZ; 
pre true; 
post true; 
end op; 
end operations; 
states 
static A....A 
transition goes to ~ on read p38; 
end state; 
dynamic ~B 
op read_data reads from p38; 
timing (l,wcet,u); 
transition goes to ~ on true; 
end state; 
initial A~; 
end states; 
end activity; 
-- Begin IDA Descriptions 
1 --
ida AIM is 
Kind Signal; 
Datatype Image.Raw_Imagej 
e~d ida; 
ida ME is 
Kind Channel; 
Datatype Mode,number; 
end ida; 
ida AM is 
Kind Pool; 
Oatdtype Image.Processed_Image: 
end ida; 
io1.1 AID i:3 
Ki:vi Sig~.ll; 
Dat..ltype INS_Oata.pos; 
.··:\d id,l; 
ido.l Be i:o; 
lUnd Siq:l.ll; 
Datat YP'" B1 T _ T ... ~t . BIT_Asses9n".ent; 
f-'~d ida; 
id,l :-:SI is 
Ki~d Siq~~\I; 
tlo.lt ,lot YP'" :-:i ~!l i 1", _~1 t .lot ~. st.!otus 1 
end 1<'1.\; 
id., XS2 is 
I\1:1(t Poolj 
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Datatype Missile_state.pos; 
end ida; 
ida AD is 
Kind Signal; 
Datatype Actuators.crnd; 
end ida; 
ida TS is 
Kind Stimulus; 
Datatype NULL; 
end ida; 
-- Begin RTN Descr iptios 
1---
rtn netl is 
MC.pl reads from ME; 
AC_SS.p36 writes to AIM; 
RAM.p13 reads from AIM: 
RAM.pIS writes to ME; 
RAM.p16 writes to k~: 
RAM.pI? writes to AID; 
RA..~.pI9 writes to BC; 
MB.p2S reads from BC; 
MB.p26 writes to ME; 
SA.pI2 reads from AM; 
SA.p9 reads from MSI; 
SA.pIO writes to AD; 
TA.p20 reads from AID; 
TA.p2I reads from MS2; 
TA.p22 writes to ME; 
~SS.p38 reads from AD; 
MC.pO writes to TS: 
TG.p34 reads from TS; 
INav.p6 writes to MSI; 
INav.p8 writes to MS2; 
end rtn; 
1--
-- Begin Theory Oescr iptions 
1--
theory 
miat : TitT'.e 
deadline : Time 
AsSurr.ptionl : AXIO~ 
FORALL !1: Occ, tl. t2: Th'.e): 
th(al_Id~_pl, i, tl) AND thl.l1_I,j!l-p1, i·d, t~) IMPLIES 
t2 >- t1 + -ldt 
Assumption2 : AXIOM 
miat > deadl! ne 
A:J:Ju:-pt lO:I:~ AXIOM 
,j",.}d11ne > al_ul + ..t.":' _u.' 
Ttu:o [ 0:':" 1 : THEOP-EM 
rORALL (1: Occ. t 1: Time): 
thlal_rds-pl, i. t1) IY.PLIES 
EXISTS (t2: Tl:~): t.h(d2_w~...JJ~. i, t2) AlW 
t2 . - t1 + (j~.,rjll:)~ 
Theore~.2 THEORE.."! 
> 
i 
~ 
~ 
CIl 
~ 
~ 
CIl 
~ 
9 (j 
~ 
o 
z 
CIl 
-f 
end; 
1-
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FORALL (i: Oce, tl: Time): 
th(a2_we-p4, i, tI) I~PLIES 
EXISTS It2: Ti!'!'.e): th(al_rds--p1, i, tZ) AND t2 < tl 
END 
1-
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A.2 Modified Axiomatic Semantics 
Those axioms modified for the TAo activity are: 
TA_ax_31_rpl: AXIOM 
Vi: Occ,t},t2: Time· 0(1TAJpl,i,t) /l.0lTA_'Pl,i,t2 ~ 
--,posCTA_check_missile_alignment(TA_incoming-,ns( tl ), TA_inPIII(tl» (TA_MS(lz» V 
posCTA_check_missile_alignment( TA_incoming_ms(t), TA_input(t) )(TA_MS(12» 
TA_ax_31_rp2 : AXIOM 
Vi: Occ,t),t2: Time· 0(1TAJP2,i,tJ) /I. o lTA_'P2, i,t2 ~ 
--,post_TA_check_missilcalignment(TA_incoming_ms(t) ), TA_inpm(tl) )(TA_MS{tz» V 
poscTA3heck_missile_a/ignment(TA_incoming_ms(t) ), TA_inpllt(tl» (TA_MS( t2» 
TA_ax_3 Lrp3 : AXIOM 
Vi: Occ,t) ,t2: Time· 0(1TA_'P3, i,t) /I. 0lTAJP3,i,t2 ~ 
--,poscTA_check_missile_alignment(TA_incoming_ms(t), TA_inpII1(tl »(TA_MS(tz» V 
poscTA_check_missile _alignment(TA_incoming_ms(tl), TA_inpllt( tl» (TA_MS(t2» 
TA_rds_p2Lax: AXIOM 
Vi: Occ, t: Time· 0(rds""p21, i,t) ¢:> 
3j: Occ· 0(TTA_'P1,j,t) V 0(TTAJP2,j,t) V 0(TTAJP3,j,t) 
TA_ax_17Jpl : AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,t) : Time· 0(1TA_'P1,i,tt} ~ 
3t2: Time· t) + TA_l ::; t2 ::; tl + TA_1I /I. 
0(lTAJpl, i,t2) 
TA_ax_17_rp2: AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,tl :Tlme·0(1TA_'P2,i,tl) ~ 
3t2 : Time· tl + TA_l ::; t2 ::; tl + TA_" /I. 
0(lTAJP2, i, t2) 
TA_ax_17_rp3: AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,t) :Tlme·0(1TAJP3,i,t) ~ 
3t2 : Time· tl + TA_l ::; t2 ::; tl + TA_II /I. 
0(lTAJP3, i, t2) 
TA_ax_5_rpl : AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,tl :Tlme·0(lTA_'P1,i,tJ) ~ 
(true/l.0(1TA_D,i,tJ) V 
(3j: Occ· valueFaultL,j,tJ) /I. 0(1TA_'P2,j,tl» 
TA_ax_5_rp2: AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,tl : Time· 0(lTAJP2,i,tl) ~ 
(true/l.0(1TA_D,i,tt}) V 
(3j: Occ· vallleFallltLj, tl) /I. 0(1TA_'P3.j. tJ) 
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TA_ax_5_rp3: AXIOM 
Vi: Occ,tl : TIme· 0(.lTA_rp3,i,td =? 
(true /\ 0(lTA_D, i,tl» 
TA_ax_4_rpl : AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,tl :TIme·0(.lTA_B,i,tl) =? 
true /\ 0(lTAJpl,i, tl) 
Those axioms modified for the SAa activity are: 
vl_ax_l : AXIOM 
Vtl :TIme·3i:Occ·0(vl_we....PY,i,td ¢} 
3j: Occ· 0(lvl_stateV,j,td 
vCax_2: AXIOM 
Vi: Occ, tl : TIme· 0(lvl_stateV, i, td =? 
3t2: TIme· t2 + 1:S tl :S t2 + It/\ 0(Tv I_state V, i, t2) 
vl_ax_3: AXIOM 
Vi: Occ, tl, t2: TIme· 0(jvl_stateV, i, tl) /\ 0(lvl_stateV, i, t2) =? 
post_vote(tl, t2) 
IH_ax_ll' : AXIOM 
Vi: Occ, tl : TIme· 0(TIH_A,i,t2) 
3j: Occ,t2: TIme· 0(stim_clk4,j,t2) /\ 0(JlH_A,i,t2) V 
tl + 1:S t2 :S tl + It/\ 0(JlA_A, i,t2) 
IH_ax_14' : AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,tl : TIme· 0(JlH_A,i,tI} =? 
3j: Occ,t2: TIme· 0(stimJlk4,j,tl) V 
tl-It:S t2:S tl-I/\001H_A,i,t2) 
IH_ax_2' : AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,tl :TIme·0(JlH_A,i,td =? 
3j,k: Occ· 0(jlH_abandon_check,j,tl) 1\ 0(stimJlk4,k,tl) V 
0(jlH_watchdog,j, td /\ 0(stim_clk4,k, tI} 
IH_ax_18: AXIOM 
Vi: Occ, tl : TIme· 0(jlH_watchdog, i, tI} =? 
3t2: TIme· tl + 1:S t2 :S tl + It/\ 0(JlH_watchdog, i, t2) 
IH_ax_19: AXIOM 
Vi: Occ,tl : TIme· 0(JlH_watchdog,i,tI} =? 0(TIH_wait,i,tI} 
IH_ax_20: AXIOM 
Vi:Occ,tl : TIme· 0(jlH_wait,i,tI} =? 
3j: Occ,t2: TIme· 0(stimJlk4,j,t2) /\ 0(JlH_wait, i,(2) V 
0(stim""pB,j, t2) 1\ 0(JlH_wait, i,t2) 
186 
APPENDIX A. CASE STUDY SPECIFICATIONS 
IH_ax_21 : AXIOM 
Vi: Dcc, 11 : TIme . 0( VH _wail, i, 11) => 
3j,k: DCC,12: TIme· 0(1JH_abandon_check,j,t2)1\0(stim_clk4,Ie.tz) V 
0(1JH_lockJiring,j, (2) 1\ o (stim.J)B , Ie, (2) 
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Appendix B 
Axiomatic Soundness Proofs and 
Lemmas 
B.1 Soundness Conjectures 
The axiom schema's which define .Q are partitioned into the following families: Start-up; State Exit; State 
Entry; Progress and Stability axioms, following the state-machine axiomatisation in [Pay02J. 
Paynter also stated: 
The complexity of this schema derives from the fact that it defines the relationship bt'llIl'en 
the number of times the source state has been exited, and the number of times the target has 
been entered. This depends upon the number of transitions into the target state, and the fact 
that the guard and static semantics together ensllre that the source state will hare a single ('xiI 
transition. This information is static, and may be exploited when instantiating the schema for 
each pair of states which satisfy the guard to determine which clause of the schema applies. 
Exploiting this information when instantiating the schema is helpflll; tril'ial proofs abow the 
relationship between target and sOllrce indexes need not be repeated for each separate state-
machine specification. 
We therefore only select the interesting examples from this schema and show the resulting conje(;(un:, 
sound. Where possible, we cover the array of possibilities in different conjectures, instead of repeating the 
same justification for each proof. 
Note, the conditions in the square brackets at the top of the conjectures, are its guards. These are a~sumed 
known in the first step of each proof. Several auxiliary functions are used to aid presentation and are taken 
from the existing axiomatic semantic definitions. 
The following four functions define syntactic properties of state-machine,. and are used in the guards to 
the conjectures below. 
TransitionsOllt : State x Transition-set -> Transition-set 
TransitionsOw(s, ts) ~ {t I t E ts· t.src = s} 
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Transitionsln : State x Transition-set -> Transition-set 
Transitionsln(s, ts) ~ {t 1 t E ts· t.trg = s} 
Sucessors : State x State-set x Transition-set -+ State-set 
Sucessors(s, state, ts) ~ {s' Estates 13t E ts· t.src = s 1\ t.trg = s'} 
Predecessors : State x State-set x Transition-set -> State-set 
Predecessors(s, state, ts) ~ {s' Estates 13t E ts· t.src = s' 1\ Urg = s} 
The following four functions characterise whether a state has a single (SE) or multiple 1.\1 E) entry transi-
tions, and single (SX) or multiple (MX) exit transitions: 
SE, ME, SX, MX : State x State-set x Transition-set -> lE 
SE(s, state, ts) ~ #Predecessors(s, states, ts) = I 
ME(s, state,ts) ~ #Predecessors(s, states, ts) > 1 
SX(s,state,ts) ~#Sucessors(s,states,ts) = 1 
MX(s,state,ts) ~#Sucessors(s,states,ts) > 1 
B.1.1 Ax2:: Static State Exit 
[is_staticstate(s), s, E enabled(s,ts,tr), SE(s,states,ts)] 
P(1t) ~ Vtl E inds 1t. ].I- Ej 1t(td =} is, Ei 1t(tl) 
B.1.2 Ax3:: Dynamic State Exit 
[s = dynamic, s, E enabled(s,ts,tr), ME(s)] 
P(1t) ~ Vtl E inds1t].l- Ej 1t(tl) =} is, Ej 1t(tl) 
B.1.3 Ax4:: (Initial) State Entry 
[s = initial, MX(s,states,ts) , ME(s,states,ts), i> 1, Ss E Predecessors(s,states.ts)] 
P(1t) ~ Vtl E inds1t· is Ej 1t(tl) =} 3t2 E inds1t· ].I-s Ej 1t(12) 
B.1.4 Ax5:: State Entry 
[s # initial, sp E Predecessor(s, ts)] 
P(1t) ~ Vtl E inds1t· is Ej 1t(tl) =} ].I-p Ej 1t(tJ) 
B.1.S Ax6:: (Dynamic) State Progress 
[s = dynamic] 
P(1t) ~ Vt\ E inds 1t. is Ej 1t(t\) 1\ len 1t ~ t\ + II =} 312 E inds 1t. ].I- Ej 1t(1cIM2 -:; t\ + II 
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B.1.6 Ax7:: (Static) State Progress, Event Transition 
[s = static, label = event] 
P(1t) ~ Vtl E inds 1t -e E; 1t(tl) => Js E; 1t(tl) 
B.1.7 AxS:: (Static) State Progress, Timed Transition 
[s = static, label = timed] 
P(1t) ~ Vtl E inds 1t - Ts E; 1t(tl) A len 1t ~ tl + /I => 
:J t2 E inds 1t - Js E; 1t(t2) Alz :S tl + /I 
B.I.S Ax9:: (Dynamic) State Stability 
[s = dynamic] 
P(1t)~Vtl Einds1t- .].I'E;1t(tJ) => :Jtz Einds1t- TSE;n(lc)A 
tl-wcrt :S t2 :S tl-bcet 
B.1.9 AxlO:: (Static) State Stability, Event Transition 
[s = static, label = event] 
P(1t)~Vtl Einds1t-.].I'E;1t(tJ) => :Jt2Eindsn- TSE;n(t2)A 
tl -/I :S tz :S tl -I 
B.1.10 Axll:: (Static) State Stability, Timed Transition 
[s = static, label = timed] 
P(1t) ~ Vtl E inds1t- .].I' E; 1t(tJ) => e E n(ld 
B.I.11 Ax12:: Stop States 
[s = static] 
P(n) ~ Vtl E inds 1t - term E n(len 1t) => ....,.].1' E; n(tl) 
B.2 Top Level Soundness Proofs 
B.2.1 Ax2 
As Ax3 
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B.2.2 Ax3 
PROOF (Ax3) 
from rtn: RTN; 0': l:; 1t: finn; 
inds 1t : N-set 
2 from t: NJ; t E inds res]; If E [es](t) 
2.1 -, .Is E [es](t) 
infer t E inds res] .Is Ej [es](t) => ls's Ei [es](t) 
3 Vt E inds res]· .Is Ei [es](t) => ls's Ej [es](t) 
4 P([esJ) 
5 from P(:It'); s: ES; inv-firtn(:It'r+ [sJ) 
5.1 from~ Einds:lt'sconc[s]; .lsEi:lt'r+[S]{~) 
infer ls's Ej 1t,r+ [s] (~ ) 
infer ~ E inds1t'sconc[s]· .Is Ei:lt' r+ [s](~) => ls's Ej:lt' r+ [s](~) 
6 V~ E inds:lt'sconc[s]· .Is Ei:lt' r+ [s](~) => ls's Ej:lt' r+ [s](~) 
7 P(1t'r+[sJ) 
infer V1t : firm' P( 1t) 
I non-zero I is E 1t(t) 
-, .Is E 1t(t) 
I exit-enter-succ I 
t:N J ; O':l:; 1t:finn; 
(mk_tr(s, ss), 0', 1t( 1, ... , t)) .!!-. true; 
.Is E 1t(t) 
iss E 1t(t) 
B.2.3 Ax4 
inds-fonn(h3 ) 
non-zero(2.h3) 
=>-1-righl-vac(2.1) 
'v'-I-sel( 1.2) 
folding(3) 
exil-enler-succ(5.I.h I) 
=>-1(5.l.h 1,5.1) 
'v'-I-sel(l.5) 
folding(6) 
nnn-indn(4.7) 
• 
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PROOF (Ax4) 
from rtn: RTN; cr: E; x: llnn; S = initial =* i> 1 
inds X : N'-set 
2 fromt:N'l; tEinds[es]; tvE;[es](t) 
2.1 i = 1 
infer .lsp Ej [es](t) 
3 t E inds res]· is E; [es](t) =*.lsp Ej [es](t) 
4 Vt E inds res]· .Is E; [es](t) =* ls"s Ej [es](t) 
5 P([es]) 
6 from P(1t'); s: ES; inv-llnn(1t' n. [s]); l' E inds1t' n. [s] 
6.1 from is E; 1t' n. [s](l) 
infer .Iss E; 1t' n. [s](t') 
infer tv E; 1t' n. [s](t') =* ls"s Ei 1t' n. [s](t') 
7 '<It' E inds 1t'sconc[s]· is E; 1t' n. [s](t') =* ls"s E; 1t' n. [s](t' 
8 P(1t' n. [s]) 
infer Vx: llrtn· P(x) 
B.2.4 AxS 
PROOF (Ax5) 
from rtn: RTN; cr: E; x: llnn; s # initial =* i> 1 
1 inds x : N'-set 
2 from t: N 1; t E inds [es]; is E; [es](t) 
2.1 i = 1 
infer .lsp E; [es](t) 
3 t E inds res]· is E; [es](t) =* ls"p E; [es](t) 
4 Vt E inds res]· .Is E; [es](t) =* ls"s Ej [es](t) 
5 P([es]) 
6 from P(1t'); s: ES; inv-llnn(1t' n. [s]); l' E inds1t' n. [s] 
6.1 from is E i 1t' n. [s]( 1') 
infer ls"s E; 1t' n. [s](t') 
infer ls" E; 1t' n. [s](t') =*.lss E; 1t' n. [s](t') 
7 '<It' E inds 1t'sconc[s]· is E; 1t' n. [s] (1') =* ls"s E; 1t' n. [s](t' 
8 P(1t' n. [s]) 
infer Vx : llrtn . P( x) 
inds-fonn(h3) 
occ-once(2.h2) 
contradiction(M,2.1) 
=>-1(2.h2,2) 
V'-I-set( I ,3) 
folding(4) 
enter-exit-pred(6.I.h I) 
=>-1(6.l.h 1.6.1) 
V'-I-set( 1 ,6) 
folding(7) 
llnn-indn(5,8) 
• 
inds-fonn(h3) 
occ-once(2.h2) 
contradiction(M,2.1) 
=>-I(2.h2,2) 
V'-I-set( 1 ,3) 
folding(4) 
enter-exit-pred(6.I.h 1) 
=>-1(6.l.h 1,6.1) 
V'-I-set(1,6) 
folding(7) 
llnn-indn(5,8) 
• 
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I occ-once I 
t,i:H1; s:ES; e:Event; 
t E inds [sJ· e Ei [s](t) 
i= 1 
I enter-exit-pred I 
t:N"l; cr:L; 1t:Ilnn ; 
(mk_tr(sp, s), cr, 1t(I, ... , t)) l!.. true; 
tr E 1t(t) 
j.l-p E 1t(t) 
B.2.5 Ax6 
done in main body of thesis 
B.2.6 Ax8 
as Ax6 
B.2.7 Ax9 
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PROOF (AX9) 
from rtn : RTN; 0': E; 1t: TIrln 
inds 1t: N ,-set inds-fonn(h3) 
2 res] :TIrln ?-fonn 
3 from t, E inds res]; .Is E; [es](t!) 
3.1 31" E inds res]· ls E;[es](1") At" < tl exit-=>-enter() 
3.2 ..., .Is E; [es](t!) 
infer 3 t2 E inds res]· ls E; res] (t2) A tl-wert :$ t2 :$ t,-beet contradictionO 
4 tl E inds res]· .Is E; [es](t!) => 3t2 E inds res]· ls E; [es](t2) At,-wert:$ t2 :$ t)-beet =>-1(3.hl,3.h2,3) 
5 Vt, E inds res]· .Is E; [es](tl) => 3t2 E inds res]· ls E; [es](t2) At,-wert:$ t2:$ t)-beet 'v'-I-set(l,4) 
6 P([es]) folding(5) 
7 from P(1t'); s: ES; inv-TIrln (1t' '" Is]); 
~ E inds1t'''' [s]; J.y E; 1t''''[s](~) 
7.1 3 t" E inds 1t' '" Is], ts E; 1t' '" [s](1") A 1" < ~ exit-=>-enter(7.h4,7.h5) 
7.2 from ti E inds1t'" [s]; ls E; 1t''''[s](ti) Ati < ~ 
7.2.1 ~ -wert :$ ti :$ ~ -beet prem-??? 
A-I(7.2.h2,7.2.1) 
7.3 
infer ts E; 1t' '" [s] (ti) A ~ -wert :$ ti :$ ~ -beet 
ts E; 1t' '" [s](ti) A ~ -wert :$ ti :$ ~ -beet 3-E(7.1,7.2.hl.7.2.h2.7.2) 
infer 3 ti E inds 1t' '" Is], ls E; 1t' '" [s](ti) A ~ -wert :$ ti :$ ~ -beet 
8 ~ Einds1t''''[s]· .lsE;1t''''[s](~) => 3ti Einds1t"'[s]. lsE;1t"'[s](ti)A 
~ -wert :$ ti :$ ~ -beet 
9 V~ Einds1t''''[s]·.lsE;1t''''[S](~) => 3tiEinds7t"'[s]'lsE;7t"'[s](ti)A 
10 P(1t' '" Is]) 
infer V7t : TI rln • P( 1t) 
t, i: N); 7t: TIrln ; 
. I t E inds 7t. J.y E; 7t(t) 
B.2.8 AxlO 
asAx9 
B.3 Additional Lemmas 
~ a:A,s:A* 
len-
len s'" [a] = sllee(len s) 
~ -wert :$ ti :$ ~ -beet 
3-1-set(7.3) 
=>-1(7.h4. 7 .h5. 7) 
'v'-I-set(7.h4.8) 
folding(9) 
TIrln-indn(6,1O) 
• 
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PROOF (LEN-~) 
from a:A,s:A* 
infer lens~ [aJ = succ(lens) 
PROOF (=-V-{ }-I) 
from a:N; b:N; a = b 
O:N 
2 a+O= a 
3 a+O= b 
4 3k:N·a+k=b 
infer a 2': b 
s:A-set I =-v-{}-I I s = 0 V s;6 0 
PROOF (=-v-O-I) 
from s : A -set 
1 {} :A-set 
2 ~(s= 0) 
infer s = {} V s ;6 {} 
a:N,b:N,a - b 
L..--v_-=.2:--," a 2': b 
• 
O-fonn 
+-defn-O-right(h I) 
=-subs-right(b )(h l,h3,2) 
3-1(1,3) 
folding(4) 
• 
{}-form 
0-=- I(h 1.1) 
unfolding(2) 
• 
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VDM Tool support for SOS definitions 
In this Appendix, we present the full VDM-SL model which defines the abstract syntax on which our SOS 
rules are specified. In an attempt to syntax and type check these rules we specify each SOS rule as an 
implicit VDM-SL functions [ABV94j and examine the implementation consideration, that a concurrent. 
non-deterministic model pose. 
C.I Abstract Syntax 
types 
17.0 Id = token; 
18.0 Var = token; 
19.0 Expr = token; 
20.0 Event = token; 
21.0 Fault = LATE _EXIT; 
22.0 Bounds: : beet: N 
.1 bert:N 
.2 weet:N; 
23.0 Port::id:1d 
.1 dir: IN lOUT: 
24.0 Time Bound :: IOlrer: N 
.1 upper:N; 
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25.0 Label = TzmeBound I Event I Expr I Fault; 
26.0 Static-State: : id : Jd; 
27.0 Operation:: id: Id 
.1 read-vars: Var-set 
.2 written-vars: Var-set 
.3 input-parameter: [Id] 
.4 output-result: [Id] 
.5 preC:Expr 
.6 postC: Expr; 
28.0 Dynamic-State: : id: Id 
.I ops: Operation-set 
.2 bounds: Bounds; 
29.0 State = Static-State I Dynamic-State; 
30.0 Transition:: src: Id 
.1 trg:Id 
.2 I: Label; 
31.0 SM : : ss : State-set 
.I ts: Transition-set 
.2 initial: Id; 
32.0 Activity: : input-ports: Port-set 
.I output-ports: Port-set 
.2 local-state: Id .!!!... Var 
.3 ops: Operation-set 
.4 sm:SM; 
33.0 IDA ::id: Id 
.I size: N 
.2 protocol: POOL I CHAN I SIGNAL; 
34.0 Connection: : act-id: Id 
.I port-id:Id 
.2 ida-id:Id 
.3 dir: IN lOUT; 
35.0 rtn-spec = token; 
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36.0 RTN: : acts: Activity-set 
.1 idas: IDA-set 
.2 net: rtn-spec; 
C.2 Context Conditions 
C.2.t Auxiliary Objects 
We need an object to record the static information about the given real time network: 
37.0 RTN-Types = Id ~ (Actirit\· I IDA I Connection); 
C.3 (Normative) Semantics 
What follows are two presentations of (hopefully) the same semantics. In our attempt to define an SOS 
semantics in the Plotkin Style, we give side-by-side to each rule a YD~l function which (in the lea't) ') nt;lx 
& type checks our rules. 
C.3.1 Semantic Objects 
Dynamic information I about RTN components are stored in: 
38.0 = Id ~ (port I ida I act I dySt); 
and the history of a RTN 
39.0 = (Event-set)'; 
The (dynamic) RTN components we consider are: 
40.0 port = Var; 
41.0 ida::ls:Var'; 
42.0 act: : cs: Id 
.1 Is:ld~Var 
, staWs: INIT I WAlT _RO I WAIT_WE I WAIT _ TR IINSS IINOS I TERM I FAULT; 
4.1.0 dySt: : ops: Id' 
Note, the dom r. C dom RTN-Types in that for all components with dynamic properties (port, IDAs, Activi-
ties & Dynamic States) in RTN-Types their dynamic properties are in L It is envisaged some initialisation 
rulce would define this. 
I Static information can be obtained from RTN-T\'pes 
'It is not clear currently \\ hat this would look like 
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C.3.2 Auxiliary Functions 
insfO detennines whether an id of an Activity. A component is a state. 
functions 
44.0 insf:Activity x Id -+ INSS IINOS 
.1 ins! (A, id) Q 
.2 let s E A.sm.ss be st 
.3 s.id = id in 
.4 if isjs,Dynamic-State) 
.5 then INOS 
.6 else INSS; 
The following three auxiliary functions are required to convert a set of Operation to a sequence of Operation 
ids ... 
45.0 getOplds: Operation-set -+ Id' 
.1 getOplds(opset) Q 
.2 let ops = set2seq[Operation] (opset) in 
.3 [ops(i).id liE inds ops]; 
46.0 set2seq[@elem]: (@elem-set) -+ (@elem') 
.1 set2seq(s) Q 
.2 seqBuilder[@elem] (s, 0); 
47.0 seqBuilder[@elem]: (@elem-set) x (@elem*) -+ (@elem') 
.1 seqBuilder(s,sq) Q 
.2 its = {} 
.3 then sq 
.4 else let x E sin 
.5 seqBuilder[@elem](s\ {x}, [xJf''\. sq); 
C.3.3 Semantic Rules 
The types of the required relations are 
~ : ((RTN-Types x E x TI) x (E x TI)) 
Other semantic (transition) relations defined are: 
.!!!. : ((RTN-Types x E x TI) x (E x TI)) 
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~ :((RTN-Types x 1: x n) x (1: x n)) 
~ : ((Port x 1:) x Val) 
~ : ((Expr x 1:) x JR) 
The relations above wiII form the function signatures for the VDM functions. for example: 
48.0 ..!..... : RTN -Types x 1: x n x 1: x n --+ JR 
C.3.3.1 Auxiliary Semantic Functions 
49.0 expr: Expr x Id.!!!... Var --+ JR 
.1 expr(e,ls) ~ 
.2 is not yet specified; 
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C.3.3.2 Operations 
The meaning of a single operation is defined with four rules, depending on whether the operation reads, 
writes, does both or neither: 
Reads, not Write 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E doma\ 
a\ (a) = mk_act(cs, ls, INDS) 
a\ (cs).ops i= [J 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id,rd, we, in"'p, Ollt...p, pre, post) E elemss.ops /\ hdal (cs).ops = id 
in"'p i= nil,out...p = nil 
(in"'p, RTN, ad!!!.. v 
Is' = Is t{ in"'p f-+ v} 
(pre, Is) ~ true 
(post, Is') ~ true 
I dySt-op-rd I (RTN,a\, ret) ~ (a\ t{cs f-+ tlal (cs).ops,a f-+ mk_act{cs,ls', INDS)}, {rd{in...pH) 
YDM Function: 
50.0 dySt-op-rd(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:Ja 
.1 pre let a E dom be st is) (a) , act) in 
.2 let mk-act (cs, Is, INDS) = (a) in 
.3 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p,ollt-p,preC,postC) E RTN {a).ops be sl 
.4 (cs).ops i= 0/\ 
.5 hd (cs).ops = id /\ 
.6 in-p i= nil /\ 
.7 out-p = nil in 
.8 let inp E RTN (a). input-ports be st 
.9 inp.id = in-p in 
.10 let Is' = (a).lst{inp.idf-+ rdport(inp,)} in 
.11 e.xpr(preC,ls) /\ e.xpr(postC, Is') 
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.12 post let a E dom be 51 
.13 ((a).cs).ops # 0 in 
.14 leI op E RTN(a).opSbe 51 
.15 hd ((a).cs).ops = op.id /\ 
.16 op.input-parameter # nil in 
.17 leI inp E RTN (a).input-ports be 51 
.18 inp.id = op.input-parameterin 
.19 leI Is' :Id ~ Varbe st 
.20 Is' = (a ).Is t{inp.id 1-+ rdport (inp,)) /\ 
.21 expr(op.preC, (a).ls) /\ 
.22 expr(op.postC,Is') in 
.23 leI mk-act(cs,ls,INDS) = (a) in 
.24 = t{cs 1-+ II (cs).ops,a 1-+ mk-act(cs,ls', INDS)} /\ 
.25 = r+[{mk-Ioken(nrd(in""p)n)}]; 
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Reads and Writes 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domo, 
0\ (a) = mCact(cs,IS,INDS) 
0\ (cs).ops:l [] 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id,rd, we, in..jJ, out..jJ,pre,post) E elem5s.ops /\ hdo, (cs).ops = id 
in..jJ:I nil,out..jJ:I nil 
(in-p,RTN,ot}!!!.. v 
Is' = Is t {in-p l-+ v} 
(pre,ls) ~ true 
(out-p, v',Is') ~ Is" 
(post, Is") ~ true 
I dySt-op-rdwe I (RTN, 0" 1t,) ~ (0, t {cs l-+ tl 0, (cs).ops, a 1--+ mk_act(cs, Is", INDS)}, {rd(in..jJ) , we (01lt..jJ )} ) 
51.0 dySt-op-rdwe(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:lR 
.J pre let a E dom be 5t i5_( (a), act) in 
.2 let mk-act (cs, ls, INDS) = (a) in 
.3 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p, out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be 51 
.4 (cs).ops:l 0/\ 
.5 hd (cs).ops = id /\ 
.6 in-p :I nil /\ 
.7 out-p :I nil in 
.8 let inp E RTN (a) .input-ports be 5t 
.9 inp.id = in-p in 
.10 letts' = (a).ls t {inp.id l-+ rdport(inp,)} in 
.11 expr(preC,ls)/\ 
.12 let outpERTN(a).outpllt-portsbe5t 
.13 outp.id = out-p in 
.14 let Is" : Id.!!!.. Var in 
.15 3v: Var' 
.16 Is" = (a).1s t Is' t{ outp.id l-+ weport(olltp, v,)} /\ 
.17 expr(postC,Is") 
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.18 post let a E cIom be st 
.19 «a).cs).opsfDin 
.20 let op E RTN(a).opsbe st 
.21 hd «a).cs).ops = op.id /\ 
.22 op.input-parameter f nil /\ 
.23 op.output-result f nil in 
.24 let inpERTN(a).input-ponsbest 
.25 inp.id = op.input-parameterin 
.26 let Is': Jd ~ Var be st 
.27 Is' = (a).lst{inp.id f-+ rdpon{inp,)} /\ 
.28 expr(op.preC, (a).ls) in 
.29 let outp E RTN (a).output-ponsbe st 
.30 outp.id = op.output-result in 
.31 let Is": Jd ~ Var be st 
.32 3v: Var· 
.33 Is" = (a).ls t Is' t{ olltp.id f-+ wepon(outp, v,)} /\ 
.34 expr(op.postC,Is") in 
.35 let mk-act(cs,ls,INDS) = (a) in 
.36 = t{cs f-+ tl (cs).ops,a f-+ mk-act (cs, Is", INDS)} /\ 
.37 = 0[{mk-token (n rd(in-p) n),mk-token ("we(ollt-P) ")}] ; 
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No Read, but Write 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domCJt 
CJt (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, INDS) 
CJt (cs).ops =1= [] 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id,rd, we,in...]J,oucp,pre,post) E etemss.opsi\hdCJI (cs).ops = id 
in...]J = nil, out...]J =1= nil 
(out...]J, v',ls) ~ Is' 
(post,ls') ~ true 
I dySt-op-we I (RTN,CJt, 1[t) ~ (CJt t{ cs ~ IICJI (cs).ops,a 0--. mk_act(cs,Is', INDS)}, {we(ollt...]J)}) 
52.0 dySt-op-we(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r: lR 
.1 pre leI a E dom be sl isj (a),act) in 
.2 lelmk-act(cs,ls,INDS) = (a) in 
.3 let mk-Operation(id,read, we,in-p,ollt-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be sl 
.4 (cs).ops =1= 0 i\ 
.5 hd (cs).ops = id i\ 
.6 in-p = nil 1\ 
.7 Ollt-p =1= nil in 
.8 leI outp E RTN (a) .outpllt-pOrtS be sl 
.9 outp.id = out-p in 
.10 lells' : Id .!!!... Var in 
.II 3v: Var· 
.12 ls'= (a).lst{outp.id~weport(outp,v,Hi\ 
.13 expr(postC,Is') 
.14 post leI a E dom be sl 
.15 «a).cs).ops =1= 0 in 
.16 let op E RTN (a) .ops be sl 
.17 hd «a).cs).ops = op.id 1\ 
.18 op.input-parameter = nil 1\ 
.19 op.output-result =1= nil in 
.20 let outp E RTN (a) .output-ports be st 
.21 outp.id = op.output-result in 
.22 let Is': Id .!!!... Var be st 
.23 3v: Var· 
.24 Is' = (a).lst{outp.id ~ weport(outp, \'.)} 1\ 
.25 expr(op.postC,Is') in 
.26 letmk-act(cs,ls,INDS) = (a) in 
.27 = t{cs ~ II (cs).ops,a ~ mk-act(cs,ls', INDS)} 1\ 
.28 = n.[{mk-token(nwe(out...]J)nH]; 
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Neither Reads, nor Write 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domol 
ol(a) = mk_act(cs, Is, INDS) 
01 (cs).ops =J [] 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id,rd, we,in""p,out""p,pre,post) E elemss.opsAhdOI (cs).ops = id 
in""p = nil,out....p = nil 
(pre, Is) .!...,. true 
(post, Is) .!...,. true ~ s (RTN,OI,1tt) ---> (01 t{ CS I---> UOI (cs).ops}, {}) 
53.0 dySt-op(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:lR 
.1 pre let a E dom be st is) (a),act) in 
.2 letmk-act(cs,ls,INDS) = (a) in 
.3 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p,out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops in 
.4 (cs).ops =J [] A 
.5 hd (cs).ops = id A 
.6 in-p = nil A 
.7 out-p = nil 
.8 post let a E dom be st 
.9 «a).cs).ops =J [] in 
.10 let opERTN(a).opsbest 
.11 hd «a).cs).ops = op.id A 
.12 op.input-parameter = nil A 
.13 op.output-result = nil in 
.14 let mk-act (cs, Is, INDS) = (a) in 
.15 = t{cs I---> U (cs).ops, a I---> mk-act (cs, Is, INDS)} A 
.16 = f\.[{}] ; 
C.3.3.3 States 
Initial States 
Associated operations and events of states are evaluated once a state is entered, therefore the semantics for 
the initial state are simply to enter the state. 
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Static State 
Plotkin Rule: 
a Edemcr, 
crt (a) = mk_actL_,INIT) 
~ uact= mk_act(RTN(a).sm.initial,RTN(a).local-state, WAIT_TR) 
s (RTN,cr" 'Tt,) --+ (cr, t{a I-> uact}, { lRTN(a).sm.initial}) 
VDM Function: 
54.0 InitSSt(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:, :,:) r:1B 
.1 pre let a E dom in 
.2 isj (a), act) /\ 
.3 (a).status = INIT 
.4 post let a E dom be st 
.5 is_( (a), act) /\ 
.6 (a).status = [NIT in 
.7 let uact = mk-act(RTN (a).sm.initial, 
.8 RTN(a).local-state, 
.9 WAIT_TR) in 
.\0 = t{a I-> uact} /\ 
.11 = ""[mk-token(nup_RTN(a).sm.initial n )] ; 
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Dynamic State 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E OOmcrl 
crl (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, INIT) 
uact = mk_act(RTN(a).sm.initial,RTN{a).local-state, INDS) 
mk_DynamicState(id,ops,J E RTN(a).sm.ss/\id = cs 
trgs mk dySt([op I op E ops)) I dySt-init I s (RTN,crl,1tI) ---- (crl t{af->uact,RTN(a).sm.initiah-+trgs}, 
{ rRTN(a).sm.initial}) 
VOM Function: 
55.0 InitDySt(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:B 
.1 pre let a E OOm in 
.2 id(a),act)/\ 
.3 (a).status = INIT 
.4 post let a E dom be st 
.5 id (a), act) /\ 
.6 (a).staws = INIT in 
.7 let uact = mk-act(RTN (a).sm.initial, 
.8 RTN (a).local-state, 
.9 INDS) in 
.10 = t{a f-> uact} /\ 
.II = (""\.[mk_token(nup_RTN{a).sm.initial")]; 
Static States 
Static states are effectively wait states, therefore the semantics simply evaluate an exit transition. 
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Dynamic States 
A dynamic state may optionally read an input value, and/or write a result to an associated port as specified 
in the abstract syntax. This behaviour is dealt with at the operation level, rather here we define the dynamic 
behaviour as such: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domcrt 
crt (a) = mk_aet(es,ls, INDS) 
crt (es).ops = {} 
uaet = mk_aet(es,ls, WAIT_TR) [§J s (RTN,crl, 1t1) --+ (crl t{a 1-+ uaet}, {}) 
YDM Function: 
56.0 DynSt(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:lE 
.1 pre let a E dom in 
.2 isj (a), act) /\ 
.3 ((a).es).ops = [] 
.4 post let a E dom be st 
.5 is_((a),aet)/\ 
.6 ((a).es).ops = [] in 
.7 let = t{a 1-+ mk-aet( (a).es, (a).ls, WAIT_TR)} in 
.8 let mk-Dynamie-State (id, ops, mk-Bounds(beet, bert, weet)) E RTN (a ).sm.ss be st 
.9 id= (a).esin 
.10 strans (RTN " " ) /\ 
.11 :3 t I , t2 E inds . 
.12 tl + beet::; t2/\ 
.13 t2::; tl + weet /\ 
.14 mk-token("up_es")E (tl)/\ 
.15 mk-token ("dwn_es") E (t2) ; 
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Terminate State 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E dorn<1\ 
is_( <1\ (a), act) 
~tr E RTN(a).sm.ts· tr.src = <1\ (a).cs 
~ s (RTN,<1\, 'It\) -+ (<1\ t{a 1-+ mk_act(<1\ (a).cs,<1\ (a).Is, TERM)}, {}) 
VDM Function: 
57.0 Term(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:B 
.I pre let a E dorn be st isj (a), act) in 
.2 -dtrERTN(a).sm.ts·tr.src= (a).cs 
.3 post let a E dorn be st 
.4 is_((a),act)/\ 
.5 (...,3tr E RTN(a).sm.ts·tr.src = (a).cs) in 
.6 letrnk-act(cs,ls,INDS) = (a) in 
.7 =t{al-+rnk-act(cs,ls,TERM)}/\ 
.8 = "'[{}] ; 
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C.3.3.4 Transitions 
A YDM 'header' function for the distinction below is: 
58.0 tr-trans(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:lIi 
.1 poststr-trans(RTN",,) V dtr-trans(RTN",,) ; 
Depending on whether the target state is static, or dynamic: 
For Dynamic 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domcrl 
crl (a) = mk_act(cs,Is, WAIT_TR) 
tr E RTN(a).sm.ts 
(tr, crl, 1t1) ~ true 
mk_Dynamic _State (id" mk_Bounds( bcet, bcrt, wcet)) E RTN (a) .sm.ss /\ id = CS 
3tl E inds 1t1 . ~s Ei 1t1 (t.) /'Itl +bcet:::; len 1t1 < tl + wcet 
~t2 E inds1t1 . t2 ~ tl/\ lcs EHI 1t1 (t2) 
ins( crl (tr.trg)) = INDS 
uact = mk_act(tr.trg,Is,INDS) 
~ trgs = mk_dySt([op I op E s.ops·s E RTN(a).sm.ss/\s.id = tr.trg]) tr-dySt s } (RTN,cr\, 1t.) --> (cr\ t{a f-+ uact,tr.trg I-Hrgs}, { jtr.src, ltr.trg ) 
YDM Function: 
59.0 dtr-trans(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:lIi 
.I pre let a E dom in 
.2 let mk-act(cs,Is, WAIT_TR) = (a) in 
.3 insf(RTN(a),cs) = INDS/\ 
.4 3tr E RTN (a).sm.ts· str(tr,,) 
.5 post let a E dom be st 
.6 mk-act( (a).cs, (a).Is, WAIT_TR) = (a) /\ 
.7 insf(RTN (a), (a).cs) = INDS in 
.8 let trERTN(a).sm.tsbest str(tr,,) in 
.9 let uact = mk-act(tr.trg, (a).Is, INDS) in 
.10 let s E RTN (a).sm.ss be st s.id = tr.trg in 
.II let trgs = mk-dySt(getOplds(s.ops)) in 
.12 = t{a f-+ uact,tr.trg f-+ trgs} /\ 
.13 = "'[{ mk-token (ndwn_tr.src"),mk-token (nup_tr.trg"))] ; 
For Static 
Plotkin Rule: 
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aEdomO'I 
0'1 (a) = mk_aet(es,/s. WAIT _ TR) 
tr E RTN(a).sm.ts 
(tr, 0'1, 1td .!!.., true 
mk_Dynamie_State(id,. mk_Bollnds(beet. ben. IICer)) E RTN(a).sm.ss Aid = cs 
:Jtl E inds 1t1 'rs Ej 1tdtd /\ ~t2 E inds 1t1 ·t2?' tl /\ h Ei+1 :til (2) /\ 
tl + beet:S len1t1 < tl + weet 
ins(O'I (tr.trg» = INSS 
/tact = mk_aet(tr.trg, Is, WAIT _ TR) ~ s (RTN, 0'1, 1td --> (0'1 t{ a 1--+ lIaet}, { Jtr.sre. ltr.trg} ) 
YOM Function: 
60.0 str-trans(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r: B 
.1 pre let a E dam in 
.2 let mk-aet(cs,Is, WAIT_TR)= (a) in 
.3 insJ(RTN(a),es)=INSS/\ 
.4 :J tr E RTN (a) .sm.ts· str (tr,,) 
.5 post let a E dam be st 
.6 mk-aet((a).es,(a).ls,WAIT_TR)= (a)/\ 
.7 insJ(RTN(a), (a).es) = INSS in 
.8 let trERTN(a).sm.tsbest str(tr,,) in 
.9 let /tact = mk-aet(tr.trg, (a).ls, WAIT_TR) in 
.10 = t{ a 1--+ lIact} /\ 
.11 = (\,[{mk-token ("dwn_tr.src"),mk-token ("lIp_tr.trg")}] ; 
Three rules totally define the semantics of a transition for the rule: 
..!.... :((Transition x 1: x D) x B) 
YOM 'header' function for this relation is: 
61.0 str (tr: Transition,:,:) r: B 
.1 post tt-tr (tr, , ) V el'-tr (tr,,) V expr-tr (tr.,) ; 
Time Triggered Transition 
Plotkin Rule: 
is_(tr.l. TimeBOllnd) 
:J tl E inds 1t1' lsre Ej 1t1 (tl) /\ 1.lower :S len 1t1-tl :S I.llpper 
~ t2 E inds 1t1' Jtrg Ej 1t1 (t2) /\ I.llpper < len 1t\-t2 :S 1.lower 
§] (mk_transition(src. lrg.l). O'\.1td .!!.., true 
YOM Function: 
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62.0 n-tr(tr: Transition,:,:) r: 18 
.J pre is_(tr.l, 1imeBound) /\ 
.2 (3tl E inds . 
. 3 mk-token("up_tr.srcn ) E (tl)/\ 
.4 tr.l.lower ~ (len) - tl /\ 
.5 (len) - tl ~ tr.l.upper) /\ 
.6 (...,312 E inds . 
. 7 mk-token("dwn_tr.trg n ) E (t2)/\ 
.8 tr.l.lower ~ (len) - 12 /\ 
.9 (len) - 12 ~ tr.l.upper) 
.10 post true ; 
Event Triggered Transition 
Plotkin Rule: 
is_(tr.l, Event) 
3 t\, t2 E inds 1t\. lsrc Ej 1t\ (td /\ tr.1 E 1t( (t2) /\t2 ~ t( ~ ) Ir (mk_transition(src,trg,/),cr(,1t( ~ true 
YDM Function: 
63.0 ev-tr (tr: Transition, :, :) r: 18 
.J pre isjtr.I,Event) /\ 
.2 3tl,t2 E inds . 
.3 mk-token (nup_tr.src") E (tl) /\ 
.4 tr.1 E (t2) /\ 
.5 t2 ~ tl 
.6 post true ; 
Expression Triggered Transition 
Plotkin Rule: 
~ Ir (mk_transition(src,trg,/),cr\,1td ~ true 
is_(l, Expression) 
(I, cr() ~ true 
YDM Function: 
64.0 expr-tr (tr: Transition, :, :) r: 18 
.\ pre isjtr.I,Expr) /\ 
.2 expr(tr.l,) 
.3 post true ; 
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C.3.3.5 Ports 
In light of defining the operation semantic rules, it is clear that we must address the semantics of ports. 
Ports are the interface between Activities and IDAs. An IDA has two ports. 
We must give the semantics here for an activity reading & writing to a port in terms of the local variables 
used with an operation definition and the value of the port. Later, we must ensure (consistency condition?) 
that the time and values written and read are consistent with those with the IDA. 
Plotkin Rule: 
dir= IN 
::Ii E domo·o(i) = id 
~ ro . (mk]ort(id, dir) , 0) --+ 0(/) 
YDM Function: 
65.0 rdport(p: Port,:) r: Var 
.1 pre p.dir = IN A 
.2 3iEdom·i=p.id 
.3 post let i E dom be st i = p.id A 
.4 p.dir = IN in 
.5 r = (i) ; 
Plotkin Rule: 
o(p).dir = OUT ~ (p ) we t{P } ,v,o --+0 ...... v 
YDM Function: 
66.0 weport (p: Port, v: Var, :) : 
.1 pre p.dir= OUT 
.2 post = t{p.id ...... v} ; 
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C.3.3.6 IDAs 
Pool 
Read 
Plotkin Rule: 
a,c,i E domO"\ 
0"\ (i) =mk_ida(vals) 
RTN(i).protocol = POOL 
0"\ (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, WAIT_RO) 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_op(id, rd, we, in-p,out'p,pre,post) E s.ops 1\ hdO"(cs).ops = id 
in-p i- nil 
RTN(c) = mk_Conn(a, in-p, i, IN) 
uact = mk_act(cs,ls,ins!(RTN(a),cs) ~ s (RTN, 0"\, 1t\) --+ (0"\ t {p 1-+ 0"\ (i),a 1-+ IWCt} , {rd(in"'p)}) 
YDM Function: 
67.0 rd-Pool(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:Ja 
.1 pre let i E dam be st is-ida ( (i)) 1\ 
.2 RTN (i).protocol = POOL in 
.3 leta E dam in 
.4 let mk-act(cs, Is, WAIT_RO) = (a) in 
.5 let s E RTN (a).sm.ss be st s.id = cs in 
.6 let op E s.ops be st op.input-parameter i- nil in 
.7 let c Edam RTN in 
.8 RTN (c) = mk-Connection (a,op.inpllt-parameter, i, IN) 
.9 post let i E dam be st is-ida ((i)) 1\ 
.10 RTN (i).protocol = POOL in 
.11 let a E dam in 
.12 let mk-act(cs,ls, WAIT_RO) = (a) in 
.13 let sERTN(a).sm.sSbest s.id=csin 
.14 let op E s.ops be st hd (cs).ops = op.id 1\ 
.15 op.input-parameter i- nil in 
.16 let c Edam RTN be st RTN (c) = mk-Connection (a,op.inpllt-parameter,i.IN) in 
.17 let uact = mk-act (cs, Is, ins! (RTN (a),cs)) in 
.18 = t{op.inpm-parameterl-+ (i),a 1-+ IWCt} 1\ 
.19 = ("\.[{mk-taken(nnCinput-parameter")}] ; 
Write 
Plotkin Rule: 
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a,c,i E dom<J1 
<JI (i) = mkjDA{vals) 
RTN{i).protocol = POOL 
<J1{a) = mk_ACT{cs,ls, WAIT_WE) 
s E RTN{a).sm.ss 
mk_op{id,rd, we,in..]J,out..]J,pre,post) E s.ops "hd<J1 (cs).ops = id 
out..]J=I nil 
RTN{c) = mk_Conn{a,RTN{cs).out..]J,i,OUT) 
uact- mk ACT{cs,ls,ins{RTN{cs)) I we-Pool I , 
VDM Function: 
68.0 we-Pool {RTN : RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:$ 
.1 pre let i E dom be st is-ida ({i) ) " 
.2 RTN (i).protocol = POOL in 
.3 let a E dom in 
.4 let mk-act{cs,ls, WAIT_WE) = (a) in 
.5 let s E RTN (a).sm.ss be st s.id = cs in 
.6 let op E s.ops be st op.output-result =I nil in 
.7 let c E dom RTN in 
.8 RTN (c) = mk-Connection (a, op.output-result, i, OUT) 
.9 post let i E dom be st is-ida ({i)) " 
.10 RTN (i) .protocol = POOL in 
.11 leta E dom in 
.12 let mk-act{cs, Is, WAIT_WE) = (a) in 
.13 let sERTN{a).sm.ssbest s.id=csin 
.14 let op E s.ops be st op.output-result =I nil in 
.15 let c E dom RTN be st RTN (c) = mk-Connection (a,op.output-reslllt, i, OUT) in 
.16 let /lact = mk-act{cs,ls, ins! {RTN (a),cs)) in 
.17 = t{op.output-result >-> (i),a>-> uact} " 
.18 = f+[{ mk-token (nwe_outputJesultn)} 1 ; 
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Channel 
Read 
Plotkin Rule: 
a,e,i E domOI 
01 (i) = mkjDA(vals) 
RTN(i) = mkjDA (id, size, CHANNEL) 
lenvals> 0 
01 (a) = mk...ACI'(es,ls, WAIT_RD) 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_op(id, rd, we, in-p,out-p,pre,post) E s.ops 1\ hdol (es).ops = id 
in-p =f nil 
RTN(e) = mk_Conn(a, RTN(es).in-p, i, IN) 
I I uaet-mk ACI'(es,ls,INDS) 
VDM Function: 
69.0 rd-Chan(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:B 
.1 pre let i E dam be st 
.2 is-ida ( (i) ) 1\ 
.3 len (i).Is > 01\ 
.4 RTN (i).protocol = CHAN in 
.5 let a E dam in 
.6 let mk-act(cs,ls, WAIT _RD) = (a) in 
.7 let s E RTN (a).sm.ss be st s.id = cs in 
.8 let op E s.ops be st op.input-parameter=f nil in 
.9 let c Edam RTN in 
.10 RTN (c) = mk-Connection (a, op.input-parameter, i, IN) 
.11 post let i E dam be st is-ida ( (i)) 1\ 
.12 RTN (i).protocol = CHAN in 
.13 let a E dam in 
.14 let mk-act(cs,ls, WAIT_RD) = (a) in 
.15 let s E RTN (a).sm.ss be st s.id = cs in 
.16 let op E s.ops be st op.input-parameter =f nil in 
.17 let e Edam RTN be st RTN (e) = mk-Conneetion (a,op.inpllt-parameter, i, IN) in 
.18 let uact = mk-act(cs, Is, ins! (RTN (a),es)) in 
.19 = t{i 1--+ tl (i).Is,op.input-parameterl--+ hd (i).Is,a 1--+ uact} 1\ 
.20 = r+[{mk-taken (nrd_inpllt-parameter")}] ; 
Write 
Plotkin Rule: 
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a,c,i E dom<J1 
<JI (i) = mkjDA(vals) 
RTN(i) = mkjDA(id,size, CHANNEL) 
size < len vals 
<J1(a) = mk_ACT(cs,ls, WAIT_WE) 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_op(id,rd, we,in-p,out-p,pre,post) E s.ops I\hd<J1 (cs).ops = id 
out-p i- nil 
RTN(c) = mk_Conn(a,RTN(cs).out-p,i,OUT) 
I I uact - mk ACT(cs,ls,INDS) 
Note, the implicit blocking caused by size < len vals. 
VDM Function: 
70.0 we-Chan(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:lR 
.I pre let i E dom be st 
.2 is-ida ( (i)) 1\ 
.3 RTN (i).size < len (i).ls 1\ 
.4 RTN (i).protocol = CHAN in 
.5 leta E dom in 
.6 let mk-act(cs, ls, WAIT_WE) = (a) in 
.7 let s E RTN (a).sm.ss be st s.id = cs in 
.8 let op E s.ops be st 0p.Olltput-reslllt i- nil in 
.9 let c E dom RTN in 
.10 RTN(c) = mk-Connection(a,op.output-result,i,OUT) 
.II post let i E dom be st is-ida ((i)) 1\ 
.12 RTN(i).protocol = CHAN in 
.13 let a E dom in 
.14 let mk-act(cs,ls, WAIT_WE) = (a) in 
.15 let s E RTN (a).sm.ss be st s.id = cs in 
.16 let op E s.ops be st 0p.Olltpllt-reslllt i- nil in 
.17 let c E dom RTN be st RTN (c) = mk-Connection (a,op.Olltpllt-reslllt,i,OUT) in 
.18 let /lact = mk-act(cs,ls, ins! (RTN (a),cs)) in 
.19 = t{i I-> (i}.lsr\. [(op.output-reslIlt)],a I-> /lact} 1\ 
.20 = r\.[{mk-token("we_outpllcres/llt")}] ; 
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C.4 Fault Semantics 
What follows in this section are the Plotkin-style SOS rules for faults considered of RTNs. We first define 
the fault transition rule which defines the fault actions at the state-machine level. 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domCJI 
CJ\ (a) = mk_act(cs,ls,mkJault(f)) 
3t E RTN(a).sm.ts ·mk Transition(src,trg,l) Asrc - cs A I-! 
I fault-transition I (0, f (RTN,CJ\, 'Tt\ res]) -+ (CJ\ t{a 1-+ mk_act(trg, Is, in.if(trg»},esU if, Jcs. Ttrg}) 
VDM Function: 
71.0 FaultTr(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,(O,[es]:) r:J8 
.I pre let a E dom in 
.2 letmk-act(cs,ls,FAULT) = (a) in 
.3 3tr E RTN (a).sm.ts· tr.src = cs A isjtr.l, Fault) 
.4 post let a E dom be st 
.5 mk-act( (a).cs, (a).ls,FAULT) = (a) in 
.6 let trERTN(a).sm.tsbest tr.src= (a).cs A isjtr.l, Fault) in 
.7 let uact = mk-act(tr.trg, (a).ls, in.if (RTN (a),tr.trg)) in 
.8 = t{a 1-+ uact} A 
.9 (0, res] = (O,[esU {mk-token ("!ault"),mk-token ("cs"), mk-token ("up_tr.trg"n] ; 
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C.4.1 Late Exit Fault 
Depending on the current state (dynamic/static), cs of an activity, the semantics for a late ail/ault are as 
follows. 
C.4.1.1 Static State 
Given the exit transition from a static state is TIme Bounded, then the rule is as follows: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domcrl 
crl (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, WAIT _TR) 
3t E RTN(a).sm.ts· mk_Transition(src, trg,mk_TImeBollnd(l,u) /\src = cs 
3 tl E inds'lt ·rcs Ej 'It(tl) Atl + I ::; tl + II < len It /\ 
~t2 E inds'lt· ~s Ej It(t2) At2 > tl 
/Illct = mk_act(cs,ls,mkJalllt(LATE_EXIT» 
I st-late-time-exit fault I ( ) s ( ) RTN,crl,'lt1 ---+ cr2,es 
(RTN,crl t{a I--> /lact} , 'It I ('\. [{late exitJalllt}]) L (cr2,es) 
VDM Function: 
72.0 stLateTImeExitFalllt(RTN :RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:lR 
.1 pre let aEdom best (a).status=WAIT_TRin 
.2 let Ir E RTN (a).sm.ls be st Ir.src = (a).cs /\ isjlr.l, TImeBollnd) in 
.3 3tl E inds . 
.4 mk-token("up3s") E (tl)/\ 
.5 11 + tr.l.lower::; II + 1r.l.llpper /\ 
.6 11 + tr.l.upper < len /\ 
.7 (-,3t2Einds . mk-token ("dwn3s") E (12)/\ 
.8 t2 > 11) 
.9 post let a E dom be st (a).status = WAIT_TR in 
.\0 let tr E RTN (a).sm.ts be st Ir.src = (a).cs /\ is_(Ir.l, TImeBOllnd) in 
.11 let tl E inds be st 
.12 mk-token("llp_cs") E (II) /\ 
.13 11 + tr.l.lower ::; t I + Ir.l.llpper /\ 
.14 11 + Ir.l.llpper < len /\ 
.15 (-,312 Einds .mk-token("dwn_cs")E (t2)/\ 
.16 12>ll)in 
.17 let Ilact = mk-act( (a).cs, (a).ls, FAULT) in 
.18 = t{ a I--> ltaCt} /\ 
.19 = ('\.[{mk-token("late_exitJa/llt"»]; 
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Given the exit transition from a static state is Event Bounded, then the rule is as follows: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domol 
01 (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, WAIT_TR) 
3t E RTN(a).sm.ts· mk_Transition(sn:, trg, mk_Event(e)) 1\Sn: = cs 
3tl'~ E inds1£·tl < ~/\ tcs Ei1£(td/\e E 1£(~)/\ 
~t2 E inds1£· lcs Ei 1£(t2)!\t2 ~ ~ 
uact = mk_act(cs,ls,mkJault(LATE_EXIT)) 
I st-Iate-event-exit-fault I ( S) RTN,OI,1£I) -+ (02,es 
(RTN,OI t{a I---> uact},1£1 '" [{late exitJault}]) L (02,es) 
VOM Function: 
73.0 stLateEventExitFault(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:, :,:) r: lR 
.1 pre let a E dom be st (a).status = WAIT_TR in 
.2 let tr E RTN (a).sm.ts be st tr.sn: = (a).cs /\ isjtr.l,Event) in 
.3 3tl,12 E inds . 
.4 tl < t2/\mk-token("llp_cs") E (tl)/\ 
.5 tr.l E (12) /\ 
.6 (-,3t3Einds ·mk-token(ndwn_cs")E (t3)/\ 
.7 t3 > t2) 
.8 postlet a E dom best (a).status= WAIT_TR in 
.9 let tr E RTN (a).sm.ts be st tr.sn: = (a).cs /\ is_(tr.l, Event) in 
.\0 let tl E inds in 
. \I let t2 E inds be st 
.12 tl < t2/\mk-token("llp_cs") E (tl) /\ 
.\3 tr.l E (t2) /\ 
.14 (-,3t3Einds .mk-token("dwn_cs")E (t3)/\ 
.15 t3 > t2) in 
.16 let uact = mk-act( (a).cs, (a).Is, FAULT) in 
.17 = t{a I---> uact} /\ 
.18 = "'[{mk-token("late_exitJallltn)}]; 
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C.4.1.2 Dynamic State 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domal 
al (a) = mk_act(es, Is, INOS} 
mk_DynamicState(id,_,mk_Bounds(beet, bert, weet)) E RTN(a}.sm.ss Aid = es 
3tl E inds1t1 . ts E 1t(tJ) All +beet~ tl +weet< len1t1 A 
~t2 E inds1tI·!;S E 1t(t2} Al2 > tl 
uaet = mk_aet( es, Is, mkJault( LATE_EXIT}) 
I . I (RTN,al t{a J--+ uaet}, 1t1 f+[{late exitJault}]) L (a2. es) 
YDM Function: 
74.0 dyLateExitFault(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:,:,:} r: B 
.I pre let a E dom be st (a}.status = INOS in 
.2 let mk-Dynamie-State(id,ops, mk-Bounds (beet, bert, weet)) E RTN (a).sm.ss be st 
.3 id = (a}.es in 
.4 3tl E inds . 
.5 mk-token("uPJs") E (tl}A 
.6 tl+beet~tl+weetA 
.7 tl + weet < len A 
.8 (-dt2 E inds . mk-token ("dwn_es") E (t2) A 
.9 t2>tl) 
.10 post let a E dom be st (a).status = IN OS in 
.11 let mk-Dynamie-State (id, ops, mk-Bounds(beet, bert, weet)) E RTN (a }.sm.ss be 5t 
.12 id= (a).esin 
.13 let tl E inds be st 
.14 mk-token("uPJsn) E (tl}A 
.15 tl + beet ~ tl + weet A 
.16 tl + weet < len in 
.17 let t2 E inds be st mk-token("dwn_esn) ft (t2) A 
.18 t2>tlin 
.19 let uaet = mk·aet( (a}.es, (a).ls, FAULT) in 
.20 = t{ a J--+ ltaet} A 
.21 = f+[{mk-token(nlate_exitJault n)}]; 
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C.4.2 Early Exit Fault 
Depending on the current state (dynamic/static), cs of an activity, the semantics for a early exil jallil are as 
follows. 
C.4.2.1 Static State 
Given the exit transition from a static state is TIme Bounded, then the rule is as follows: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domol 
01 (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, WAIT_TR) 
3t E RTN(a).sm.ls . mk_Transilion(sn:, Irg, mk_nmeBound(l, 1/)) Asn: = cs 
3 tl E inds 1t. rcs Ei 1t( II) !\ len 1t < II + I ::; tl + II !\ 
312 E inds1t· .Jcs Ei 1t(t2)!\t2 > tl 
uact = mk_acI(cs, Is, mkJalllt(EARLY _EXIT)) 
(RTN,OI t{a ....... lIact} , 1t1 f\. [{ early exilJallll} J) L (02, es) I st-early-time-exit-fault I ( ) s ( ) 
. . RTN,OI,1t1 -+ 02,es 
YOM Function: 
75.0 stEarlyTImeExitFalllt(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r: lR 
.1 pre let a E dom be st (a).status = WAIT_TR in 
.2 let tr E RTN (a).sm.ts be st Ir.sn: = (a).cs!\ is_(Ir.l, TImeBound) in 
.3 3tl E inds . 
.4 mk-token (nup_cs n ) E (II)!\ 
.5 len < t I + tr.l.lower!\ 
.6 II + tr.l.lower < tl + tr.l.upper A 
.7 (3t2 E inds . mk-token ("dwnJs") E (t2) A 
.8 t2> tl) 
.9 post let a E dom be st (a) .statlls = WAIT _ TR in 
.10 let tr E RTN (a).sm.ts be st tr.src = (a).cs!\ isjtr.l, nmeBollnd) in 
.11 let tl E inds be st 
.12 mk-token("up_cs") E (tl)A 
.\3 len <tl+lr.l.lowerA 
.14 tl + tr.l.lower < tl + tr.l.llpper!\ 
.15 (3t2 E inds . mk-token ("dwnJs") E (t2)!\ 
.16 t2 > tl) in 
.17 let uact = mk-act( (a).cs, (a).ls, FAULT) in 
.18 = t{a ....... IIllCt}!\ 
.19 = f\.[{ mk-token ("early_exitJalllt")}] ; 
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Given the exit transition from a static state is Event Bounded, then the rule is as follows: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domo) 
01 (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, WAIT_TR) 
3t E RTN(a).sm.ts·mk_Transition(sre,trg,mk_Event(e)) l\Sre = cs 
3t),~ E inds 1t. t) < ~ /\ Tcs Ei 1t(tI) /\e E 1t(~) /\ 
3t2 E inds1t· Jcs Ei 1t(t2) /\12 < ~ 
uact = mk_act(cs, Is, mkJault(EARLY _EXIT)) 
.--____ ---, (RTN,OI t{a f-+ uaCI},1t1 f'.[{early_exiIJaull}]) L (02,es) I st-early-event-exit-fault I ( s ( ) 
. . RTN,o),1tI) --> 02,es 
YOM Function: 
76.0 stEarlyEventExitFault(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:]a 
.1 pre let aEdom best (a).statlls=WAIT_TRin 
.2 let trERTN(a).sm.tsbest tr.sre= (a).cs/\isjlr.I,Event) in 
.3 3tl,t2 E inds . 
.4 tl < t2/\mk-token("up_cs") E (11)/\ 
.5 tr.l E (t2) /\ 
.6 (3t3 E inds . mk-token ("dwn_cs") E (t3)/\ 
.7 13 < (2) 
.8 postlet aEdom best (a).status=WAIT_TRin 
.9 let tr E RTN (a).sm.ts be st tr.sre = (a).cs /\ isjlr.I,Evenl) in 
.10 let tl E inds in 
.11 let t2 E inds be st 
.12 tl < t2/\ mk-token ("up_cs") E (tl)/\ 
.13 tr.1 E (t2) /\ 
.14 (3t3 E inds . mk-token ("dwn_cs") E (t3) /\ 
.15 t3 < (2) in 
.16 let uact = mk-acI( (a).cs, (a).ls, FAULT) in 
.17 = t{a f-+ uact} /\ 
.18 = f'.[{mk-token("early_exitJaull")}j; 
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C.4.2.2 Dynamic State 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domO"I 
0"1 (a) = mk_aet(es, is, INDS) 
mk_Dynamic_State(id,_,mk_Bounds(beet,bert, weet)) E RTN(a).sm.ss A id = es 
3tl E inds1t1 . ~s E 1t(t.) Atl + beet < len1t1 ::; tl +weetA 
3t2 E inds1t1 . t"s E 1t(t2) At2 < len1t1 
uaet = mk_aet(es, is,mkJault(EARLY _EXIT)) 
I . I (RTN,O"I t{a 1-+ uaet},1t/" [{early exitJalllt}]) L (0"2,es) 
VDM Function: 
77.0 dyEarlyExitFault(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:lR 
.1 pre let a E dom be st (a).status = INDS in 
.2 let mk-Dynamie-State(id,ops, mk-Bounds (beet, bert, weet)) E RTN (a).sm.ss be st 
.3 id = (a}.es in 
.4 3tl E inds . 
. 5 mk-token("up_es") E (tl)A 
.6 tl +beet::; tl +wcetA 
.7 tl + weet < len A 
.8 (3t2 E inds . mk-token ("dwn_es") E (t2) A 
.9 t2 < len) 
.10 post let a E dom be st (a}.status = INDS in 
.11 let mk-Dynamie-State (id,ops, mk-Bollnds (beet, bert, weet)) E RTN (a}.sm.ss be st 
.12 id= (a}.esin 
.13 let tl E inds be st 
.14 mk-token("up_es") E (tl) A 
.15 tl+beet::;tl+wcetA 
.16 tl + weet < len in 
.17 let t2 E inds be st mk-token ("dwnJs") E (t2) A 
.18 t2 < len in 
.19 let uaet = mk-aet( (a).es, (a).ls,FAULT) in 
.20 = t{a 1-+ uaet} A 
.21 = 0[{mk-token("early_exitJault")}]; 
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C.4.3 Read Faults 
Late Read: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E dom<fl 
<fl(a) =mk_act(es,ls,INDS) 
mk_DynamicState(id,ops,mk_Bounds(beet,ben, weet)) E RTN(a).sm.ss "id = cs 
mk_OperationC,_,_,in-p,out-p,_,_) E ops" in"'p 1= nil 
3tl E inds1t1 ·l;s E 1t(tJ) Atl + beet < len1t\" 
~t2 E inds1t\·rds(in-P) E 1t(t2)At2 > t\ 
uaet = mk_aet(es,ls,mkJault(LATE_READ)) 
I (RTN,<f\ t{a f-+ uaet},1t\ n.[{late readJalllt}]) L (<f2,es) 
YOM Function: 
78.0 lateReadFault(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:B 
.1 pre let a E dom be st (a).status = INDS in 
.2 let mk-Dynamie-State (id, ops, mk-Bounds (beet, ben, weet)) E RTN (a).sm.ss be st 
.3 id = (a).cs in 
.4 let mk-Operation (id,read, we, in-p, ollt-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be st 
.5 «a).es).ops i= 0" 
.6 hd «a).es).ops = id" 
.7 in-p i= nil in 
.8 3tl E inds . 
. 9 mk-token("up_cs") E (tl)/\ 
.10 tl+bcet<len/\ 
.11 (.., 3t2 E inds . mk-token (" rd(in-p)") E (t2) " 
.12 t2>tl) 
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.13 postlet a E dom be st (a).status = INDS in 
.14 let mk-Dynamic-State(id,ops,mk-Bounds(bcet,bcrt, wcet)) E RTN(a).sm.ss be st 
.15 id = (a).cs in 
.16 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p, out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be st 
.17 «a).cs).ops =I 0 /\ 
.18 hd «a).cs).ops = id /\ 
.19 in-p =# nil in 
.20 let tl E inds be st 
.21 mk-token('up_cS')E (tl)/\ 
.22 tl + bcet < len /\ 
.23 (-,312 E inds ·mk-token(·rd(in....P)·)E (12)/\ 
.24 t2> tl) in 
.25 let uact = mk-act( (a).cs, (a).ls, FAULT) in 
.26 = t{ a 1-+ uact} /\ 
.27 = "'[{mk-token("lateJeadJault")}]; 
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Early Read: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domcrl 
crl (a) = mk_act(es,ls, INOS) 
mk_Dynamic_State(id,ops,mk_Bounds(beet,bert, weet)) E RTN(a).sm.ss /I id = es 
mk_OperationL,_,_, in-fJ,out-fJ,_,_) E ops /I in"p '" nil 
3 tl E inds XI . ts E 1t(tl) /I 
3t2 E inds1t1 . rds(in-fJ) E 1t(t2) /lt2 < tl 
uaet = mk_act(es,ls,mkJault(EARLY _REAO)) 
I I (RTN, crl t{a 1-+ uaet}, 1t1 f>- [{earlYJeadJault})) L (cr2,es) 
. dy·early·read·fault s (RTN,crl,1tJ) -> (cr2,es) 
VOM Function: 
79.0 earlyReadFault(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:B 
.I pre let aEdom best (a).status=INOSin 
.2 let mk·Dynamie-State (id, ops, mk·Bounds (beet, bert, weet» E RTN (a ).sm.ss be st 
.3 id= (a).esin 
.4 let mk-Operation(id,read, we,in-p,out-p,preC,postC) E RTN(a).ops be 51 
.5 «a).es).ops '" 0 /I 
.6 hd «a).es).ops=id/l 
.7 in-p '" nil in 
.8 3tl Einds ·mk-token("up_es")E (11)/\ 
.9 (3t2 E inds ·mk-Ioken("rd(in-fJ)") E (t2)/\ 
.10 t2<tI) 
.11 post let a E dom be st (a).status = IN OS in 
.12 let mk-Dynamie-State (id, ops, mk-Bounds (beet, bert, weet)) E RTN (a).sm .ss be st 
.13 id= (a).esin 
.14 let mk.Operation(id, read, we,in-p,out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be st 
.15 «a).es).ops'" 0 /\ 
.16 hd «a).es).ops = id /\ 
.17 in-p", nil in 
.18 let 11 E inds best mk-token("uPJs") E (/1)/1 
.19 (3/2 E inds .mk-token("rd(in-fJ)") E (/2) /I 
.20 12 < tI) in 
.21 let uaet = mk-ae/( (a).es, (a).Is, FAULT) in 
.22 = t{ a 1-+ uae/} /\ 
.23 = f>-[{mk-token("earlYJeadJault")}]; 
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Value Read: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domO') 
0') (a) =mk_act(cs,IS,INDS) 
0'1 (cs).ops # [] 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id, rd, we, in-p, out-p,pre,post) E elemss.ops A helO'I (cs).ops = id 
in-p # nil,out-p = nil 
(in-p,RTN,O'I)!!!.. v 
Is' = Is t{in-P ...... v} 
(pre, Is) ..:.... false 
uact = mk_act(cs, Is', mkJault(vALUE_READ)) 
I I 
(RTN,O'I t{ a ...... uact,cs ...... 110'1 (cs).ops}, XI f\. [{ni(in-p), vallie readJall/r}j).!.... (0'2. es ) 
dy-value-read-fault J 
'--------' (RTN,O'I,1tI) -+ (0'2,es) 
VDM Function: 
80.0 va[ueReadFau!t(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:1R 
.I pre let a E dom be st is) (a),act) in 
.2 let mk-act(cs,ls,INDS) = (a) in 
.3 let mk-Operation(id,read, we,in-p,out-p,preC,postC) E RTN(a).ops be st 
.4 (cs).ops # 0 A 
.5 hd (cs).ops = id A 
.6 in-p # nil A 
.7 out-p = nil in 
.8 let inp E RTN (a).input-ponsbe st 
.9 inp.id = in-p in 
.10 let Is' = (a).lst{inp.id ...... rdpon(inp,)} in 
.II ...,expr (preC, Is') 
.12 post let a E dom be st 
.13 ((a).cs).ops # 0 in 
.14 let opERTN(a).opsbest 
.15 hd ((a).cs).ops = op.id A 
.16 op.input-parameter # nil in 
.17 let inp E RTN(a).input-ponsbe st 
.18 inp.id = op.input-parameter in 
.19 let Is':ld~ Varbest 
.20 Is' = (a).lst{inp.id ...... nipon(inp,)} A 
.21 ...,expr(op.preC, (a).ls') in 
.22 let uact = mk-act(cs, Is', FAULT) in 
.23 = t{cs ...... II (cs).ops,a ...... uact} A 
.24 = f\.[{mk-token("rd(in-p)"),mk-token("vallleJeadJall[t")}]; 
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Omit Read: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domal 
al (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, INOS) 
mk_DynamicState(id,ops,mk_Bounds(bcet,bcrt, wcet)) E RTN(a).sm.ss 1\ id = es 
mk_OperationC,_,_,in-p,out-p,_,_) E ops 1\ in-p '" nil 
3tl,t2 E inds7tI·l:;SE;7t(tl)I\.1:"sE;7t(t2)I\ 
~t2 E inds 7t1 . rds(in-p) E 7t(Iz) 1\11 < 1'2'5 t1 
uact = mk_act(cs,ls,mkJault(OMIT_REAO)) 
I' I (RTN,att{al-+uact},7t/"[{omit readJault}])L..(a2,es) 
dy-omlt-read-fault s (RTN,al,7tI) -+ (a2,es) 
VOM Function: 
81.0 OmitReadFault(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:, :,:) r: lR 
.1 pre let a E dom be st (a).status = INOS in 
.2 let mk-Dynamic-State{id, ops, mk-Bounds (beet, bcrt, weet)) E RTN (a ).sm.ss be sl 
.3 id = (a).cs in 
.4 let mk-Operation (id, read, we,in-p,out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be st 
.5 «a).cs).ops i- 01\ 
.6 hd «a).cs).ops = id 1\ 
.7 in-p i- nil in 
.8 3tl,t2Einds ·mk-token("up_cs")E (tl)/\mk-token("dwnJs")E (t2)/\ 
.9 (.3t3 E inds . 
. 10 mk-token("rd(in-p)") E (t2) 1\ 
.11 tl < t3/\ 
.12 t3 ~ t2) 
.13 post let a E dom be st (a).status = IN OS in 
.14 let mk-Dynamic-State {id,ops,mk-Bounds(beet, bcrt, weet)) E RTN (a).sm.ss be sl 
.15 id = (a).cs in 
.16 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p, out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a ).ops be st 
.17 «a).cs).opsi- 0 /\ 
.18 hd «a).cs).ops = id /\ 
.19 in-p i- nil in 
.20 let tiE inds in 
.21 let t2 E inds be st mk-token (nup_cs") E (tl) /\ mk-token ("dwn_cs") E (t2) /\ 
.22 (. 3t3 E inds . 
. 23 mk-token ("rd(in-p)") E (t2) /\ 
.24 tl < t3/\ 
.25 t3 ~ t2) in 
.26 let lIact= mk-act( (a).cs, (a).ls,FAULT) in 
.27 = t{ a 1-+ IIaCt} /\ 
.28 = f"+[ {mk-token (. omicreadJault·)} 1 ; 
230 
APPENDIX C. VDM TOOL SUPPORT FOR SOS DEFINITIONS 
C.4.4 Write Faults 
Late Write: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domol 
01 (a) =mk_act(es,ls,INDS) 
mk_DynamicState(id,ops,mk_Bounds(beet,ben, weet)) E RTN(a).sm.ss 1\ id = cs 
mk_OperationL,_,_, in...]J,out...]J,_,_) E ops I\out...]J 1= nil 
3tl,t2 E inds1tl· tSE;1t(tl)I\ ~SE;1t(tl)I\ 
~Iz E inds1tl·wds(out...]J) E 1t(Iz)I\1z > t2 
uaet = mk_aet(es,ls,mkJault(LATE_WRITE)) 
I . I (RTN,ot t {a 1--+ uaet}, 1t1 0.- [{late_writeJault}]) L (02,es) . dy-Iate-wnte-fault . s ~ ___ ---.J (RTN,OI, 1tI) --+ (02,es) 
YOM Function: 
82.0 lateWriteFault(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:B 
.1 pre let a E dom be st (a).status = INDS in 
.2 let mk-Dynamie-State (id, ops, mk-Bounds (beet, ben, weet» E RTN (a) .sm .ss be 51 
.3 id = (a).es in 
.4 let mk-Operation(id,read, we,in-p,out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be 5t 
.5 «a).es).ops1= 0 1\ 
.6 hd «a).es).ops = id 1\ 
.7 out-p 1= nil in 
.8 :3tI,t2 E ind5 . mk-token (nup_es n) E (tI)I\mk-token(ndwn3sn) E (t2) 1\ 
.9 ( -d t3 E inds . mk-token (n we( out...]J) n) E (t3) 1\ 
.10 t3 > t2) 
.11 post let aEdom best (a).status=INDSin 
.12 let mk-Dynamie-State (id, ops, mk-Bounds (beet, ben, weet» E RTN (a).sm.ss be 5t 
.13 id= (a).esin 
.14 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p, out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be 51 
.15 «a).es).ops 1= [] 1\ 
.16 hd «a).es).ops = id 1\ 
.17 out-p 1= nil in 
.18 let tl E inds in 
.19 let t2 E inds be st mk-token (nup_es n) E (tI) 1\ mk-token (ndwn_es n) E (12) 1\ 
.20 ( -.3 t3 E inds . mk-token (n we( out...]J) n) E (t3) 1\ 
.21 t3 > t2) in 
.22 let uaet = mk-aet( (a).es, (a).ls, FAULT) in 
.23 = t {a 1--+ l«let} 1\ 
.24 = 0.-[{ mk-token (nlate_writeJaultn)} 1 ; 
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Early Write: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domO'I 
0'1 (a) =mk_act(cs,ls,INDS) 
mkJ)ynamic_State(id,ops,mk_Bounds(bcet,bcn, wcet)) E RTN(a).sm.ss A id = es 
mk_OperationC,_,_,in""p,out....p,_,_) E ops Aout""p of; nil 
3 tl, t2 E inds XI . ts E; X(tl)A $:s E; X(t2) A 
312 E inds XI . wds(out""p) E x(12) A12 < t~ 
uact = mk_act(cs,ls,mkJault{EARLY _ WRITE)) 
I : I (RTN,0'1t{al-+uact},xl("\.[{early_writeJault}])L(0'2,es) . dy-early-wnte-fault . s L..:.._-=--__ -.J (RTN,O'I,X.) -+ (0'2,es) 
YDM Function: 
83.0 earlyWriteFault (RTN: RTN-Types, :,:,:,:) r: 1R 
.I pre let a E dom be st (a).status = INDS in 
.2 let mk-Dynamic-State(id,ops,mk-Bollnds{bcet,ben, weet» E RTN (a).sm.ss be st 
.3 id = (a).cs in 
.4 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p,ollt-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be st 
.5 «a).cs).ops of; 0 A 
.6 hd «a).cs).ops = id t\ 
.7 Ollt-p of; nil in 
.8 3tl,t2Einds ·mk-token{"llp_cS")E {tl)Amk-token("dwn_cs")E (t2) A 
.9 (3t3 E inds . mk-token ("we(ollt....p)") E (t3) A 
.10 t3 < t2) 
.II post let aEdom best (a).statllS=INDSin 
.12 let mk-Dynamic-State(id,ops,mk-Bounds(bcet,bcn, weet)) E RTN (a).sm.ss be st 
.13 id= (a).csin 
.14 let mk-Operation (id,read, we,in-p,out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be st 
.15 «a).cs).ops of; 0 A 
.16 hd «a).cs).ops = id A 
.17 Ollt-p of; nil in 
.18 let tl E inds in 
.19 let t2 E inds be st mk-token ("IlP_CS") E (tl) Amk-token ("dwn_cs") E (t2) A 
.20 (3t3 E inds . mk-token(" we (Ollt....p) ") E (t3) A 
.21 t3 < t2) in 
.22 let Ilact = mk-act( {a).cs, (a).ls, FAULT) in 
.23 = t{a 1-+ IWCt} A 
.24 = ("\.[ {mk-token (" early_writeJalllt")} 1 ; 
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Value Write: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domal 
al (a) = mk_act(cs, Is, INDS) 
al (cs).ops '" [] 
s E RTN(a).sm.ss 
mk_Operation(id,rd, we,in"'p,out"'p,pre,post) E elem5s.ops"hdal (cs).ops = id 
in"'p = nil,out"'p '" nil 
(out...p, v',ls) ~ IS 
(post, Is') .::.... false 
uact = mk_act(cs,Is',mkJault(VALUE_ WRITE» 
(RTN, al t{a ...... uact,cs >-+ tlal (cs).OpS},1t1 n.. [{ we(ollt...p), vallie writeJalllt}]) L (a2,es) I dy-value-write-fault I ( s) 
. RTN,al,1t.) --> (a2,es 
VDM Function: 
84.0 valueWriteFault(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r: B 
.I pre let a E dom be 5t isj (a), act) in 
.2 let mk-act(cs,ls, INDS) = (a) in 
.3 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p, ollt-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be 51 
.4 (cs).ops'" D" 
.5 hd (cs).ops = id" 
.6 in-p '" nil " 
.7 out-p = nil in 
.8 let inp E RTN (a).input-ports be st 
.9 inp.id = in-p in 
.10 let Is' = (a).ls t{inp.id ...... rdport(inp,)} in 
.11 expr(preC,ls') " 
.12 let outp E RTN (a).output-portsbe st 
.13 outp.id = out-p in 
.14 let Is" : Id .!!!.. Var in 
.15 3v: Var· 
.16 Is" = (a).ls t Is' t{ outp.id ...... weport(outp, v,))" 
.17 -,expr(postC,Is") 
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.18 post let a E dom be st 
.19 «a).cs).ops =1= 0 in 
.20 let op E RTN (a) .ops be st 
.21 hd «a).cs).ops = op.id t\ 
.22 op.input-parameter =1= nil in 
.23 let inp E RTN(a).input-pons be st 
.24 inp.id = op.input-parameterin 
.25 let Ii: Id .!!!... Var be st 
.26 li = (a ).Is t{inp.id I-> rdpon (inp,)) t\ 
.27 expr(op.preC, (a).Ii) in 
.28 let outp E RTN (a ).output-pons be st 
.29 outp.id = op.output-result in 
.30 let Ii': Id.!!!... Var be st 
.31 3v: Var· 
.32 Ii' = (a).Lst Ii t{olltp.id ...... wepon(outp, v,)} /\ 
.33 --.expr(op.postC,ls") in 
.34 let uact = mk-act(cs,li,FAULT) in 
.35 = t{cs I-> tl (cs).ops,al->uact}/\ 
.36 = ("'\.[{mk-token (" rd{in-p) "),mk-token ("value_writeJault"))] ; 
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Omit Write: 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E doma\ 
a\ (a) = mk_act(cs,ls, INDS) 
mk_DynamiCState(id,ops,mk_Bounds(bcet,bcn, wcet» E RTN(a).sm.ss\ id = cs 
mk_Operationc,_,_, in...jJ,out...jJ,_,_) E ops /\out...jJ =I- nil 
3 t\, t2 E inds 1t\ . l;s Ei 1t(td/\ ts Ei 1t(t2) 1\ 
~t2 E inds1t\·wds(out...jJ) E 1t(t2)M\ < t2 ~ 12 
uact = mk_act( cs, Is, mkJault( 0 M IT_WRITE» 
I .. I (RTN,a\ t {a ...... uact},1t\ r.[{omicwriteJault}]) L (a2,es) 
. dy-omlt-wnte-fault . s (RTN, a\, 1td ---+ (a2, es) 
VDM Function: 
85.0 OmitWriteFault(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r:B 
.I pre let a E dom be 5t (a).status = INDS in 
.2 let mk-Dynamic-State (id, ops, mk-Bounds (bcet, bcn, wcet» E RTN (a) .sm .ss be st 
.3 id= (a).csin 
.4 let mk-Operation (id, read, we,in-p,out-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be 51 
.5 ((a).cs).ops =I- 0 /\ 
.6 hd ((a).cs).ops = id /\ 
.7 out-p =I- nil in 
.8 3tl, t2 E ind5 . mk-Ioken (nup_cs n) E (tl) /\ mk-Ioken (ndwn3s") E (t2) /\ 
.9 (...,3t3 E inds . 
. IO mk-token (n wee out...jJ)") E (t2) 1\ 
.11 tl<t3/\ 
.12 t3 ~ t2) 
.13 post let a E dom be sl (a).status = INDS in 
.14 let mk-Dynamic-State (id,ops, mk-BO/lnds (bcet,bcn, wcet» E RTN (a).sm.ss be 51 
.15 id= (a).csin 
.16 let mk-Operation (id, read, we, in-p, ollt-p,preC,postC) E RTN (a).ops be 51 
.17 ((a).cs).ops =I- 0 /\ 
.18 hd ((a).cs).ops = id /\ 
.19 out-p =I- nil in 
.20 let tIE inds in 
.21 leI t2 E ind5 be 51 mk-loken (nllp_CS n ) E (tl) /\ mk-Ioken ("dwn_cs") E (t2) /\ 
.22 (...,3t3 E inds . 
. 23 mk-token (nwe(out...jJ)n) E (t2) /\ 
.24 tl < t3/\ 
.25 t3 ~ t2) in 
.26 leI /lact = mk-act( (a).cs, (a).Is, FAULT) in 
.27 = t{a ...... uact} /\ 
.28 = r.[{mk-loken(" omiU1.·riteJaultnH] ; 
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C.4.S Crash Faults 
Plotkin Rule: 
a E domol 
01 (a) = mk_acl(cs,ls, (NOS) 
:3 II E inds x I . l;s E; x( II) /\ 
~/2 E indsXI· !:sE;X(t2)1\t2 > tl 
uacl = mk_acI(cs,ls,mkJault(CRASH)) 
I dy-crash-fauIt r (RTN,OI t {a I--> uact}, XI "- [{crashJault}]) .!... (02, es) 
'"-----' (RTN,OI,XI).2.. (02,es) 
VDM Function: 
86.0 crashFault(RTN: RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r: B 
.1 pre let a E dom be st (a).status = (NOS in 
.2 let mk-Dynamic-State (id, ops, mk-Bollnds (bcet, bcrt, wcet)) E RTN (a) .sm .ss be sl 
.3 id = (a).cs in 
.4 :3 tl E inds . mk-token ("llp_CS") E (tl) /\ 
.5 (-dt2Einds ·mk-token("dwn_cs")E (t2)/\ 
.6 t2>tl) 
.7 post let a E dom be st (a).status = (NOS in 
.8 let mk-Dynamic-State(id,ops, mk-Bollnds(bcet, bcrt, wcet)) E RTN (a).sm.ss be 51 
.9 id = (a).cs in 
.10 let tl E inds be 51 mk-token ("up_cs") E (tl) in 
.II let t2 E inds be st mk-token ("dwn_cs") ri (t2) /\ 
.12 t2 > tl in 
.13 let uact = mk-act( (a).cs, (a).ls, FAULT) in 
.14 = t{a I--> IwCt} /\ 
.15 = "-[{ mk-token ("late3xitJalllt")}] 
C.S Implementation Considerations 
"Concurrency is present in labelled transition systems (LTSs) only as an interpretation of 
non-determinism." [Pay93] 
We require a transition system which distinguishes between the intermediate states -configurations- during 
an evaluation of an RTN. This requires a fine-grained semantics which is commonly referred to as a small 
step semantic, which requires judgements for single steps in the evaluation. Conversely, a large step 
semantics is one which evaluates a construct (in our case an RTN) and returns the final state and trace. 
The semantic rules we have derived and described previously are sufficiently fine-grained and constitute a 
small step semantic. 
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Addressing the issue of concurrency, having a static specification (rtn), the interpretation of concurrency is 
clear. Given a configuration (RTN, (JI,XI), any rules whoms premises are satisfied should fire concurrently 
and introduce concurrency into our semantics. 
C.S.l An Executable Specification (for Animation) 
The implication to implement ~ is to consider ramifying the results of the (powerset) relation...!.... Consid-
ering an implementation of...!... we explore an executable specification of"'!'" in VDM-SL. This exploration 
unveils the pitfalls of giving an executable specification [Fuc92, HJ89] of a predicate, requiring we ramify 
the resulting set of configurations. Three possible implementations are considered and contrasted and a 
final decision made. We motivate the benefits of such a model and outline its contribution to first the ver-
ification of the SOS rules, and secondly, its contribution to animating the semantics in an interpreter-like 
fashion. 
To design and specify the semantics of a programming Ispecification language involves a number of clerical 
task, such as rendering, type-checking and animation. Tools help elevate some of this burden as well as 
impose confidence in the validity of the specifications. However, the tools currently availahle [tea94, 
vDHK96] exhibit considerable variation in their sophistication. 
We begin by exploring the benefits of using the VDMToolsand draw observations from our own work 
which then motivates a switch to using existing tool support - LETOS [Har97]. Our key observation is 
supported by the work that surrounds LETOS, for which we give an introduction. The issues with regards 
animation are a running theme throughout the discussion. 
C.S.I.1 Modelling non-determinism 
Adopting the Plotkin-style rule format, the issue of concurrency and non-determinism is factored out to a 
"meta-level". It is this meta-level that is of interest here. Although the notation used separates out the issue 
of the order in which to apply the rules from that of the relation between states, the complication of writing 
a function which directly defines the set of all possible states remains [Jon03). 
Whatever the origin of the non-determinism, it is clear that 
exec: RTN x E x n -+ E x n 
does not capture the semantics intent. A move to producing a set of states, as in 
exec: RTN x E x n -+ P (E x n) 
is not convenient because of the need to ramify the combinations. The key advantage of a rule format such 
as: 
a E domol 
;S_(JI (a), act) 
~tr E RTN(a).sm.ts· (r.src = 01 (a).cs 
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is that it provides a natural way of expressing the relation 
~ :P«RTN x Ex TI) x Ex TI) 
Given this relation, we wish to specify the "meta-level" with a predicate such as: 
87.0 strans(RTN:RTN-Types,:,:,:,:) r: B 
.J post if all-term (RTN,,) 
.2 then = /\ = 
.3 else let mk- (,) = ex-strans(RTN,,) in 
.4 3:,: ·strans(RTN",,)/\ = /\ = ; 
which specifies entirely the non-determinism in our model expressed in the ~ relation. 
We are now interested in modelling this non-determinism in an explicit executable VDM-SL model, and 
the next section articulates our ideas on how to animate our semantics. 
C.S.1.2 Implementation in the VDMTools 
From the set of SOS rules as described in Section 5.2.1, we represent each rule as an explicit VDM-SL 
function. However, VDM-SL -as implemented in the VDMTools- prohibits specifying a mechanism that 
chooses the next rule to fire in a configurations (RTN, a I, xd non-deterministically. We address this issue 
and those described previously. We assume a set of function identifiers, which are the identifiers to the 
explicit specifications of our SOS rules, form a set (world) which represents the total options for making a 
transition in our semantic model. From this set, we can find the subset of enabled functions whose premises 
are true in a given configuration. From this set, enabled we can specify non-deterministically which rule 
to fire. However, the VDM-SL implementation will always choose the same element from a set. 
The remaining issue is given the set of enabled functions, should we evaluate each element i) in tum, ii) in 
parallel, or iii) recursively. We now specify an implementation of this "meta-level" as exec 10. exec20 and 
exec30 respectively and discuss the merits for each. 
Three possible implementations of the "meta-level" 
First, that the execution is based on recursion where one of the enabled functions from (ai, XI) is evaluated, 
then recurse until all activities in the network have terminated. 
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88.0 exec: RTN -Types x x ~ y 
.1 exec{RTN,,) ~ 
.2 ihall-term(RTN,,) 
.3 then letf E select (world, n, R1N,,) in 
.4 casesf: 
.5 F I -4 let mk- (,) = fl (R1N,,) in 
.6 exec (R1N,,), 
.7 F2 -4 let mk- (,) = f2 (RTN,,) in 
.8 exec! R1N" ) 
.9 end 
.10 else mk- (,); 
• This implementation returns one of the possible traces. 
Secondly, that all enabled functions in (0'1, XI) are executed in parallel and thc rc\ulting C(lnfigurati(ln~ 
ramified. This relies on the fact the rules are non-interfering 3. 
89.0 exec2: RTN-Types x x -+ x 
.1 exec2(RTN,,) ~ 
.2 if ,all-term (RTN,,) 
.3 then let enabled = select (world, {}, RTN. ,) in 
A let mk- (,) = merge-all ({ casesf: 
.5 FI-+fl(RTN.,), 
.6 F2-+f2(RTN .. ) 
.7 end I 
.8 f E enabled}) in 
.9 exec2 (RTN,,) 
.10 elsemk-(,); 
• This implementation returns the ramified set of allthc possible IracL" 
Thirdly, that all enabled functions in (aI.xI) are cxecuted recursively. in that each function i, evaluatcd on 
the result of the previous recursivc step. until all activilie'o are Ierminatcd. 
90.0 exec3: RTN-Types x x -+ x 
.1 exec3 (RTN,,) ~ 
, if ,all-tenn (RTN,,) 
.3 then let enabled = select (lI'orld. n, RTN. ,) in 
..l let mk- (. ) = recllrse (enabled, RTN. , ) in 
.5 exec3 (RTN.,) 
.6 else mk- (, ); 
'Each activity is essentially a sequential loop (with JX",ible non-delenniniqic path.,) 001) one rule for one acti\~1y .. ,II be ahle ,,, 
·fire·. therefore ~e can be sure another rule will nol interfere 
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• This implementation returns the greedy semantics, such that all the possible execution paths are 
evaluated and ramified. 
Discussion 
Each proposal proposal has its merits, but only one realises an adequate specification of the concurrency 
& non-determinism required - that is exec3(). However, exec3 is more complicated than it first appears. 
Its caIl to an auxiliary function, recurse hides the detail that each SOS rule enabled in the configuration 
(RTN, (II, xI) is executed in a fashion that the state is ramified on conclusion. The function. Tf'ClIrse relies 
on the atomicity of the SOS rules and being non-interfering. 
91.0 recurse :func-set x RTN-Types x x -> X 
.1 recurse(e,RTN,,) ~ 
.2 if e i {} 
.3 then letf E e in 
.4 let mk- (,) = casesf: 
.5 FI ->fl (RTN,,), 
.6 F2 -> f2 (RTN,,) 
.7 end in 
.8 recurse (e \ if}, RTN,,) 
.9 else mk- (,) 
The call to recllrse in exec3 is: 
recurse(enabled,RTN, (II, XI) 
from which recurse recursively caIls itself until all the enabled rules originally specified to it have been 
executed _ this is therefore a greedy semantic. The recursively call with reclIrse is: 
recurse( enabled 
setj,RTN, cr',~) 
wheref is the function last to be executed which produced the new state (cr') and trace (~). The choice of 
which function to execute is made non-deterministically4 by selecting a function identifier from enabled. 
it is then executed to produce (cr'~). 
4Thou
o
h the VDMTooiswill always choose the same element from a -et on each execution 
.. 
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